TFT: How do we scale back from here?
Sameer Lalwani: In the short-term, it appears that India has satisfied its aims with what is being described as a “surgical strike” or “targeted operation.” It was able to take some military action to satiate a domestic audience, achieve a tactical success by interdicting however many terrorists it hit, and mitigate the pressures and risk of escalation. A lot may depend on how Pakistan chooses to respond. By disputing the novelty or scale of the cross-border operation that India claims, Pakistan has managed expectations of retaliation. This forbearance can be a sign of a maturing power. Many great powers have chosen secrecy, concealment, and denial to manage escalation risks. As both sides reduce the alert status of their forces, the prospect of a major military clash also begins to recede
In the long-term, most policymakers recognize that the ends of conflict resolution necessitates dialogue on root of tensions. This includes disputes such as Kashmir, Siachen, and Sir Creek as well as cross-border terrorism. The perpetual trouble however is with the means and ways to these ends. It does not appear—as revealed through recent words or deeds—that there is an appetite on either side at the moment for the type of serious engagement required. Right now, both sides believe they can deal comfortably with neither war, nor peace, but period flare-ups in tensions and calculated risks.
TFT: The war of narratives being fought on the TV dents diplomacy - state narratives lapped up without question or challenge and positions taken - how do we deal with this?
SL: There are legitimate reasons states try to control the narratives of cross-border conflict due to concerns about operational security or escalatory pressures. But in my opinion, we’ve seen a significant jump in mis-information and disinformation during this recent crisis episode on both sides. Just like in a functioning marketplace, proper assessment of costs and benefits necessitates good information or is subject to market failure. Poor quality information within a crisis can lead to false optimism, miscalculation, and risky decision-making.
The international relations literature tells us that the quality of information on an adversary’s capabilities, resolve, intentions, signals, and actions can be a fundamental determinant of conflict. Good information enables decision-makers to make sound strategic judgments and tactical choices. It is hard enough to obtain good information on adversary traits in peace time so amidst the din of war drums and the fog of crisis, this challenge is compounded. Bad information can hyper-inflate threats, produce dangerous overconfidence, and prompt risky decisions without sufficient reflection.
The incentives of media organizations may not always align with national interests. Competition for ratings can drive media organizations towards a nationalist outbidding frenzy and actions without sufficient scrutiny or debate. This is true even in mature democracies like in the United States, like for instance in the ramp-up to the Iraq war.
To redress this information problem, a significant amount of responsibility for the solution lies within media establishments, journalists, and anchors to think past the immediacy of ratings and recognize that their job is to investigate conventional wisdom and to closely scrutinize details of events or arguments from a variety of angles. Some responsibility too resides with citizens who drive the marketplace and have the power to create a demand for good, thoughtful information that encourages them to think rather than cater to their fears and prejudices.
However, the lions’ share of responsibility probably resides in the leadership of a country, however defined. Leaders can set a precedent of encouraging informed, democratic debate that is healthy for a country’s decision making and yields optimal outcomes. Leaders can also exercise good judgment and place national interest above populism or emotional satisfaction.
TFT: The United States is unwilling to cut ties with Pakistan. And there is the strategic relationship with Beijing as well. How does India bring pressure to bear on Pakistan keeping these ties in mind?
SL: India appears to be trying to apply pressure on Pakistan in three ways: diplomatically by public condemnation and isolation, economically by considering a review of MFN status and the Indus Waters Treaty, and militarily with tactical strikes on terrorist launching pads across the border.
India can and has applied pressure in the regional SAARC neighborhood to embarrass or constrain ties between Pakistan and other South Asian neighbors. This can reduce confidence amongst observers and investors or create headaches for Pakistan on its borders, for instance if relations with countries such as Afghanistan considerably worsen. India’s diplomatic leverage at the international level is considerably hampered by China’s veto on the UN Security Council. Still, if India decides to place pressure on Pakistan at the core of its foreign policy, it can leverage its economic weight with a number of developed countries and major powers vying for its markets.
The United States is also increasingly tilting towards India’s corner for a number of strategic and economic reasons. The US certainly wants a relationship with Pakistan but it is offering less (i.e. reduced coalition support funds and foreign military financing) and expecting less in the future. Meanwhile, the U.S. relationship with India has grown so it is increasingly more sympathetic to India’s concerns. Whether tacitly or overtly, the US appears to be supporting a more activist and assertive India—in Afghanistan, in the maritime domain, and on the Line of Control at least for cross-border interdiction operations—even if that does increase some pressure on Pakistan. At the moment, it does not seem to support more aggressive action but circumstances could change in a new crisis.
China’s continued diplomatic and material support of Pakistan can counterbalance and obstruct long-term Indian pressure, but as other scholars have pointed out, it is unclear if China is willing to stick its neck out for Pakistan in a crisis. Because of significant Chinese investments in the ground, it stands to lose much more in a conflict so actually has incentives to constrain escalation and conflict. Some analysts point out China has quietly applied pressure in the past even when lesser interests were at stake for instance after 9/11, during the Lal Masjid crisis, and prior to Operation Zarb-e-Azb.
So long as India keeps the scale of retaliation to terrorism at a tactical and diplomatic level, China is unlikely to intervene. However, if India tries to escalate military strikes or pressure Pakistan by abrogating the Indus Water Treaty, both of which could threaten China’s equities within Pakistan, China could revisit its stance, and perhaps threaten the flow of rivers from China to India like the Bhramaputra or Indus rivers.
Still, placing all its eggs in the China basket may not be prudent for Pakistan. Though an extreme example, the case of North Korea should be instructive. North Korea still counts China as a stalwart ally yet still suffers from considerable isolation from the rest of the world.
With input from Aasim Zafar Khan, a journalist in Lahore