In the past few weeks, much ink has been spilled analysing Pakistan’s General Elections 2024 through the lens of the 'civil-military' binary. As an entry point into socio-politico and economic landscape, the civil-military binary helps us understand the lack of consensus on the rules of power-sharing among elites in Pakistan. Consequently, it tends to mediate significant political-economic outcomes in Pakistan.
But like every abstract theoretical category, the binary of civil-military has its own blind spots. Civilians are not a monolith; they are fractured across socio-economic classes, among other things. Therefore, the binary of civil-military can easily invisibilise class, gender and ecology-based contradictions. Taking cognisance of this, the article goes beyond the dichotomy of the civil-military binary and offers a socio-economic (class)-based understanding of the 2024 General Election (GE) outcomes in Pakistan.
I argue that the success of PTI vis-à-vis PML-N in GE 2024, notwithstanding pre-poll and post-poll rigging allegations, is intricately tied to prevailing economic crisis in Pakistan. In particular, livelihood crisis among working classes played an important, if not decisive role, in the election outcomes.
The major conundrum of the GE 2024 results is the fact that PML-N failed to become the single largest party in the National Assembly despite being on the ‘right’ side of the establishment. Ex-post, it is convenient to argue that PML-N underperformed in the elections because it was perceived as pro-establishment. However, it is important to point out that historically, landed and political elites of Punjab have sided with the forces of the establishment, and electorally, the perception of being aligned with the establishment has been used to their advantage by political parties and candidates.
Economic hardship faced by working people of Punjab in the past few years played an important role in ensuring that PML-N does not become the single largest party in the National Assembly
Given the fact that in 2018, PML-N, and this time PTI, did well in Punjab despite being on the ‘wrong’ side of the establishment, may suggest that undergoing demographic and structural changes in Punjab have created a new constituency that does not approve of the establishment’s role in the political arena. How significant is this core constituency, and is it likely to represent a permanent or temporary change? In other words, have PTI supporters become ideologically or principally opposed to the extra-constitutional role of the establishment, or are they okay with the establishment's actions as long as they benefit PTI? Given the historical animosity between political parties and the nature of electoral competition, it's likely to be the latter, and the same can be said about PML-N supporters. More importantly, the leadership of PTI and PML-N seem to be indifferent at best when the establishment goes after their political opponents.
Does this mean being (or perceived) a pro-establishment party has become a curse now? Not necessarily. PPP was also perceived as a pro-establishment political party in GE 2024 yet it did extremely well in Sindh. In other words, PTI wave that was observed in KP and Punjab was largely absent in Sindh. In fact, PPP got a landslide victory in Sindh which reflects that it has ‘successfully’ (in terms of electoral logic) catered to its working class/peasantry base in Sindh. This can be partly attributed to expansion of cash handouts (BISP) and other redistributive economic policies via patronage networks.
There are other socio-institutional factors as well, such as large estates (semi-feudal structures) in interior Sindh which makes electoral competition in Sindh less competitive than Punjab and KP. Given these differences between Punjab and Sindh, we need to be cautious in our comparisons. But at the very least, PPP’s success in Sindh pushes us to explore socio-economic factors which can mediate electoral outcomes.
Thus, I reiterate my main argument that the economic hardship faced by working people of Punjab in the past few years played an important role in ensuring that PML-N does not become the single largest party in the National Assembly.
Here, I elaborate on this. PTI’s support base in Punjab is primarily affluent urban residents, college-educated young people, professional classes, and diasporic communities. They form the political base of PTI. As of now, it seems unlikely they will vote for anyone but PTI. We expect this base to grow in coming years, and they have shown resilience to come out in large numbers on February 8th, 2024.
The PML-N-led coalition government approached the economy only from a macroeconomic perspective, ignoring the microeconomic manifestations of the economic crisis
On the other hand, PML-N historically relied on traders/merchants (key players in the bazaar economy) and small businesses as its political base in urban centres. It is important to ask why these socio-economic groups supported PML-N. I would argue it was primarily due to the economic policies of PML-N, which were seen as pro-growth and development. In other terms, PML-N built its political base through economic development rather than any abstract ideology. As a result, its political base is more responsive to economy (henceforth can easily shrink) than PTI’s base which seems to be more motivated by the ideology/discourse. In rural spaces, both PML-N and PTI tend to rely on existing societal hierarchies and patronage networks to garner political support.
But neither PTI nor PML-N can win elections solely based on their political base. Both parties need ‘swing’ voters to win elections. Who are the swing voters in Punjab? Working classes in urban centres are the main swing voters in Punjab. They are up for grabs because they are likely to be more attuned to the economic reality of the day-to-day grind.
Economic policies adopted by PML-N after assuming power in 2021 ended up demotivating its political base and pushing away swing voters. In the past year and a half, the PML-N-led coalition government approached the economy only from a macroeconomic perspective, ignoring the microeconomic manifestations of the economic crisis. That is, policies of macroeconomic stabilisation have deepened the livelihood crisis for the working people of Pakistan. One of its starkest manifestations has been a massive jump in utility bills for the working and middle classes of Pakistan.
PML-N tried to justify its policies by making a case that PTI was reckless in its fiscal spending, which brought Pakistan to the brink of bankruptcy, but it did not sit well with the working people.
Thus, PML-N’s underperformance in Punjab and Hazara districts of KP can be attributed to the following two possibilities or a combination of both. One, working classes either stayed at home and did not come out to vote for PML-N because they were disillusioned by the economic performance of the PML-N-led coalition government. Two, they voted for PTI to register their protest against: a) anti-working people policies of the last 18 months of PML-N led coalition government and b) to approve PTI’s ‘redistributive’ policies such as the expansion of the Ehsas program, Langar (Free food camps), Health Card, and subsidies on fuel and utilities.
One major takeaway is that getting on the ‘right’ side of the establishment is not going to cut it anymore. Political parties have a simple choice: adopt pro-people (progressive) economic policies, or face the wrath of working people in elections.