It seems a coveted third term has not brought about good fortune for Indian premier Narendra Modi. Since he took oath as Prime Minister of India for a third consecutive term, he has faced several setbacks on the foreign and domestic fronts. First, freedom fighters carried out several attacks in various parts of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK). Second, Modi faced criticism from the West, especially the US, for visiting Russia. In fact, his visit to Russia affected India's credibility as a reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific region. The third shock was the ouster of New Delhi's time-tested friend leading their Eastern neighbour, Bangladesh's PM Sheikh Hasina Wajid.
The ouster of the Awami League government has highlighted a major shortcoming in India's neighbourhood policy. Since 2014, BJP has been trying to portray that Narendra Modi has altered India's foreign policy through various initiatives such as converting their 'Look East Policy' into the 'Act East Policy', 'Introducing Neighbourhood Policy' and redefining Indian foreign policy outlook on the international arena. His neighbourhood policy primarily revolved around establishing high-level relationships, improved connectivity, and enhanced economic cooperation.
One of the predominant features of India's neighbourhood policy was to play a partisan role in the domestic affairs of neighbouring South Asian states. Take, for instance, what happened in Maldives. New Delhi cultivated a relationship with the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) and former President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. Since 2018, New Delhi significantly enhanced its political influence and strategic presence in Maldives while vehemently supporting the MDP and Solih. However, the 2023 elections in Maldives led to a severe setback when Mohamed Muizzu emerged victorious on the back of promises to expel Indian forces from the island.
Similarly, India faced a similar situation in Afghanistan in 2021 when the Taliban took control of Kabul. Since 2001, New Delhi had cultivated its partnerships with anti-Taliban forces and rejected the Taliban as a political reality of Afghanistan. This is why New Delhi was stunned when the Afghan Taliban took control of Kabul. In fact, uncertainty and a sense of loss in terms of its investments in Afghanistan were highly criticised by Indian media, opposition, and intelligentsia.
There is a higher probability that New Delhi will try to regain diplomatic and strategic space in Dhaka by offering economic assistance, showing leniency to bilateral disputes and engaging the new government at multilateral forums like BIMSTEC
The recent protests in Bangladesh and the subsequent ouster of Sheikh Hasina have once again raised concerns as New Delhi has lost a trusted partner in Dhaka. The relationship between the Awami League and BJP over the past decade cultivated into a very strong partnership. From bilateral economic, political and strategic relationships to conflict management, both Sheikh Hasina and Narendra Modi remained supportive of each other. This is why New Delhi has been viewed as supportive of Sheikh Hasina's oppressive policies. Hence, a strong anti-India sentiment has increased in Bangladeshi society in recent years.
The region has started witnessing the negative implications of India's strategy of supporting favourable regimes in smaller South Asian states. Domestic politics in Maldives has been divided into two blocs, i.e., pro-India and the pro-China bloc. Similarly, the political forces in Nepal have been divided into two categories. The India-out movement in Bangladesh reflects the public's discontent against Indian interference in political affairs.
New Delhi has tried to minimise these setbacks by re-engaging opposition parties as it did in Maldives, Afghanistan, and Nepal and may do so again in Bangladesh. It is a fact that the economic and political clout, strategic significance and sheer geographical size do not allow India's immediate smaller South Asian states to be blindsided by New Delhi indefinitely. This happened in Afghanistan and Maldives, where India has tried to regain political and economic relevance in these countries by offering humanitarian assistance and high-profile engagements.
India's backing of Sheikh Hasina's government has been instrumental in minimising Pakistan's and China's influence in Bangladesh, serving New Delhi's regional interests by keeping rival powers in check. This is why there is a higher probability that New Delhi will try to regain diplomatic and strategic space in Dhaka by offering economic assistance, showing leniency to bilateral disputes and engaging the new government at multilateral forums like BIMSTEC. However, in this entire process, New Delhi might waste significant economic and political resources and strategic presence in its neighbourhood.
To conclude, the policy of taking sides in neighbouring countries seems to have tangible short-term results in terms of increased political influence, economic gains, and perhaps enhanced strategic presence in the immediate neighbourhood. However, in the long term, this policy brings about shocks and setbacks and cultivates hatred and irrelevance for New Delhi within the larger segments of societies of smaller South Asian states.