What part of the military's role in Pakistan’s political system makes the system dysfunctional? Or what part of the military's role brings the society to the brink of civil conflict?
In my opinion, the military's policy input in the decision-making processes – like foreign policy or internal security – is not by itself problematic at all. Pakistan is located in a tough neighbourhood and from day 1, even the country's founders perceived it as a security state. In the 1990s, the military thinking which perceived a major threat to the country's survival emanating primarily from internal sources, took root in the corridors of power. The post-9/11 security situation only reinforced lessons already learnt by the military leadership.
So, when now the military plays an oversized role in the decision-making processes leading to the formulation of foreign policy and external and internal security policies, it is something to be understood. Or if somebody has the qualms to question military oversized role in these processes, they should first suggest an alternative course—which in practical terms would mean that there should be some alternative institutional capacity in place for the formulation of policies in these fields to edge the military bureaucracy out of these processes.
But the problem arises when the military bureaucracy uses the international linkages that they develop in the process of formulation and execution of foreign policy to consolidate their hold on power structures of the country. In the post-Musharraf period, military leaders started to act as diplomat-in-chief of the Pakistani government. For every government in Islamabad the internal security situation of the country became the prime foreign policy issue. Meanwhich foreign leaders—foreign ministers and heads of the state of Western as well as Muslim countries—wanted to discuss with nobody other than the official occupying the office of Chief of Army Staff (COAS).
What makes Pakistan’s military’s involvement a problem? The answer must be the military’s role as a partisan in the country’s internal political conflicts. Not only that, the Pakistan military has a long history of playing partisan roles in ideological, religious, sectarian and political conflicts
The visits of Army Chief to foreign capitals were given wide publicity in the local and foreign media during this period. Even this may be understandable given the fact that Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan were acting as major nodes in terrorist networks, where major international terror organisations have their headquarters. There was a time when major terror attacks around the world were traced back to the Pak-Afghan border areas or to mainland Afghanistan. A foreign leader doesn’t have to be a rocket scientist to gauge in such situations that the point person to deal with in such situations is not the prime minister of Pakistan but the army chief.
Deeply ironic was the fact that the Prime Minister or the civilian government didn’t have any institutional capacity to formulate policies related to these issues. Of-course, technically the military's capacity comes within the ambit of the Prime Minister’s executive powers. But in a country where the media wing of the military proudly and unashamedly announces military leadership intentions to support the civil governments on any given policy issue, the assertion of institutional autonomy by the military should be taken as an established fact. All this activity, however, takes place in the neat, formal and well-disciplined bureaucratic world of Islamabad. No fuss, no mess and nothing unruly: the Prime Minister simply concedes his constitutional powers and Chief of Army Staff and the military bureaucracy encroaches upon these powers in a situation where civilian governments simply lack capacity to formulate policies or to execute them on their own.
So, this in of itself doesn’t make Pakistan’s political system dysfunctional. After all there are other countries where the military leadership plays a role in formulation and execution of foreign and security policies.
Then what does make Pakistan’s military’s involvement a problem?
The answer must be the military’s role as a partisan in the country’s internal political conflicts. Not only that, the Pakistan military has a long history of playing partisan roles in ideological, religious, sectarian and political conflicts. During General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, the Pakistani military was presented as a guardian of the ideological frontiers of the Pakistani state. In those days the military government created and supported deep religious and sectarian divisions in the society—through law making— which fester as bleeding wounds in the body politic of Pakistan to this day.
From day one, Pakistan has been an ideologically diverse society: different political, religious, sectarian and ideological groups coexist in our society since the days of the British colonial era. The military under Zia made an attempt to impose an ideological straitjacket on Pakistani society when it tried to enforce fundamentalist brand of Islam at the social and political level. So, in a way, the military under Zia acted as a partisan in ideological, sectarian and religious conflicts by joining the ranks of those who were advocating a particular brand of Islam, particular ideology and particular sectarian worldview.
The post-Zia period saw the rise of a particular class of politicians, sectarian leaders and ideologues in Pakistani society who drew benefits from the military’s partisan political, sectarian and ideological roles in society. After Zia died in an air crash, the PPP under Benazir Bhutto came to power after parliamentary elections. The PPP, which was at the receiving end of the military's brutalities during the Zia era, was perceived as a threat by the then military leaders. Therefore, these military leaders became partisan in the political conflict between the left-leaning PPP and right-leaning coalition of religious and secular groups led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
The military’s partisan role can push us as a society into a wider conflict. And the new Pakistani government will be faced with a new phenomenon of violence which is now being described in Pakistan as political violence by disgruntled political groups
This was not a linear process: so when the PPP normalised its relations with the military leadership, the latter turned its guns against the next man in power, Nawaz Sharif. Thereafter the military's partisan political role became customary. Gradually the military became an autonomous actor or player in a political power game. By the time the military government of General Musharraf came to an end, the military assumed a permanent partisan role in the political game. At times they were supporting one political player and at other times they were supporting another.
This situation was greatly facilitated by the rise of new political leaders like Imran Khan who were openly advocating the military's partisan role in politics. Imran Khan was coaxing military leaders to support his efforts against corrupt politicians during the last days of his rule. There were journalists in Pakistan who were telling their audiences that the military was maintaining files on the corruption of the Sharif family and military intelligence officials had themselves shown these files to them. Imran Khan started to publicly appeal to the military to shun their “neutrality”—this was when a military spokesman told the media that the military was neutral in the fight over no confidence motion against PM Khan—and join hands with him against his opponents.
Imran Khan’s assertions made it clear that he wanted to make the military a tool of his anti-corruption drive against his political opponents. Nawaz Sharif, on the other hand, is a little savvy when it comes to defining his preference for what kind of role the military should play in the public realm. He doesn’t publicly advocate the military's partisan role. But that doesn’t mean that does not benefit from the military’s partisan role in the country's politics.
In fact, with Imran Khan now at the receiving end of the military’s ire, the currently existing political situation has badly exposed Nawaz Sharif. He readily jumped onto the military’s bandwagon when it started using coercive machinery of the state against Imran Khan and his party activists in the wake of the 9 May 2023 attacks on military installations in the country. Now, Nawaz Sharif’s party hopes to be the chief beneficiary of the military’s partisan role against Imran Khan and his party.
The military’s partisan role can push us as a society into a wider conflict. And the new Pakistani government will be faced with a new phenomenon of violence which is now being described in Pakistan as political violence by disgruntled political groups. The 8 February 2024 parliamentary elections were contested on the slogan of whether to punish those who were involved in mob attacks on military installations on 9 May 2023 when Imran Khan’s PTI activists attacked military installations. Election results clearly show that PTI won popular votes and the party which was demanding judicial action against PTI workers, ie PML-N, didn’t fare well in the elections.
Yet Nawaz Sharif’s party is paradoxically in a comfortable position to form a government in Islamabad with the help of other smaller parties. PTI has already started a protest against what it is describing as a conspiracy to deprive it of its mandate. Two days after the elections, a senior official of the caretaker government told the media that some disgruntled elements were again planning attacks on military installations:
"I will appeal to these people not to attack military installations. We have been told by intelligence agencies that they have intercepted telephonic conversations in which people are discussing attacks on military installations," said the senior official of the caretaker government.
This is going to be a very difficult challenge for the new government which will assume office sometime in the middle of March. PTI, the party which was involved in attacks on military installations, won the largest number of seats in parliamentary elections but would not be able to form a government, and has again been accused by its critics of planning another such attack. Political observers say that election results show that judicial proceedings against PTI workers is not a very popular cause. And yet the new government will have to continue judicial proceedings against political violence carried out by PTI workers. This unpopular move is likely to overshadow the new government's policy decisions related to the rise of Taliban led violence in the north west of the country.
The argument that military force has to be used in a society like Pakistan to deal with internal security threats simply could not be sustained in all situations. This argument might be valid in situations where organized and heavily armed groups are waging insurgencies or terror campaigns against the society and state. But this is a foolish argument if it is fielded against mainstream political and sectarian groups or ideologies or dissenting individuals and groups.
The Pakistani military has to become an institution which not only at a theoretical level but also at a practical level should be deeply and strongly non-partisan in political, social, ideological and religious conflicts. Military leaders must realise what kind of society they have been tasked to defend. It is diverse at the political, social, ideological, sectarian and religious levels. If the military continues to be partisan against any group in the society, it will defeat the rationale of its existence and maintenance as a force. In such a situation, the military's confrontation with popular political leaders and groups could be described as foolhardy.
In the post-Musharraf period, the military leaders first acted in a partisan manner against Nawaz Sharif and this was followed by a state of confrontation between the military leaders and popular political groups. Now the military is having its second confrontation with a popular political leader, Imran Khan, within a span of less than six years.
This is a recipe for a big disaster that could lead to civil conflict.