But unlike the ties between Pakistan and the US – which have perhaps been overanalyzed by experts both at home and abroad – little has been written about the relationship between Islamabad and Riyadh. This lack of research perhaps has more to do with Saudi Arabia being a closed, exclusionary state rather than an unwillingness in Pakistan to approach the subject. China falls in the same category.
In December, Islamabad was seemingly surprised to find itself in among the 34 members of a “counterterrorism” coalition announced by Saudi Arabia. The government said it would join the alliance, but insists it does not know any more details. On February 16, Pakistan confirmed its soldiers will join the ‘North Thunder’ exercises close to Saudi Arabia’s border with Iraq. These decisions were made in spite of fears of sectarian tensions at home and a decline in ties with Iran.
What is behind this unbreakable alliance?
“It has everything to do with being Pakistani,” says Ayesha Siddiqa, a military scientist and author. “The creation of this country based on religion has created an unequal relationship that cannot be balanced.”
The real challenge in disengaging with Saudi Arabia is economic
After the Arab oil embargo of 1973, when certain Arab states became very rich overnight, the Saudi monarchy used its newfound wealth to embark on a global tour in a bid to associate their kingdom with Islam. The king of Saudi Arabia was named ‘the Protector of the Noble Sanctuaries’, with the sole purpose of creating religious legitimacy for the monarch, says Kamran Bokhari, a Middle East and South Asia expert at the University of Ottawa and the author of Political Islam in the Age of Democratization. “This happened over several decades, and now much of Muslim world – Pakistan included – cannot differentiate between the two,” he said.
But even before 1973, Saudi Arabia had close ties with Jamaat-e-Islami founder Abul Ala Maudoodi. The party did not have significant power or influence until before the Zia regime.
During the Afghan Jihad, the kingdom continued a process of “salafization” of Pakistan’s Deobandis, mainly through donations. Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi citizen, and Abdullah Azzam, an Egyptian cleric, set up the ‘Maktab al Khidmat’ bureau to organize the flow of money and personnel from the gulf states into the Afghan resistance against the Russians. The network led to the development of Al Qaeda. It is not clear how closely the Pakistani state was involved.
“It is not like there were rogue Saudi elements going about in the country,” says Ayesha Siddiqa. “The state knew everything and allowed it to happen.”
Kamran Bokhari disagrees. Even if Pakistani intelligence was aware of this inflow of extremists, there was a lack of understanding as to what they were up to in Peshawar and in Afghanistan, he says. “Later, these same Arabs would not only lay the foundations for Al Qaeda but also challenge the Afghans themselves for control over the Taliban.”
There is further disagreement on the extent of Saudi influence within Pakistan. “There has always been too much emphasis on the Saudi influence here, without objectively assessing ground realities,” says Ayesha Siddiqa. “They did play an active role, but by blaming everything on them, we are washing our hands clean of everything.”
Pakistan’s recent refusal to join the Saudi war in Yemen is seen by some as a change in its policy towards Riyadh.
“The real challenge in disengaging with Saudi Arabia will be the livelihood of up to 1.5 million Pakistanis that work and live in the kingdom,” said defense analyst Imtiaz Gul. Remittances from Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia account for nearly one third of the total annual remittances, with the figure crossing $5.6 billion in 2015. “A major stream of revenue will dry up, and it will add a lot of pressure on the local job market.”
According to Imtiaz Gul, the defense cooperation pact with Saudi Arabia seems magnificent on paper, “but it’s not all that”. Most of the cooperation revolves around training of Saudi forces and limited defense of critical institutions.
Pakistan has been ambivalent about supporting Saudi Arabia’s plans in Syria, but sooner or later, it will have to take a clear position on whether it wants to become part of the Riyadh-Tehran feud. That position is critical in determining the future of ties between Islamabad and Riyadh.