Pakistan’s lingering intra-elite conflict is entering a decisive but dangerous phase. It may destruct our fragile parliamentary democracy, power centres and administrative structures.
The intra-elite conflict may be described as artificial, since Pakistan’s political elite is neither fighting a class war nor disputing ideology. Clearly, the elite share common social and economic class interests. Take the composition of the two warring political parties: leaders that are stars in their own rights lead them; their second tier of leadership comprises middle or upper-middle classes; and crony capitalists who depend on the state largesse finance the expensive political activities of the party in power. Also, the landed elite join the party the power centres favour.
So if their class composition and social and political interests are the same, then what are they fighting over? The governments of the two parties have shown strong tendencies to serve the economic interests of the dominant social classes.
It would be wrong to suggest that the parties are devoid of ideology. They share a common ideology -- of acting as front organisations for state institutions and powerful individuals. They often launch frontal attacks against senior state officials. However, this act is hardly ever meaningful; for instance, focused on reforming state institutions, but it is mostly aimed at molding attitudes and policies of state institutions in their favour in future political contests.
The third party involved in the intra-elite conflict comprises representative of state institutions, that clandestinely participates in this conflict through decision-making and extending support to a political party. The third party’s aim is to grab unfettered political power. They function from behind closed doors of powerhouses in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
The third party’s involvement in political conflicts has a long history. Let’s start with August 2014, when an artificial political upheaval was unleashed in the country. The ongoing intra-elite conflict is a result of events recorded back then. Those who launched the protest march and those against whom the protest march was directed belong to the upper classes of Pakistan. Most of them live in urban areas of Central and Northern Punjab. Most of them are industrialists or big businessmen who sided with the landed elite after it became clear that they would come to power. The powerful officials of state institutions (read army generals and spymasters) played a key role in this intra-elite conflict of August 2014 – whereby the opposition refused to accept the party in power as the legitimate government of the country.
Two outcomes of this intra-elite conflict will cast a dark shadow on the democratic future of the country.
First, it is no secret that the elite has developed linkages with ranks and files of the Pakistani military. Previously, the army generals had favourites. Now the army’s ranks and files choose their favourites. This could severely compromise the discipline within the army. This could also lead to the intra-elite conflict adversely affect the country’s stability.
Second, the political actors are increasingly displaying a tendency to subvert the political system for personal gains. The blocking of the constitutional process of vote counting in the National Assembly on the no-confidence motion against Imran Khan is fresh in memory. We could witness more such instances of political subversions as the intra-elite conflict intensifies in the coming days. The fear of losing power might force the elite to subvert the political system.
The intra-elite conflict may be described as artificial, since Pakistan’s political elite is neither fighting a class war nor disputing ideology. Clearly, the elite share common social and economic class interests. Take the composition of the two warring political parties: leaders that are stars in their own rights lead them; their second tier of leadership comprises middle or upper-middle classes; and crony capitalists who depend on the state largesse finance the expensive political activities of the party in power. Also, the landed elite join the party the power centres favour.
So if their class composition and social and political interests are the same, then what are they fighting over? The governments of the two parties have shown strong tendencies to serve the economic interests of the dominant social classes.
First, it is no secret that the elite has developed linkages with ranks and files of the Pakistani military. Previously, the army generals had favourites. Now the army’s ranks and files choose their favourites.
It would be wrong to suggest that the parties are devoid of ideology. They share a common ideology -- of acting as front organisations for state institutions and powerful individuals. They often launch frontal attacks against senior state officials. However, this act is hardly ever meaningful; for instance, focused on reforming state institutions, but it is mostly aimed at molding attitudes and policies of state institutions in their favour in future political contests.
The third party involved in the intra-elite conflict comprises representative of state institutions, that clandestinely participates in this conflict through decision-making and extending support to a political party. The third party’s aim is to grab unfettered political power. They function from behind closed doors of powerhouses in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
The third party’s involvement in political conflicts has a long history. Let’s start with August 2014, when an artificial political upheaval was unleashed in the country. The ongoing intra-elite conflict is a result of events recorded back then. Those who launched the protest march and those against whom the protest march was directed belong to the upper classes of Pakistan. Most of them live in urban areas of Central and Northern Punjab. Most of them are industrialists or big businessmen who sided with the landed elite after it became clear that they would come to power. The powerful officials of state institutions (read army generals and spymasters) played a key role in this intra-elite conflict of August 2014 – whereby the opposition refused to accept the party in power as the legitimate government of the country.
Second, the political actors are increasingly displaying a tendency to subvert the political system for personal gains. The blocking of the constitutional process of vote counting in the National Assembly on the no-confidence motion against Imran Khan is fresh in memory.
Two outcomes of this intra-elite conflict will cast a dark shadow on the democratic future of the country.
First, it is no secret that the elite has developed linkages with ranks and files of the Pakistani military. Previously, the army generals had favourites. Now the army’s ranks and files choose their favourites. This could severely compromise the discipline within the army. This could also lead to the intra-elite conflict adversely affect the country’s stability.
Second, the political actors are increasingly displaying a tendency to subvert the political system for personal gains. The blocking of the constitutional process of vote counting in the National Assembly on the no-confidence motion against Imran Khan is fresh in memory. We could witness more such instances of political subversions as the intra-elite conflict intensifies in the coming days. The fear of losing power might force the elite to subvert the political system.