The recent terrorist attacks on security personnel in Balochistan and the suicide attack in Islamabad have rung alarm bells about the resurgence of the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It is intriguing to attempt understand how the once defeated terrorist group has revitalized itself and has reemerged as a threat to Pakistan's internal security. Pakistan's failed 'stick and carrot' policy regarding the TTP and the support of the Afghan Taliban, coupled with wider geopolitical developments have brought about the Taliban's recent resurgence in Pakistan.
For the longest time, Pakistan orchestrated and propagated a dichotomy between the 'Good Taliban' and 'Bad Taliban,' and offered many explanations enunciating the differences between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. However, they had only one major difference: the former had secret bases in Pakistan and was active against the Afghan government, while the latter had secret bases in Afghanistan and was involved in terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan provided safe havens to Afghan Taliban leaders, military assistance to the fighters, and medical facilities to the injured, with the hope to use them in Afghanistan against the Afghan nationalists who did not recognize the Durand Line, as well as to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's other miscalculation was that the Afghan Taliban, once in power, will force the TTP to stop terrorism in Pakistan.
What Pakistan’s geniuses of Afghan policy failed to recognize is that both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban have the same sectarian leanings, Jihadi ideologies, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, and above all, many TTP members have pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban's pseudo-Islamist state. It was illogical to assume that two outfits with the same ideology would end up at loggerheads the way Pakistan intended. Regarding the TTP, the Afghan Taliban pursued the same strategy that Pakistan followed regarding the Afghan Taliban: secretly supporting the group while not recognizing it openly, simultaneously suggesting peace talks as the only long-term solution.
Pakistan had joined the US in the 'War on Terror' after 9/11, despite its close relations with the Afghan Taliban. However, it continued its secret support of the Afghan Taliban parallelly. Pakistan was apparently of the view that there is no military solution to the Afghan fiasco and it can only be settled through negotiated settlements. Pakistan supported the Taliban to strengthen its ‘strategic depth,’ and to use the group to further its interests in Afghanistan. After the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Prime Minister Imran Khan declared the Taliban's takeover of Kabul as ‘breaking the chains of slavery’, while the then ISI chief, General Faiz Hameed, gave the assurance, with a smile of a triumphant soldier, that ‘everything will be alright’ in Afghanistan. The calculations appear to have misfired.
Pakistan still yields influence over the Taliban regime, and they listen to its reservations. But at the same time, it must be reckoned with that the Afghan Taliban value their independence and that they are not dependent on Pakistan. As with their relations with the TTP, the incumbent Afghan regime retorts that they have no influence over the insurgent group, and has advised Pakistan to settle their issues with the group amicably. Whether it was Karzai and Ghani or now the Taliban regime, Pakistan’s concerns about the TTP remain the same after being involved in all of these violent “games of thrones”. With no cross-border help, it is almost impossible to completely eradicate terrorism in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban remained supportive of Pakistan as their interests aligned, but when Pakistan could not do much for them post their recapture of power in 2021, they showed their true colors. The Taliban regime demonstrated that "there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests" in foreign relations.
Pakistan initially trod on the path of normalization of relations with the TTP, as advised by the Afghan Taliban. Reportedly, some five hundred TTP terrorists were allowed to resettle in Pakistan's tribal regions to build confidence between the parties. The Pashtun nationalist groups in Pakistan, such as PTM, raised concerns over it, but were overlooked. After wasting two years in negotiations, Pakistan seems to be back where it was before, only allowing the Taliban to strengthen their roots and regroup.
One geopolitical factor that is making rounds is that America is organizing anti-Taliban groups, such as the Northern Alliance and other nationalists, in Afghanistan against the Taliban to create instability in the region. The recent media coverage of the Taliban banning girls' education in Afghanistan by the Western media is said to aim at creating public opinion in favor of upcoming adventures. Any instability in the region is of great concern for China and the Central Asian states along with Pakistan, who have all played a key role in the Taliban's consolidation of power. The catastrophe was predicted when America haphazardly left Afghanistan, without any intra-Afghanistan dialogue, leaving disgruntled groups looking for opportunities to recuperate. The Taliban’s stubbornness regarding not including opponents in the government further aggravated the situation. Pakistan needs to be cautious in its policy regarding future misadventures in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has always been actively embroiled in Afghanistan's internal politics since the 1970s: from fighting the 'Godless Soviets' to the internal clashes between the Mujahideen warlords and the War on Terror, to the Taliban's recapture of power in 2021. Pakistan has only gained pitiful amounts of military and economic assistance for its role in Afghanistan, but the damages that it has concurred, in the form of lives lost and infrastructural destruction, far outweigh the benefits. It is time that Pakistan disassociates itself from Afghanistan's internal politics and starts guarding its own borders.
The Afghan Taliban and the TTP are basically ‘two sides of the same coin’: they just happen to exist on different sides of the Durand Line. Both have this naïve obsession with establishing an ‘Islamic State’, besides sharing the dream of a greater ‘Pashtunistan’. Dealing with both these groups needs separate policies. While the TTP demands a 'carrot-and-stick' policy: using power when necessary and negotiating when the outfit is ready to give concessions. On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban now function as a de facto state, warranting dealings worthy of a state. Tribal jirgas, religious clerics, and warlords such as Siraj-Uddin Haqqani should be employed as a tool of influence over the Taliban regime. Only the right decisions at this crucial juncture can save Pakistan from being engulfed in another wave of terrorism, and the destruction of previous wars should serve as a reminder that we cannot afford to be bogged down with a serious terrorism problem again.
For the longest time, Pakistan orchestrated and propagated a dichotomy between the 'Good Taliban' and 'Bad Taliban,' and offered many explanations enunciating the differences between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. However, they had only one major difference: the former had secret bases in Pakistan and was active against the Afghan government, while the latter had secret bases in Afghanistan and was involved in terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan provided safe havens to Afghan Taliban leaders, military assistance to the fighters, and medical facilities to the injured, with the hope to use them in Afghanistan against the Afghan nationalists who did not recognize the Durand Line, as well as to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's other miscalculation was that the Afghan Taliban, once in power, will force the TTP to stop terrorism in Pakistan.
What Pakistan’s geniuses of Afghan policy failed to recognize is that both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban have the same sectarian leanings, Jihadi ideologies, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, and above all, many TTP members have pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban's pseudo-Islamist state. It was illogical to assume that two outfits with the same ideology would end up at loggerheads the way Pakistan intended. Regarding the TTP, the Afghan Taliban pursued the same strategy that Pakistan followed regarding the Afghan Taliban: secretly supporting the group while not recognizing it openly, simultaneously suggesting peace talks as the only long-term solution.
Pakistan had joined the US in the 'War on Terror' after 9/11, despite its close relations with the Afghan Taliban. However, it continued its secret support of the Afghan Taliban parallelly. Pakistan was apparently of the view that there is no military solution to the Afghan fiasco and it can only be settled through negotiated settlements. Pakistan supported the Taliban to strengthen its ‘strategic depth,’ and to use the group to further its interests in Afghanistan. After the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Prime Minister Imran Khan declared the Taliban's takeover of Kabul as ‘breaking the chains of slavery’, while the then ISI chief, General Faiz Hameed, gave the assurance, with a smile of a triumphant soldier, that ‘everything will be alright’ in Afghanistan. The calculations appear to have misfired.
Pakistan still yields influence over the Taliban regime, and they listen to its reservations. But at the same time, it must be reckoned with that the Afghan Taliban value their independence and that they are not dependent on Pakistan. As with their relations with the TTP, the incumbent Afghan regime retorts that they have no influence over the insurgent group, and has advised Pakistan to settle their issues with the group amicably. Whether it was Karzai and Ghani or now the Taliban regime, Pakistan’s concerns about the TTP remain the same after being involved in all of these violent “games of thrones”. With no cross-border help, it is almost impossible to completely eradicate terrorism in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban remained supportive of Pakistan as their interests aligned, but when Pakistan could not do much for them post their recapture of power in 2021, they showed their true colors. The Taliban regime demonstrated that "there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests" in foreign relations.
Pakistan initially trod on the path of normalization of relations with the TTP, as advised by the Afghan Taliban. Reportedly, some five hundred TTP terrorists were allowed to resettle in Pakistan's tribal regions to build confidence between the parties. The Pashtun nationalist groups in Pakistan, such as PTM, raised concerns over it, but were overlooked. After wasting two years in negotiations, Pakistan seems to be back where it was before, only allowing the Taliban to strengthen their roots and regroup.
One geopolitical factor that is making rounds is that America is organizing anti-Taliban groups, such as the Northern Alliance and other nationalists, in Afghanistan against the Taliban to create instability in the region. The recent media coverage of the Taliban banning girls' education in Afghanistan by the Western media is said to aim at creating public opinion in favor of upcoming adventures. Any instability in the region is of great concern for China and the Central Asian states along with Pakistan, who have all played a key role in the Taliban's consolidation of power. The catastrophe was predicted when America haphazardly left Afghanistan, without any intra-Afghanistan dialogue, leaving disgruntled groups looking for opportunities to recuperate. The Taliban’s stubbornness regarding not including opponents in the government further aggravated the situation. Pakistan needs to be cautious in its policy regarding future misadventures in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has always been actively embroiled in Afghanistan's internal politics since the 1970s: from fighting the 'Godless Soviets' to the internal clashes between the Mujahideen warlords and the War on Terror, to the Taliban's recapture of power in 2021. Pakistan has only gained pitiful amounts of military and economic assistance for its role in Afghanistan, but the damages that it has concurred, in the form of lives lost and infrastructural destruction, far outweigh the benefits. It is time that Pakistan disassociates itself from Afghanistan's internal politics and starts guarding its own borders.
The Afghan Taliban and the TTP are basically ‘two sides of the same coin’: they just happen to exist on different sides of the Durand Line. Both have this naïve obsession with establishing an ‘Islamic State’, besides sharing the dream of a greater ‘Pashtunistan’. Dealing with both these groups needs separate policies. While the TTP demands a 'carrot-and-stick' policy: using power when necessary and negotiating when the outfit is ready to give concessions. On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban now function as a de facto state, warranting dealings worthy of a state. Tribal jirgas, religious clerics, and warlords such as Siraj-Uddin Haqqani should be employed as a tool of influence over the Taliban regime. Only the right decisions at this crucial juncture can save Pakistan from being engulfed in another wave of terrorism, and the destruction of previous wars should serve as a reminder that we cannot afford to be bogged down with a serious terrorism problem again.