The recent episode of action against the Chotu gang has once again highlighted the inadequacies of capacity of the state to govern and maintain order. The capacity limitations of our governance structure surface frequently, but as soon as a crisis is over, the matter is swept under the carpet. The encounter with Chotu gang has come up as another rude awakening. The shortcomings of the governance infrastructure to ensure rule of law and dispense social justice give birth to outlaws like Robin Hood, Phoolan Devi and Chotu, who sometimes become powerful enough to challenge the state itself.
Rather than myopically blaming the police force or a provincial government in this specific case, the gravity of the real problem needs to be realized. The real challenge is the dwindling governance capacity of the state. In case of Pakistan, the process of state building could never take off for a plethora of reasons. Francis Fukuyama mentions in Political Order and Political Decay that it is the administrative strength of governance structure in a state that staves off the danger of fragility or failure. Despite all odds, the Pakistani society has demonstrated remarkable resilience, but it is high time we realized that there exist serious capacity gaps in the governance framework.
The role of the executive or the administrative branch is extremely vital in state building. It may sound unpalatable but it is a fact that history has witnessed the existence of many strong states which could thrive merely on the basis of strong executive, when other pillars of modern state were nonexistent. The Pax Romana (The famous Roman Peace) which spread over the large tracts of Europe for a period of more than two centuries could become possible, after a long period of frequent wars, only because of the strength of the Roman governance. Even today, some authoritarian states have successfully achieved miraculous economic development only by virtue of a strong executive capable of making and implementing decisions and policies. The reference to past or present authoritarian states by no means justifies undermining of the democratic order or judicial independence, it is merely to emphasize desirability of robust governance as a pivot of the state.
We inherited reasonably developed institutions at the time of independence vis-à-vis our western neighbors or several Middle Eastern and African states. But afterwards, the bulk of governance apparatus experienced a stunted growth and hardly a few institutions could continue to grow. Due to exigencies of geopolitics, Pakistan has constantly remained entangled in zero sum cycles of war-and-peace along with repeated disruptions of democracy. The stumbled democratic process and burden of a war economy have left little space for institution building. Due to chronic instability, no long term policy initiatives could be taken by successive governments for the strengthening of their governance capacity.
The frequent political instability and the uncertainty of completion of constitutional tenures has induced a trend among the political governments to embark on short term initiatives having more public visibility, in order to get electoral dividends in minimum possible time, rather than taking long term reform measures to enhance the governance capacity. Even some very well intentioned policy initiatives often go awry because the institutions that are supposed to implement them lack the wherewithal to deliver.
The handling of Chotu gang has exposed the same issue of institutional incapacity. Prima facie, the political will was quite visible on the part of government to eradicate this gang, but when this was translated into action, the organizational shortcomings resulted in an administrative disaster. The same is the case with almost every public sector organization. It is time we learned from experiences of states like Singapore or Japan. Both these states owe their development not to natural resources but to the strength of their governance. Contemporary Japan has inherited traditions of strong governance since Meiji Restoration of the nineteenth century and has successfully built strong institutions, while Singapore has built a robust and efficient executive during the second half of the twentieth century in a short span of a few decades.
A serious and long term reform effort should also be initiated in Pakistan. Parameters of good governance, as defined by the World Bank or UNDP, may not be the gospel, but on the elements like transparency, equity and rule of law, they are difficult to disagree with. The solutions and interventions should take into account our own socio-cultural realities while strictly adhering to canons of democracy and social justice. For instance, in case of the welfare states of Scandinavia, the size of governments is big because they need large and extensive structures to implement welfare programs, while the Chinese justify their own authoritative style of governance by simply saying ‘one size does not fit all’.
Improvement of governance through reforms and capacity building needs to be on top of government agenda. If this is not undertaken, the state will remain embroiled in a low-level trap. Underperforming institutions will perpetuate underdevelopment which will continue to breed poverty and extremism. It needs to be acknowledged by all the stakeholders that a lopsided state having a few too strong and many too weak institutions at its very best can only perform just at suboptimal level.
Rather than myopically blaming the police force or a provincial government in this specific case, the gravity of the real problem needs to be realized. The real challenge is the dwindling governance capacity of the state. In case of Pakistan, the process of state building could never take off for a plethora of reasons. Francis Fukuyama mentions in Political Order and Political Decay that it is the administrative strength of governance structure in a state that staves off the danger of fragility or failure. Despite all odds, the Pakistani society has demonstrated remarkable resilience, but it is high time we realized that there exist serious capacity gaps in the governance framework.
Instability compels governments to prefer short term projects with public visibility
The role of the executive or the administrative branch is extremely vital in state building. It may sound unpalatable but it is a fact that history has witnessed the existence of many strong states which could thrive merely on the basis of strong executive, when other pillars of modern state were nonexistent. The Pax Romana (The famous Roman Peace) which spread over the large tracts of Europe for a period of more than two centuries could become possible, after a long period of frequent wars, only because of the strength of the Roman governance. Even today, some authoritarian states have successfully achieved miraculous economic development only by virtue of a strong executive capable of making and implementing decisions and policies. The reference to past or present authoritarian states by no means justifies undermining of the democratic order or judicial independence, it is merely to emphasize desirability of robust governance as a pivot of the state.
We inherited reasonably developed institutions at the time of independence vis-à-vis our western neighbors or several Middle Eastern and African states. But afterwards, the bulk of governance apparatus experienced a stunted growth and hardly a few institutions could continue to grow. Due to exigencies of geopolitics, Pakistan has constantly remained entangled in zero sum cycles of war-and-peace along with repeated disruptions of democracy. The stumbled democratic process and burden of a war economy have left little space for institution building. Due to chronic instability, no long term policy initiatives could be taken by successive governments for the strengthening of their governance capacity.
The frequent political instability and the uncertainty of completion of constitutional tenures has induced a trend among the political governments to embark on short term initiatives having more public visibility, in order to get electoral dividends in minimum possible time, rather than taking long term reform measures to enhance the governance capacity. Even some very well intentioned policy initiatives often go awry because the institutions that are supposed to implement them lack the wherewithal to deliver.
The handling of Chotu gang has exposed the same issue of institutional incapacity. Prima facie, the political will was quite visible on the part of government to eradicate this gang, but when this was translated into action, the organizational shortcomings resulted in an administrative disaster. The same is the case with almost every public sector organization. It is time we learned from experiences of states like Singapore or Japan. Both these states owe their development not to natural resources but to the strength of their governance. Contemporary Japan has inherited traditions of strong governance since Meiji Restoration of the nineteenth century and has successfully built strong institutions, while Singapore has built a robust and efficient executive during the second half of the twentieth century in a short span of a few decades.
A serious and long term reform effort should also be initiated in Pakistan. Parameters of good governance, as defined by the World Bank or UNDP, may not be the gospel, but on the elements like transparency, equity and rule of law, they are difficult to disagree with. The solutions and interventions should take into account our own socio-cultural realities while strictly adhering to canons of democracy and social justice. For instance, in case of the welfare states of Scandinavia, the size of governments is big because they need large and extensive structures to implement welfare programs, while the Chinese justify their own authoritative style of governance by simply saying ‘one size does not fit all’.
Improvement of governance through reforms and capacity building needs to be on top of government agenda. If this is not undertaken, the state will remain embroiled in a low-level trap. Underperforming institutions will perpetuate underdevelopment which will continue to breed poverty and extremism. It needs to be acknowledged by all the stakeholders that a lopsided state having a few too strong and many too weak institutions at its very best can only perform just at suboptimal level.