The Chinese commitment to CPEC and to Pakistan is perhaps best summed up by the words of Zhou Gang, the former Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan and India and a veteran career diplomat often recognized as the architect of Pak-China relations: “We will never abandon our Pakistani brothers. Our cooperation on the seaport in Gwadar, in energy self-sufficiency, transport and infrastructure is a testament of our vision to see Pakistan grow, prosper and stand tall.”
However, this is not to say that Chinese concerns end with security-related matters. Tang Mengsheng, Director of the Pakistan Studies Department at Peking University, in a side conversation in December, said that he hoped Pakistan could prioritize national interests and stability over local interests. He is also very cognizant of the fact that CPEC is a very expensive project, and that it is technologically challenging. It remains susceptible when Pakistan’s weak governance structures threaten to derail it, and political scandals continue to undermine progress.
These concerns are not without merit, as Pakistan is notorious for corruption and political mismanagement, consistently scoring in the lowest rung on independent reports such as the Transparency International’s corruption index. The prime minister, the most significant political titleholder in the land, is embroiled in the scandal resulting from the Panama leaks. All of this naturally creates uneasiness in the Chinese, as they see these issues as bottlenecks to their long term strategic vision.
The Chinese are wary of any precedent set by the West
Wang Xu, Deputy Director of South-East Study Center at Peking University, has a list of recommendations that might put some of the Chinese fears to rest.
First, he believes that China should understand the realities of the Pakistan law enforcement agencies, and should do more in terms of finances, equipment, joint trainings and intelligence sharing. The latter, he feels, needs to not only be bilateral, but also trilateral or even quadrilateral, depending on the intelligence and the context.
Second, he is staunchly against the idea of Chinese boots on Pakistan soil. The Chinese are traditionally wary of any precedent set by the West, particularly the Americans, and in their opinion, groups like Blackwater are a terrible idea on foreign soil. He feels that the security for CPEC should have four layers and should entirely consist of Pakistani personnel. The four layers are private security, police, rangers and the army.
Third, Xu is convinced that stability in the region will not be possible without a stable Afghanistan. To this end he feels that the quadrilateral mechanism should be continued to create a more stable Afghanistan, and all efforts should be undertaken to bring Taliban to the discussion table.
Finally, he feels that both countries should do more in the realm of social welfare projects. He feels that since the enactment of the National Action Plan (NAP), there are strict regulations in place for NGOs. However, this gap can be filled by initiatives from bilateral cooperation between China and Pakistan.
Mengsheng is also very candid about the increased need for cultural cooperation, and language in both countries to better study and understand each other’s cultures, ideology, nomenclature, history and aspirations. “There is a saying for our two great nations. That the friendship between Pakistan and China is higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, and sweeter than honey,” he said. “But can we shake hands on land, and truly understand one another?” It is a powerful reality check, one that reminds us of the many barriers that we need to overcome in order to work hand in hand with the Chinese to forge a better future not only for Pakistan but for the region.
The author is a journalist and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad
Email: zeeshan[dot]salahuddin[at]gmail.com
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