Nothing is more contentious than the phrase “national interest” in the political domain and debates of Pakistan. Why is that? The history of this issue is well known, stemming from the military’s role in the country’s political sphere, where it has either taken charge of national affairs directly or influenced them indirectly in so-called hybrid regimes, curtailing the role and powers of political parties and their governments.
How it started and why it started—I will skip that for now and leave this debate to historians and political scientists. The real contention, however, lies in the very definition: what qualifies as the national interest of the country? Within which framework is its definition formulated, and who is vested with the power to define it? A purely simplistic take on it would immediately point the finger at Pakistan’s military establishment—they are the ones who usurped power, they are the ones who concocted a whole narrative to sideline the political forces in the name of national interest.
But hark! Stop for a minute and ask: is that not an overly simplistic view of the matter – a very easy and convenient conclusion to draw?
Before I attempt to answer this, let’s go back to square one and try to find a standard definition of what ‘national interest’ means. I take a shortcut by putting this question to ChatGPT, and it provides five different definitions of the term as applied in political science, international relations, and public policy. However, these remain contested, and none of them can be regarded as a “standard” definition. This means that national interest is a flexible concept that can be bent and reshaped to suit different purposes.
The five definitions are as follows
Realist Definition: In classical realism and neorealism, national interest is typically defined in terms of power, security, and the survival of the state. Hans Morgenthau, a key realist thinker, argued that national interest is driven by the pursuit of power and is defined objectively as "the survival and security of the state." Liberal/Institutionalist definition includes economic prosperity, human rights, and cooperation among states. National interest, in this view, encompasses not only security but also economic development, environmental concerns, and participation in international institutions.
The definition of national interest is neither static nor universally agreed upon. Rather, it is a contested and evolving concept, subject to interpretation and manipulation by different political actors
According to Constructivist Definition national interest is socially constructed and shaped by identity, norms, and historical experiences. This means that national interests are not fixed but evolve based on changing social, political, and cultural contexts. Public Policy and Domestic Politics Perspectives emphasise that national interest is determined through domestic political debates and policymaking. It reflects the interests of different political actors (e.g., government, business elites, and civil society) and may change depending on leadership and public opinion. Legal and Constitutional Definition upholds national interest as the fundamental goals outlined in a country's constitution or legal framework, such as protecting sovereignty, ensuring economic stability, and upholding citizens’ rights.
Thus, the definition of national interest is neither static nor universally agreed upon. Rather, it is a contested and evolving concept, subject to interpretation and manipulation by different political actors.
In Pakistan’s case, the notion of national interest perhaps aligns with the country’s status as a ‘security state.’ Hence, it invokes a realist approach to national interest, where the survival of the country, owing to external threats—primarily because of the history of conflicts with India—remains paramount. This perspective overshadows other approaches to the concept, as exemplified by Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s emotionally charged speech, in which he stated, "We shall eat grass, but we shall build the nuclear bomb." He placed economic development on the back burner by prioritising the acquisition of nuclear weapons. His successor, General Zia-ul-Haq—like his predecessor, General Ayub Khan—took it to the next level, asserting that even if the Constitution had to be put in abeyance, it must be done if national security was threatened.
Now we do have nuclear weapons, and a great part of our population has eaten enough grass—the old definition of national interest in the name of a security state perhaps needs serious revision
Their opponents may argue that even if there has been an incessant existential threat, as was proven in 1971, pivotal decisions regarding national security should have been left to political institutions—the parliament and the federal cabinet. The free functioning of these institutions would have yielded better results than the political acumen of a few generals. This argument does carry weight on principle. But how can this side support its argument if these national institutions turn into arenas of horse trading, self-serving law-making, and platforms for political parties and their leaders, who display a sheer lack of understanding of security issues, the complexities of international relations and deliver nothing on the economic front?
Looking back at history, it is clear that in key decision-making sectors such as energy policy, economic policy, and water management, or in more democratic spheres such as media freedom, the performance of political parties has yielded such disastrous results that the fragile national economy itself has become a matter of national security. In other words, Pakistan now faces a multifaceted national security threat—both internal and external—compounded by an ever-growing threat of terrorism. Which of these poses a greater existential challenge can generate an endless debate.
But the fact of the matter is that all of these threats exist simultaneously, and all of them are critical.
In a situation where Pakistan faces armed attacks on its western border and a significant portion of its military remains on standby on the eastern front; where the IMF has gained so much influence in the country’s internal matters that it can interview top judges and dictate who should sit in key ministries, the concept of national interest has perhaps evolved into an extremely perplexing notion. Now we do have nuclear weapons, and a great part of our population has eaten enough grass—the old definition of national interest in the name of a security state perhaps needs serious revision.
Here are the points to ponder
Does it serve the national interest to abrogate, distort, or hold the Constitution in abeyance? Is it in the national interest to render key national institutions dysfunctional? What kind of national security challenge arises when the country has 30 million children out of school—what if they fall into the hands of jihadi organisations? What does an unhealthy, unhappy, disenchanted population mean to national security? How does an ambiguous foreign policy threaten national interest? What kind of challenge does an undisciplined population pose? How has the ideology of pan-Islamism served the national interest? The list of these national challenges is exhaustive, but it is undoubtedly in the national interest to identify them, confront them, and scrutinise them to determine what truly qualifies as national interest and what poses a greater security challenge beyond Facebook posts and people demanding political rights.
The real problem probably lies elsewhere, and we have remained preoccupied with the obvious!