Non-party based elections changed the political and electoral dynamics of the country altogether. In the absence of political parties, personal pomp and show got importance. It was evident from the five million rupees – a massive amount in those days – spent by Nawaz Sharif on his elections in PP-105 and NA-95, as the word went around. His posters, as it was reported, were displayed all along the GT Road, from Lahore to Jhelum, as a testimony to that spending. The voters in both these constituencies (provincial and national) were predominantly Arain and Kashmiri – Nawaz Sharif banked on the Kashmiri vote. Baradri (clan) affiliations filled the vacuum in the absence of pure political discourse – manifesto and political ideology – that the political parties would propound. This was the beginning of an unending series of political crimes and crises in the country. It is since then that the downfall of all the national institutions, including sports and arts, began to take place.
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif got elected for a second time from PP-105 Lahore – as well as NA-95, which he vacated – to be the Chief Minister of Punjab in 1985.
The Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo (1985-88), was a gentleman, and he wasn’t very fond of Nawaz Sharif. However, President General Zia-ul-Haq ousted PM Junejo, and Nawaz Sharif prevailed. After General Zia died in the mysterious plane crash in 1987, party-based elections took place in 1988, with Benazir Bhutto leading the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif leading the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). However, little did the political discourse matter in that election too, as the clan affiliation – the bradari system – remained the dominant factor along with the personal influence of the candidates in their respective constituencies. The 1988 elections placed Benazir Bhutto in the Prime Minister’s office, and put Nawaz Sharif back into his place as the Chief Minister of Punjab.
The years immediately following the 1985 elections were crucial for Pakistani politics. Political ideologies vanished, and the elections became dominated by the electables, with a few surprises now and then, backed by their bradaris. But this clan support, however, was not for free. It came with a price – government jobs for the young graduates from the bradaris, preferably in the police or revenue department. Consequently, during the next decade and a half, nearly all government departments, both national and provincial, became over-staffed with incompetent political appointees. This ruined key institutions like PIA, Pakistan Railways, Pakistan Steel Mills, PTV, and numerous others.
The contractors, who offered more dirty money to the MNAs and MPAs, got the contracts for the big ticket development projects. With time, those contractors swelled so big that they gained considerable influence in determining the next man in power, until they realized that they should come into power themselves.
Election candidates promised jobs, roads, water, and other necessities to the voters – their bradari – rather than having a position and opinion on matters of national importance. The members of the ruling party, the coalition partners, and other supporters, could press their leaders to allocate development funds at their discretion or face the music. It introduced a culture, which the contractors – thekedar – and government officials were going to benefit most from. The contractors, who offered more dirty money to the MNAs and MPAs, got the contracts for the big ticket development projects. With time, those contractors swelled so big that they gained considerable influence in determining the next man in power, until they realized that they should come into power themselves.
A new system came into being that normalized malversation. The hidden benefits of parliamentary democracy now became too visible, too attractive. Democracy became synonymous to this system, from which only a few could benefit. Consequently, all the institutions and government departments deteriorated gradually, owing to corrupt practices and the induction of political affiliates in all departments at the national and provincial levels.
The Sindhi, South Punjabi, and Balochi cards were played on the pretext that Punjab – namely the Punjabi elite and Punjabi establishment - consumed all the resources and the smaller provinces remained deprived, and were kept systematically underdeveloped. It was despite the fact that Sindh and South Punjab supplied most of the ruling class to the country. It made sense that the Sindh and South Punjab ruling elite kept their constituencies underdeveloped, as it would mean demanding more development funds, never to be spent on people’s welfare, and have less politically aware voters. So, it made sense to keep the ‘deprived card’ alive.
The clan politics that started in 1985 had metastasized into its final form – a great nexus of land mafias and thekedars dominating national politics as the electables.
Much of all this was rooted into the non-party based elections of 1985.
The political parties borne out of this system after 1985 were bereft of any democratic culture. Those which had existed before – PPP, PML, JI and ANP – couldn’t remain unblemished either. The intra-party elections – it is well known – became a joke. Conversely, dynasties emerged within the political parties, making them family incorporated, if not a political gang per se, in the way they functioned. In the face of all this, democracy limped and the economy began to crawl on all fours.
The best part came though when the land-grabbers joined hands with the politicians in the post-2000 era – they gradually bought media houses and made their way into the power corridors, built massive housing schemes and acquired tons of money. On one hand, they financed the political parties, on the other hands, they controlled them with their media power, until many of them decided to enter politics themselves.
The clan politics that started in 1985 had metastasized into its final form – a great nexus of land mafias and thekedars dominating national politics as the electables.
Like it or not, the PTI’s 2011 jalsa at Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore heralded a change. Despite the PTI coming to dominate national politics with the help of the establishment, it did pose a threat to the thekedar-land mafia nexus by politically mobilising the educated youth and middle classes of the country. Ironically, in 2013, when the fervor of the 2011 jalsa was still fresh, the PTI leadership wrongly fell for the electables – the same thekedar-land mafia infiltrated the PTI – undermined its own intra-party elections, and therefore lost the opportunity of purging the old political culture. Today, it pays the price for the mistakes committed a decade ago.
Among all other things that have happened since PTI’s ouster from power in 2022, the politics in Pakistan seems to have drifted away from the political culture borne out of the 1985 elections. One can perhaps effectively theorise that the economic suffering of the electorate would yield different dynamics in the next elections – whenever they happen. We might see the old political strands ending, owing to the collective memory of the past one and a half year that welds people together beyond baradari consciousness – along with the end of the electables.
The air smells different now. It’s a cloudy and calm afternoon – perfect for a cup of tea.