More than 30 years of direct military rule has fully deprived the Pakistani political system of any opportunity to build and construct organic and deep rooted democratic and constitutional traditions. Weak political institutions with no or even weaker traditions have no capacity to build or construct a foundational myth of their own, which can serve the psychological, social and political needs of the nation.
More than 30 years of direct military rule has fully deprived the Pakistani political system of any opportunity to build and construct organic and deep rooted democratic and constitutional traditions.
Centrifugal forces are strong in two out of four federating units—Balochistan and Sindh. For the past two decades, two out of four Pakistani provinces—Balochistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa—have experienced lethal insurgencies. One of these insurgent groups – the TTP, have the capability to strike in urban centers across Pakistan, a capability which they amply demonstrated in the period between 2007 and 2014. All this means that the military's myth of omnipotence provides the basis to the political and administrative structures to sustain themselves. This myth of the military’s supposed strength has been reinforced by the events that took place in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, when Pakistan started participating in the US led war against terror. There was a military government in Islamabad when Pakistan joined the War on Terror. The massive scale of efforts that the Pakistan military undertook through the course of the war eclipsed the country’s political institutions almost entirely. Political parties and political leaders were relevant to the situation only to the extent that they were allowed to make their presence felt, which, in any case, was very limited.
In 2006, a separatist insurgency started in Balochistan. This allowed the military to completely relegate political institutions and reinforce the myth of the military’s status a foundational institution that provides a basis for the country’s political and administrative structures to exist.
This is not to suggest that this is an ideal arrangement. Far from it, this situation leads to a lopsided distribution of resources and influence in Pakistani society, with the military taking a major chunk of the financial pie and enjoying a de facto, decisive say in nearly every policy matter. Besides, military machinations to create the foundational political myth were taking place in what can only be described as a political vacuum, where other political forces were barren, both at the intellectual and political level and therefore unable to present an alternative myth that could act as a foundational ideal underpinning the political system.
Imran Khan was placed as a trojan horse inside the fragile castle of an emerging democratic Pakistan.
A liberal constitutional-democratic order or a strong political or intellectual movement aspiring for such an order could have filled the vacuum, or could have challenged the foundational myth of the military. A liberal and modernist interpretation of Islam, given that modernist interpretations of Islam were a strong tradition among the Muslims of Northern British India, resources from the participatory and egalitarian cultures in Balochi, Punjabi, Pashto and Sindhi societies could have together provided an intellectual base to this liberal democratic-constitutional order. This never happened.
But we did come close to establishment of a liberal democratic-constitutional order in 1988 when Benazir Bhutto won the parliamentary elections despite open intrigues carried out by military led intelligence services to stop her from coming to power. Pakistani intelligence services used Nawaz Sharif and his political associates as pawns against Benazir Bhutto. The Nawaz Sharif-military nexus threw a wrench in the works in the way of every effort to revive parliamentary democracy in the country after a prolonged era of draconian military rule. The second opportunity to replace the military's foundational myth arose after PPP formed the government in 2008 after it won the parliamentary elections that led to the ouster of the military government of General Pervez Musharraf. Political forces across the spectrum agreed to restore parliamentary democracy by removing the contaminations introduced by General Musharraf. There was a tacit understanding that the military should remain in the barracks and aloof from interfering in the political system. This was the time when the military's intelligence services threw a second wrench in the works in the path of any possibility of a democratic-constitutional order replacing the military’s foundational myth.
Imran Khan was placed as a trojan horse inside the fragile castle of an emerging democratic Pakistan. By the time Nawaz Sharif assumed the office of Prime Minister after the 2013 parliamentary elections, military machinations to preserve its myth of providing the basis for the political system were in full swing. Imran Khan acted as their pawn. He was no ordinary pawn, as he had a substantial following among the Punjabi middle classes, the classes which are the darlings of the state. He single-handedly created a crisis of legitimacy for the Nawaz Sharif government, thus weakening the possibility of putting an end to the military's myth as a foundational institution.
Imran Khan doesn’t believe that the military should be a non-partisan institution. Since he was ousted from power, he has repeatedly criticized the military leadership for not siding with him when the opposition tabled a no confidence motion against him in the National Assembly.
Two factors strongly influenced the political outcomes in both the cases of political groups introducing a political myth of their own to replace the myth of the military. Firstly, the political leaders who spearheaded the moves to replace the myth were deeply involved in financial corruption cases and secondly, they failed miserably in creating a situation where the system could dole out any modicum of economic prosperity for the common man. The military, on the other hand, was riding a wave of sympathy among Pakistani middle classes, both in 1988 and 2008, after a perceived victory in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and for a second time when the military claimed to have defeated tribal militants in operations that started in 2009 and lasted till 2017. In both cases, the military’s confidence and sense of entitlement grew substantially in the wake of these perceived victories. These developments reinforced the military's myth, especially when it almost started to usurp policy making powers of civil government as the military operations against two insurgencies started to get underway.
Imran Khan is gearing up for a role as the second father of the nation, a possibility which he has hinted at in his media appearances.
In the meantime, the product of military machinations and intrigues has assumed a life of its own. Public opinion polls are now suggesting that Imran Khan is the most popular leader in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. But is he in a position to replace the military's myth? Before I answer this question, let me briefly introduce you to Imran Khan’s views about the military's role in the political system. Imran Khan doesn’t believe that the military should be a non-partisan institution. Since he was ousted from power, he has repeatedly criticized the military leadership for not siding with him when the opposition tabled a no confidence motion against him in the National Assembly. He has repeatedly asserted that the opposition leaders were corrupt, and therefore military leaders should have sided with him instead of supporting the government which was formed after his ouster. Unsurprisingly, this opinion has a substantial following among Punjabi middle classes. Imran Khan's view of the military's role in politics is that it should be partisan. Even the fiction of neutrality that the military leadership pretends to be its current policy is not acceptable to Imran Khan.
The second factor that could prove to be Imran Khan’s wrench throw into the works of political system are the tangible signs that Imran Khan is trying to assume a quasi-religious role for himself and his burqa clad wife within his own party, something on the basis of which he could claim some special status or privilege if he comes to power. I am not saying that Nawaz Sharif, Asif Ali Zardari and Shahbaz Sharif are not living a privileged life. But none of them are claiming any religious right or privileges for themselves. Nawaz Sharif flirted with the idea of assuming a religious role for himself during his second tenure in office. But his plans were thwarted by the then opposition and military. During his third tenure, he was completely disabused of this thought. There are TV commentators who stand ready to grant a religious title to Imran Khan.
The dream of a liberal constitutional-democratic order replacing the military’s myth of omnipresence and omnipotence will remain unfulfilled for a long time to come.
In fact, Imran Khan is gearing up for a role as the second father of the nation, a possibility which he has hinted at in his media appearances. At present, he has the kind of popular support which might facilitate him in fulfilling his wish. But power is very elusive in Pakistan, especially power which comes to you as a result of popular support. How far his popular base will take him in replacing the military's myth is something only time will tell. But one thing is certain: the dream of a liberal constitutional-democratic order replacing the military’s myth of omnipresence and omnipotence will remain unfulfilled for a long time to come.