Indian PM Narendra Modi recently told a charged rally that “we will go into Pakistan and sort them out”. The Indian Air Force chief says that the Balakot strike was just the beginning of the Indian action against Pakistan. With the world acknowledging that Pakistan is “one up” in the recent conflict (the downing of two Indian war planes and capture of one pilot showing military superiority and the release of the pilot demonstrating diplomatic finesse) and the Indian media reluctantly having to wake up to the cruel facts and ask some embarrassing questions, Mr Modi is in trouble. The opposition parties see this as an opportunity to drive the knife in and twist it. The nature of the virulent anti-Pakistan nationalism that Modi has spawned is such that if he doesn’t square the military equation soon, he will lose the next election for sure. Therefore, we may expect him to do “something”. The problem is that if he does too little he won’t get off the hook at home and if he does too much he won’t be able to handle the consequences. Damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t.
Pakistan, on the other hand, is desperate to de-escalate. Continuing a state of war readiness is prohibitively expensive, especially in a crisis-ridden economy, begging bowl in hand. It is also a fact that Pakistan’s international isolation “as a state sponsor of terrorism” is unprecedented and its economic bailout is dependent upon its ability to shut down non-state actors which carry out terrorist actions across borders. The FATF Report that will determine whether Pakistan is shoved into the “black list” and face sanctions from international finance institutions, as the Finance Ministry has pointed out, is due in May. How can Pakistan get out of this black hole?
The government has issued a four-page order detailing terms and conditions for proscribing militant/terrorist organisations. It has followed up by issuing a list of 68 organisations, including the JeM and LeT, that stand “proscribed”. Pre-emptive detentions have been carried out of prominent militants. Is this action sufficient for the international community that wants to appease India and avert an escalation of the conflict?
Inevitably, it will be asked what progress, if any, has been made vis a vis eliminating these “banned” organisations since the list of 68 pertains to those who have been progressively banned since 2001. It will also be pointed out that the two most “wanted” persons, Maulana Masood Azhar and Hafiz Saeed, are still scot free. It will be noted that two offshoots of the LeT, namely Falah-e-Insaniat and Jamaat ul Dawa (both led by Hafiz Saeed) were omitted from this list earlier and have only now been put on the Interior Ministry’s “Watch-List”. In other words, the world will want to determine if Pakistan’s Miltablishment has genuinely decided as a matter of strategic policy to disband the India/Kashmir oriented NSAs or whether these measures are just tactical moves to relieve the current pressure. On that score, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating of it. What if, as is likely, Indian repression in Kashmir continues unabated and provokes Uri or Pulwama-type resistance for which “credit” is taken by Pakistan-based NSAs or their affiliates in Kashmir?
It isn’t only the international community that is asking such questions. An increasing number of influential and concerned voices in Pakistan are also nagged by such doubts. Nawaz Sharif’s peace initiative with Narendra Modi in 2014 was derailed by certain NSAs. But when he proposed action against them, he was accused of being an “Indian agent” and Dharnas and Dawnleaks were drummed up to try and overthrow him. Now the same people are desperately trying to flog an old vice under Nawaz Sharif as a new virtue under Imran Khan. By way of explanation, if not justification, it is being argued that mutual trust between the Miltablishment and Imran Khan is responsible for this policy turnabout as opposed to a lack of it during Nawaz Sharif’s time. But no one is asking why there was such a trust deficit between an elected government and the Miltablishment at that time and why they are on the “same page” now, which would lead directly to the core issue of whether a strategic change of policy is possible today.
Pakistan’s defense policies, which include a significant role for certain NSAs, are inextricably tied to conflict with India over Kashmir. Therefore, one should not expect dramatic and unilateral strategic change until India sincerely attempts to resolve the problem of Kashmir to the satisfaction of the people of Kashmir.