Pakistan is in the grip of a Barelvi resurgence. This may not have been ominous, had it not been accompanied by violence with the threat of more to come. The violence is also evolving from sporadic individual incidents into full scale political strife. The Barelvis were known to indulge in social violence against rival sects or non-Muslims but their transformation into a political player has surprised many. The surprise comes from the conventional understanding of Barelvis as an inclusive creed, steeped in a shrine-based Sufi tradition and presenting the softer side of Islam in South Asia. The usual trappings of the Wahhabi-Deobandi sects, the puritan or takfeeri message, political jihad and global outreach were said to be missing from the Barelvi faith. But that may be changing.
A closer observation of the Barelvi school of thought and its proponents reveals more than enough similarities with other violent and politically motivated religious movements. The signs are not new but have always been associated with the Barelvi or Ahl-e-Sunnat faith – though these were in the background except for occasional outbursts.
The depiction of Mumtaz Qadri as a heroic martyr is central to the new movement
Historian and scholar Dr. Tahir Kamran has chronicled the Barelvi faith’s evolution in a series of recent articles and has predicted that “the evolution of the Barelvi movement in the modern era appears to be exactly like the evolution of the Deobandi creed”.
His conclusion was based on the transformation of the Barelvi movement from being shrine-based and mashaikh-led to one run from madrassahs and monopolised by religious scholars (alims) and prayer leaders. How does that fare in an already contested religious field in the 21st century?
The modern Barelvi mind is a fusion of three streams — a tradition of Sufis and shrines, Hanafi practices and the political economy of religion. This synthesis gave rise to a similar outcome as that of the Deobandi and Wahhabi movements in the form of what scholars have called “religious literalism”. This textual faith is not inclusive and competes with rival sects for space and religious monopoly. In fact, this contest is not recent but dates back to the 19th and early 20th century. The monopoly claims were not only on the texts but on master narratives like jihad, martyrdom, anti-imperialism and the enforcement of Shariah – and these are common to almost all religious movements including perceived newcomers like the Barelvis.
Governor Salman Taseer found himself targeted by the fury of an assertive new brand of Barelvi preachers
The recent speeches by leaders of Tehreek Labbaik (TLYR) increasingly talk of an international conspiracy and the evil designs of the US. The “martyrdom” of mujahideen is extolled and claims that the enforcement of Shariah will end injustice of all kinds are made forcefully. This is an all too familiar conventional narrative, extolled by the likes of Sayyid Qutb and Maulana Maududi, and are not expected from an upstart movement. But the Barelvis do not consider themselves upstarts.
Their first scholar-martyr and inspirational hero emerged all the way back in 1857. Allama Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi was a senior reader/judge at the British courts and later at the Mughal Court. He led five other Ulema to sign the first ever decree of Jihad against the British in July 1857, pronouncing Bahadur Shah Zafar as India’s legitimate ruler. He and his fellow Ulema declared that it was obligatory upon all Muslims to fight the infidel British. This fatwa landed Allama Fazl-e-Haq in the Andaman Islands (kala pani) where he died just before his release and is buried there. His account of his imprisonment was preserved as Saurat-al-Hindia which was published first in 1947 and later by Barelvi centers, including Lahore and Sial Sharif.
Today’s firebrand Barelvi clerics motivate the faithful to follow in the footsteps of Allama Fazl-e-Haq and his like. The parallels that can be drawn from this are ominous, and they don’t end with a political struggle. Allama Fazl-e-Haq laid the foundation of sectarian strife with a scathing critique of Shah Ismail Dehlvi’s Taqwiat-ul-Iman, and went on to issue a kufr decree at such “heresy”. The founder of the Barelvi sect, Imam Ahmad Raza Khan, exercised restraint as far as this decree was concerned, on account of a reported tauba – but was equally forceful in issuing kufr fatwas against “falsehood” and “heretics”.
In the period 1857-1947, both sides of the Sunni faith accused each other of being pro-British, and indulged in sectarian and communal clashes, as in the incident of Ghazi Ilm Din Shaheed. This trend continued after independence in the form of anti-Ahmadi riots and similar clashes.
The modern Barelvi movement has all the necessary ingredients of a violent cult - motivated members, a powerful message and martyrs. This is no longer an old shrine-based rural dispensation but has transformed into a social media savvy urban outfit
The modern Barelvi movement has all the necessary ingredients of a violent cult — motivated members, a powerful message and martyrs. This is no longer an old shrine-based rural dispensation but has transformed into a social media savvy urban outfit. The use of words like ‘Labbaik’ has been seemingly taken from Shia practices and similar rituals have also been introduced to indoctrinate and develop kinship.
On the other hand, just like the Deobandis have a soft image in Tableeghi Jamaat, so the Barelvis have a seemingly harmless Daawat Islami. Both can become launching pads for higher ambitions.
There is a foreign link missing though, which is necessary to sustain such movements. That has been made up for by generous funding from expatriates in the Persian Gulf and Europe whose role was more than obvious in recent demonstrations. This movement also has the potential to become “high church”, as per the writer Khaled Ahmed. In this way, the movement could potentially become an exporter of ideology instead of being at the receiving end. The consequences of the Barelvi resurgence with its potent mix of ideology and violence are ominous for an already polarised polity and society.
