Pakistan’s relations with the US began to warm up just a few years after independence. General Ayub Khan, who was appointed the commander-in-chief of the army in 1951, visited the US in 1953 to help forge closer ties with the US military. In a few years, the two countries signed a mutual defense agreement, and Pakistan joined the multilateral defense treaties of CENTO and SEATO, earning for itself the moniker, “America’s most allied ally.” It began receiving advanced military equipment, including M 113 Armored Personnel Carriers, M47/48 Patton tanks, F-86 fighter jets, and T-33 trainers, as well as other equipment and training for six army divisions.
However, the US consistently ignored Pakistan’s pleas to help resolve the Kashmir dispute. Within a couple of months of independence, the first war to liberate Kashmir broke out. It ended with the bulk of Kashmir in Indian hands.
Then came India’s war with Communist China in 1962. India had always claimed to be in the Non-Aligned camp. But, focusing on its strategic interests, which were focused on preventing the spread of communism, the US began providing arms to India to prevent another war with China from breaking out.
Pakistan concerned that the chance to seize Kashmir militarily from India was slipping fast, launched guerillas into Kashmir in August 1965. This triggered a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. To stop the war, the US imposed an arms embargo on both countries, which hurt Pakistan a lot more than India.
The war fizzled out in less than three weeks. To facilitate a peace deal between the warring neighbors, the USSR stepped in, and a deal was signed in Tashkent in January 1966.
In 1971, the US began to see China, not as an adversary, but as a partner to reduce Soviet influence. General Yahya facilitated a secret mission to Beijing by Henry Kissinger in July 1971, which laid the groundwork for a visit by President Nixon to Beijing in February 1972. However, in December, when India invaded East Pakistan, the US did not come to Pakistan’s aid.
Pakistan was back on the list of US priorities after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. General Zia hit it off with President Reagan. US military aid began flowing in. But the focus was on Afghanistan, not on Kashmir.
President Trump is anxious to get the Nobel Peace Prize. Resolving the nearly eight-decade old Kashmir dispute will improve the odds of him getting that prize
Once the Soviets pulled out, there was a quiet period in US-Pakistan relations. When terrorists hit the US on September 11, 2001, President Bush reached out to General Musharraf and the two struck a deal. US aid began flowing in, but once again it was focused on Afghanistan.
On December 13, 2001, terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Alleging that the terrorists were backed by Pakistan, India moved many army divisions to its border with Pakistan. Pakistan responded in kind. Soon, a million armed men were staring at each other. The US helped to diffuse the situation but made no effort to resolve the underlying dispute.
The Kashmir dispute has never made it to the top of the agenda in Washington, regardless of who is in the White House. The pundits argue that no vital US interests are involved in resolving the Kashmir dispute.
What Washington needs to realise is that the Kashmir dispute could trigger a major war between these two neighbors, who are both armed with nuclear weapons. India’s strategists believe that “asymmetrically assured destruction” would prevent a first strike from Pakistan. Pakistan believes that “deterrence rests on ambiguity.” Both are hell-bent on playing a high-stakes game of poker. A nuclear war would certainly mean the destruction of Pakistan but it would also cause massive economic and environmental damage not just to India, but to all neighboring countries, and strike a major blow at the world’s economy.
Thus far, the US interest in Pakistan has remained one-dimensional, focused on enhancing US security, not Pakistan’s security. It has supported military dictators in fighting wars, initially against communists and later against terrorists. That mindset needs to change.
Twenty-five years ago, I wrote letters to Bill Clinton and Al Gore, who were then the President and Vice President of the US. I asked them to use the good offices of the United States to mediate a resolution to the Kashmir dispute. Clinton sent me a postcard, simply acknowledging receipt of my letter.
On the other hand, Gore wrote a letter in which he said that he “remained concerned by the continuing confrontations between Pakistan and India and the potential these have for further escalation.” He said this “Administration is committed to promoting the dialogue and face-to-face meetings begun in Lahore in February of 1999 as the best forum for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences, including those over the issue of Kashmir.”
And then came the punchline. He said the US has a strong commitment to encouraging India and Pakistan to resume a productive bilateral dialogue.
The time has come to make this a reality. The US should facilitate dialogue between the two countries and provide a package of political and economic incentives tied to the results of the dialogue.
President Trump is anxious to get the Nobel Peace Prize. Resolving the nearly eight-decade old Kashmir dispute will improve the odds of him getting that prize.
The hard work on working out the details has already been done. It goes back to the back channel that existed between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the mid-2000s, which was discussed in my last column.
All that Trump needs to do is to get the Prime Ministers of Pakistan in the White House, and urge them to implement those terms. If they do so, he should commit to providing economic incentives to both countries.
Yes, he has a lot on his plate. But Trump has shown he has the talent and the energy to move on multiple fronts simultaneously. To get things moving on the South Asian front, he should send Marc Rubio, his Secretary of State, to Islamabad and New Delhi.