What has remained elusive throughout these experiments is the development of institutions. Predictably, governance has suffered.
The reasons are many and there are as many theories as there are theorists. But that’s not what I intend to do here. My concern is with the idea of ‘hybrid government’ and what it entails.
But let’s first define what the ‘hybrid’ here means.
There’s now a broad consensus — and there’s also little pretence left now — that the current government headed by Prime Minister Imran Khan was carefully (s)elected by the army. Reason: the army, just like Khan, believes, somewhat simply, that the personal greed of political families has led to mismanagement and malfeasance which, in turn, have stymied economic growth and development.
In other words, if we can get rid of traditional political families and purge traditional political parties of such families, we should be fine. Khan, being clean as driven snow, was thought sufficient to turn the situation around. That didn’t happen and is unlikely to — partly because Pakistan’s woes run deeper than the diagnosis offered by the (s)electors and partly because of capacity issues in the (s)elected.
Result: the army has steadily increased its presence in dealing with major challenges facing the country, both internal and external. Two primary examples are the National Command and Operations Centre (NCOC) and the National Locust Control Centre (NLCC).
This is what Fahd Husain wrote in an op-ed for Dawn:
“NCOC is led by Federal Planning Minister Asad Umar while NLCC is led by Federal Food Minister Fakhar Imam. The chief coordinator for NCOC is Lt Gen Hamood uz Zaman Khan and he is assisted by Maj Gen Asif Mehmood Goraya. Both belong to the Pakistan Army’s Air Defence Corps. The chief coordinator for NLCC is Lt Gen Moazzam Ejaz and he is assisted by Maj Gen Saeed Akhtar. Both belong to the Army Engineers Corps. More than 70 army officers of the Air Defence are working in NCOC while a large number of officers of Engineers are working in NLCC.”
Husain goes on to say, “The NCOC and NLCC are valuable examples of what, in our context, is called ‘hybrid governance’. In popular lexicon, this term may carry a pejorative connotation, but these two examples may well need to be examined in a value-neutral way, especially since the crises are still unfolding around us.”
In other words, the army, instead of taking over directly or pulling the strings from behind, has decided to monitor or facilitate or dictate policy and has its people placed in all important policymaking fora. Different people will use different terms, depending on how they lean politically and analytically. What needs to be understood, however, is that this hasn’t happened for the first time. Previous governments too used the army, when the need arose, to help formulate and implement policy.
But that, again, is not what I intend to talk about, though that too is an important topic.
My query today is to see whether the army’s participation in areas outside its professional remit helps or hinders the army in its main task: to train and prepare for war in order to deter it.
Short answer: it makes a fighting force lose its edge. Additionally, it raises many questions regarding the point of having a vast bureaucratic infrastructure on the civilian side, as also its utilisation and efficiency. This infrastructure also includes multiple organisations for law and policy enforcement. But that too is ancillary to the discussion here.
So, let’s return to what such ancillary engagements mean for the army, or more broadly, the military.
As I have noted elsewhere, the nature of war does not change, its conduct does. The conduct of war has changed throughout history with changes in technology. From contact war, the world has moved to no-contact war. We now have weapons whose central operating principles are distance, stealth, and surprise. They are the product of cutting-edge research and development and they require not just doctrinal changes but also specialized training.
War used to be about fighting and winning. That has largely changed. It is now more about deterrence, keeping the adversaries away. And, when need be, meting out unacceptable punishment to an aggressor.
Emerging technologies and their cross-platforms integration are not just changing the conduct of future, transformational war and its many battles. They also require complete reorganisation and doctrinal shifts and, with that, the intake, skillsets of the soldiers and their training. History is witness to a simple fact: scientific-military prowess is key to the rise of states and, the absence of scientific-military prowess is key to their fall or subjugation.
New technologies also mean that the era of labour-intensive militaries is almost over. In their place will now come tech- and capital-intensive militaries. Even basic infantry gadgets will require soldiers familiar with principles of science in order to be effective on the battle space. Some of this is in the future, but as we have seen through history, the past, present and future are a continuum. What we sow today we shall reap tomorrow and history has never been sympathetic to regrets.
As we stand today, we have a good, hardy, professional army. But is this an army geared for coming technological challenges? I am not sure. Are we aware of where technology and next-generation war is headed? Perhaps. Is that enough? Certainly not. Are we focusing on training? Apparently not. The 70 officers from Air Defence at NCOC noted by Husain most definitely are not currently in training for their military role. That is true of every officer who is involved in any activity that is not part of his/her professional role. Sure, there are areas where functions can overlap — e.g., engineering, telecommunication, computers, medicine. Specialised training in and with the civilian sector and such rotation can help military officers from those corps to hone skills. But that is a different framework altogether.
Note: the militaries fighting the next-generation wars will not have time for anything other than what they are required to do. Training is a seamless exercise. It requires focus. When we get the army to streamline WAPDA, sort out ghost schools, handle policing duties, fight invisible pathogens (unless it’s army’s specialised teams working in tandem with civilian labs), and send them after locusts et cetera, we are doing two things: one, we are acknowledging that the civilian apparatus is dysfunctional and cannot cope with what it is supposed to do and, two, we are wasting precious training time of the army and involving it in tasks that are outside its remit.
In times of national crises we need all hands on deck. But every problem cannot be treated as a national crisis. No one is saying that the military cannot and should never be called upon to help. That would be silly. But what’s required (a) is to improve capacity on the civilian side and (b) do so in order to keep the army involved in its primary job. No more or less.
Hybrid war is a threat. Hybrid government can’t be all that good!
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times and reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider