Local governments in Pakistan stand at the intersection of promise and neglect. They are constitutionally acknowledged yet institutionally fragile, financially starved yet burdened with expectations, and politically sidelined despite being the closest tier of governance to the people.
A recent report, “Status of Local Governments in Pakistan”, published by AwazCDS-Pakistan (a civil society organisation), provides a sobering account of how Pakistan’s local democracy has been systematically weakened. This essay attempts to summarise the findings of the report, which provides deeper insight into the dispositions explaining why grassroots governance remains in limbo and why reform is essential.
The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, recognises local governments only in passing. Article 32 encourages their promotion, Article 37 calls for decentralisation, and Article 140A obliges provinces to establish systems of local government. Yet these provisions remain skeletal. Unlike the detailed chapters on federal and provincial structures, local governments are left without a dedicated constitutional framework.
Without explicit constitutional protection, they remain vulnerable to dissolution at the whim of provincial assemblies. The Eighteenth Amendment, celebrated for devolving powers from the federation to provinces, conspicuously ignored the third tier. Forty-four subjects from the concurrent list were transferred to provinces, but none were assigned to local governments. Provincial Finance Commissions, which could have anchored fiscal devolution, were left without constitutional entrenchment.
The contrast with India is striking. The Indian Constitution, through the 73rd and 74th Amendments, provides detailed chapters on Panchayati Raj institutions and municipal bodies. These amendments not only define the structure and functions of local governments but also guarantee their continuity through constitutional protection. Pakistan’s silence, by comparison, leaves its local governments perpetually exposed.
The Lahore High Court’s judgment in a case underscored this gap, declaring that the constitutional mandate of elected local governments cannot be diluted or encroached upon. However, judicial pronouncements cannot substitute for constitutional clarity. Until Pakistan inserts a dedicated chapter on local governments, their existence will remain precarious, dependent on political expediency rather than constitutional permanence.
Even where local governments exist, they are financially crippled. Their budgets are meagre compared to provincial allocations, their revenue base is narrow, and their fiscal autonomy is minimal. The report’s budget tracking reveals that local governments operate with three basic classifications, namely, establishment, contingency, and development. Yet allocations are so limited that meaningful development is rare.
Historically, local governments relied on Octroi and Zila tax, a significant source of revenue. Its suspension deprived them of a vital stream, leaving them dependent on provincial transfers. The Urban Immovable Property Tax, once a local levy, was provincialised, further eroding fiscal autonomy. Grants under Provincial Finance Commissions were meant to compensate, but without constitutional protection, these commissions remain weak and inconsistent.
Local governments are not administrative conveniences; they are constitutional necessities
The result is a paradox: local governments are expected to deliver services closest to citizens, e.g., water supply, sanitation, waste management, local infrastructure, etc. Yet they lack the resources to do so. Provincial governments, meanwhile, retain both the funds and the functions, leaving local councils as hollow shells. Transparency provisions exist in law. Budgets must be approved by a simple majority, accounts displayed publicly, and citizen objections must be considered. Yet compliance is negligible.
Annual statements of accounts are rarely made available, and citizen participation in budgetary processes remains tokenistic. This fiscal starvation is not merely an administrative inconvenience; it is a democratic betrayal. When citizens elect local representatives, they expect service delivery. Denying those representatives the financial means to act erodes trust in democracy itself.
The history of local government elections in Pakistan is equally chequered. Military regimes, paradoxically, prioritised them, using local councils as instruments of legitimacy and control. Democratic governments, by contrast, treated them as a low priority, often delaying or avoiding elections altogether. The Punjab case illustrates this vividly. Elections under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, were held in 2015–2016, with councils commencing their term in January 2017. Their tenure was to last until January 2022. Yet in April 2019, the Punjab Local Government Act, 2019, dissolved all councils prematurely.
The amendment of 2020 extended the timeline for new councils to twenty-one months, but elections were never held. The Supreme Court questioned this dissolution, emphasising that elected local governments cannot be dissolved before completing their tenure. This pattern repeats across provinces. Councils are dissolved, administrators appointed, and local functions absorbed by provincial bureaucracies. Continuity is compromised, and citizens are left without grassroots representation.
The democratic deficit is not only about elections; it is about recognition. Local governments are treated as subordinate extensions of provincial departments rather than autonomous institutions. Their dissolution, delay, or manipulation reflects a broader reluctance among political elites to share power at the grassroots. The Charter of Democracy, signed in 2006 by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, promised constitutional protection for local bodies and elections on a party basis. Yet these promises remain unfulfilled.
The constitutional gap, fiscal weakness, and democratic deficit are not isolated problems; they reinforce one another. Constitutional silence allows provinces to dissolve councils at will. Fiscal weakness ensures that even when councils exist, they cannot deliver. Democratic neglect perpetuates both, as elections are delayed and councils replaced by administrators. Together, these dynamics create a cycle of fragility. Citizens lose faith in local democracy, provincial governments consolidate power, and local councils remain symbolic rather than substantive.
The challenge is not technical but political. It requires political will to share power, constitutional clarity to protect institutions, and fiscal commitment to empower councils. It requires honouring promises made in manifestos and charters, and respecting judicial pronouncements that affirm local democracy.
Reform is both necessary and possible. The report outlines a concrete agenda for restructuring and rebalancing powers among the three tiers of government. Several steps stand out: inserting a constitutional chapter on local governments, entrenching Provincial Finance Commissions in the Constitution, restoring revenue autonomy of districts, enforcing transparency provisions, guaranteeing continuity of councils, and holding elections regularly on a party basis.
These reforms would not only strengthen local governments but also deepen democracy. Empowered councils can deliver services more effectively, engage citizens more directly, and build trust in governance. They can also serve as training grounds for future leaders, nurturing democratic culture from the grassroots up.
Local governments are not administrative conveniences; they are constitutional necessities. They are the closest link between state and citizen, the arena where democracy touches daily life. To neglect them is to weaken democracy itself. To empower them is to strengthen the republic. Pakistan must choose. The choice will determine whether democracy in Pakistan remains top-heavy or truly rooted in the people.