Independent Pakistan inherited a developed civil-military oligarchy in relation to a weak political class. This oligarchy ruled for two decades until the 1971 debacle which discredited it completely. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party exploited the occasion to push back the military and harness the civil service to do his political bidding. But the military hit back through Gen Zia ul Haq’s martial law regime in the 1980s by seizing the commanding heights of politics, the economy and society. Gen Zia established a nursery for pro-military politicians through the installation of local governments and a nominated Majlis-e-Shura. Then he institutionalized a military service quota in the civil bureaucracy and “Islamised” state and society by amending the Constitution. Meanwhile, the Deep State was empowered and legitimized during the decade-long jihad in Afghanistan. Thus the Miltablishment came into being.
After Zia’s accidental death, Benazir Bhutto tried to regain control of state and society in 1988 but the Miltablishment hit back in 1990 by removing her from office and hoisting a “nursery” politician, Nawaz Sharif, in her place. However, when PM Nawaz sought political autonomy by refusing to take “dictation”, he was also removed from office in 1993. Suitably chastened, Benazir was given a second chance. When she ran afoul, she was sacked again in 1996. Nawaz was also given a second chance. But when he tried to give dictation instead of taking it by sacking Gen Pervez Musharraf, he provoked the Miltablishment to oust, imprison and exile him. In the mid 2000s, when Gen Musharraf tried to “settle” Kashmir with India under American and British pressure, he was persuaded to strengthen his hands by opening up political space for a popular politician like Benazir Bhutto who stood for the same things. But then a maverick judge, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, who had been made CJP courtesy the Miltablishment, decided he wouldn’t take “dictation” either. Thus the popular Movement for the Restoration of the Judiciary was born.
This provided Benazir an opportunity to redress the equation. She reneged on her agreement with Musharraf to stay back during the elections and returned home to a tumultuous welcome. Nawaz saw this as a referendum against Musharraf and a reaffirmation of the civilian impulse for civilian rule and democracy. So he too reneged on his exile agreement and returned home. In the sea of uncertainty for the future of the Miltablishment, General Musharraf retired as COAS in November, Gen Ashfaq Kayani became new COAS and Benazir was assassinated in December 2007. The stage was now set for the Miltablishment to ease out Musharraf who had become a losing proposition.
With the help of Nawaz Sharif, Gen Kayani leaned on President Asif Zardari to reinstate Iftikhar Chaudhry and Co. Despite Miltablishment reservations, however, Zardari passed the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010 to dilute the political economy of a strong center and restrict the federal revenue pool for defense expenditures. Wounded by the fall from popular grace after the US raid to extract and kill Osama bin Laden, the Miltablishment sought distraction by nudging Nawaz and Chaudhry to destabilize and weaken the PPP regime. Memogate followed and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani was ousted. Nawaz was given a third chance in 2013 only because the Miltablishment had not secured any political options. Once again, however, he ran afoul by insisting on prosecuting Musharraf for treason because the Miltablishment saw this as both as an affront and as an attempt to institutionalize civilian supremacy. So “Dawnleaks” followed Imran Khan’s allegations of rigged elections in 2013 and dharna in 2014, to oust Nawaz. PanamaLeaks enabled the Miltablishment to call in its earlier support of the judiciary to convict and disqualify Nawaz. The 2018 elections were then “managed” by a mysterious disruption of the RTS system to catapult Imran Khan into office. When the injured PPP and PMNL parties and leaders protested, NAB was let loose against them.
But public sentiment has turned against Imran Khan who has been shown up as an incompetent, blundering partner, exactly when state circumstances require a political leader of substance. The Miltablishment is being blamed for this mess. Ominously, Imran, too, is inclined to spread his wings from time to time. The problem is that it is in the nature of the office of a popularly elected or popularly selected prime minister to demand a degree of autonomy from the powerful Miltablishment which is loath to surrender it.
Imran Khan and the Miltablishment are seemingly on the same page because neither has the option of going it alone or choosing another partner. Also, by virtue of his official powers, the PM controls the personal fate or destiny of the two top men in the Miltablishment. So we may expect the Miltablishment to watch and wait until such issues have been resolved. Or until a popular storm is kicked up exogenously on any big issue and a scapegoat is required “in the national interest”.