On 7th October 2023, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad infiltrated into southern Israel and caught the Israel military by unprecedented surprise. Israel responded viciously. Regardless of the intensity and sophistication of attack that raises questions about Hamas’ capabilities and Israel’s military readiness, the lingering question for years has been: is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spiraling towards a third Intifada?
As history shows, with every Intifada, Israeli-Palestinian relations and the international perception of the conflict dramatically changed for the worse, pushing peaceful and positive conflict transformation and resolution further away. Another Intifada would be an absolute trainwreck.
The first Intifada spontaneously began in December 1987 after a traffic accident in which an Israeli truck killed several Palestinians in the northern Gaza Strip. The uprising took both Israelis and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership, who was in Tunis at the time, by surprise both strategically and tactically, to which the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) responded gradually with a trial-and-error policy.
The first Intifada concluded with the signing of Oslo Accord on 13 September 1993. The Accord established the Declaration of Principles for Palestinian Self Government for cooperation between Israel and the newly established Palestinian Authority (PA).
The riots initially began in Gaza, and not only swiftly expanded to the West Bank, but also gradually threatened public security within Israel’s pre-1967 borders. The Intifada, as it unravelled, wasn’t just a sporadic series of mass protests, but it had a synchronised military dimension that combined civil disobedience with sub-conventional tactics. It involved protests, strikes, commercial shutdowns, boycotts of Israeli products, hoisting of Palestinian flags, the resignation of officials in tax and police departments, demonstrative funerals and the establishment of parallel self-reliant educational, political and economic arrangements - coupled with stone throwing. It had political dimensions that transformed the internal political dynamics of Palestine, reformed Israeli-Palestinian relations and reconstructed international perception of the conflict by widely presenting the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and liberation from Israel occupation.
Known as the “war of stones,” the first Intifada took hundreds of Palestinian and Israeli lives. The tactic of throwing stones at the Israeli military defined the identity of the Intifada and symbolised Palestinian struggle. It was the time when Palestinians collectively mobilised against Israeli occupation with protests and homemade weapons, yet it questioned the credibility of Israel’s deterrence posture. This encounter compelled the IDF to prioritise counterinsurgency operations and to transform its existing military doctrine, relying on pre-emption and retaliation to containment. Israel responded to stone throwing with deployment of force, curfews, mass detentions and beatings.
The first Intifada concluded with the signing of Oslo Accord on 13 September 1993. The Accord established the Declaration of Principles for Palestinian Self Government for cooperation between Israel and the newly established Palestinian Authority (PA). It was agreed that the PA would govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip for five years and then talks on permanent status of contentious issues of borders, refugees and Jerusalem would begin. However, the Accords failed to end the Israel-Palestine conflict, but it provided Palestinians with leadership and a central organizing body – the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), both were in exile during first Intifada and were allowed to return to the Occupied Territories to form the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Oslo Accords made Palestinians feel autonomous under the PA reign and dream high of a Palestinian state, but this was meaningless because the peace process did nothing to inhibit the expansion of Israel’s settlements and oppression against Palestinians. Ultimately, the Accords gave rise to Hamas.
With the collapse of peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, the conflict entered into a newer, intense phase. Israel provoked the largest Palestinians’ uprising in 2000 after Ariel Sharon’s visit to Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa/Temple Mount on 28th September. The second Intifada, also known as Al-Aqsa Intifada, according to one estimate, registered more than 4,000 thousands casualties (including Israelis and Palestinians) till 2005. By the second Intifada, the Israel-Palestine conflict became combative - Israel used advanced weaponry, reoccupied Palestinian territories, constructed a separation wall, attacked Palestinians and kept its own casualties to a minimum. The IDF adopted and deployed a combination of containment, engagement and leadership (Yasser Arafat) change strategy to defeat the second Intifada. On the other hand, the character of Palestinian resistance changed with the use of light weapons, trained soldiers and diverse tactics of bombings, including suicide attacks. By now, Palestinians had somewhat fractured leadership as well, and Arafat did nothing to rein in violence once it started.
In contrast to first Intifada that was a spontaneous outburst of decades of repression calling for recognition, the second Intifada was a relatively organised, militarily as well as politically, battle for statehood.
The second Intifada drastically transformed Israel-Palestine relations, as well as the internal dynamics of both states. Both sides made competitive use of alliances, international opinion, military build-up and the innovative use of violent tactics to pressurise and deter the other side. Palestinians’ tactics instilled fear among Israelis; simultaneously, Israel intensified violent suppression of Palestinians. This resulted in increased insecurity of both sides and escalation of violence in region.
Amidst this escalation, the then US President George Bush distanced the US from Israeli position and endorsed the creation of a Palestinian State. Nonetheless, the disengagement of Gaza by Israel and the fall of Gaza Strip to Hamas made Gaza a lasting vulnerability and paved the way for an Israeli stronghold in the West Bank, in the process, consolidating the separation of both territories. After the mysterious death of Arafat, the new leader of the PLO, Abbas made efforts to negotiate peace with Israel to end the second Intifada in 2005. In the thick of this situation, Hamas not only managed to strengthen itself militarily with rockets and missiles capable of targeting Israeli cities, but also buttressed its position in Palestinian politics.
In contrast to first Intifada that was a spontaneous outburst of decades of repression calling for recognition, the second Intifada was a relatively organised, militarily as well as politically, battle for statehood. However, the unsettled end of the second Intifada brought a change in Israel’s policy towards occupation - from being political to a security one, with a corresponding increase in military raids in occupied West Bank and PA controlled area A and instigated Hamas’ mini-war with Israel in Gaza. Yet, nothing was intense enough to call a third Intifada.
But the recent Hamas infiltration into southern Israel and Israel’s brutal response has upped the ante. If called, a third Intifada would be deadly, considering advanced military build-up, dangerous military tactics and harsh revengeful rhetoric on both sides. Moreover, the first two Intifadas were provoked by Israel’s impulsive attitude, but this time it would be Hamas’ recklessness that could possibly lead to the break out of a deadly third Intifada, which might not be popular.
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the potential deepening of the occupation is a key driver of friction with the Palestinians. Therefore, continuous and unimpeded Israeli occupation along with unbridled and desperate Hamas’ military operations against Israel could put a lasting end to a positive conflict transformation. Furthermore, the prevailing security situation could further deteriorate in the region, encouraging other militant groups and their sponsors to engender unavoidable explosion.
An off ramp, though challenging, can be found. But there are questions to address – can Israel continue to bet on a security apparatus that is always taken by surprise? It is imperative on Israel and its allies to configure how far Israel’s military build-up will continue to undermine regional security. By the same token, are Hamas’ doings what Palestinians wish or long for? It is on every Palestinian to answer this and decide their future accordingly.