For decades, I have flirted with the idea that the state is an evil — an exploitation machine which acts as a tool in the hands of the dominant classes. There are two strains at the root of my intellectual world — Islamic revivalist thought, and Marxism — both spawned a kind of aversion to the institution of the state. Islamic revivalist thinkers all gave rise to thoughts that saw the state as a necessary evil until the times when they themselves would be in control of it. Marxism, all its schools, gave birth to thoughts that deeply resented the state as a tool in the hands of the dominant classes to oppress and exploit all other classes of society, especially the industrial labour under a capitalist mode of production.
I was born and brought up in a family with deep links with most of the Islamic revivalist movements of British India —Majalis-e-Ahrar, Durauloom Deoband and lastly, Maulana Mudoodi's Jamaat-e-Islami. My friends at the University of Punjab introduced me to Marxist literature, which was cheaply available in Lahore in the late 1980s and 1990s. We used to read Mudoodi's Islamic state and Lenin's State and Revolution side by side. The more hardcore intellectuals were fond of diving into more intense doses of Marxist literature such as "Origin of state, family and private property". This literature introduced us to the idea that the state is a man-made institution and not something which was handed over to humans by the almighty God. This was much before the time when I got the opportunity to read multiple Western authors narrating the history of human civilisation and when and where human civilisations and socio-economic conditions, and technological achievement it generated led to the creation of the state as an institution that governed human society. Islamic political thought, both modern and medieval, revolves around the basic principle that the state, as an institution, was bestowed on humans by Almighty Allah. So, most Islamic political thinkers do not go into the question of the social and economic origins of the institution of the state. Ibn-e-Khaldun may be presented as an exception — Khaldun developed a theory of tribal Asabiyya (bias) as the basis of the political power of states and empires.
Ironically, Pakistani society did not develop any indigenous scholarship about the origins of the state partially because intellectual obscurantism of our military governments killed any intellectual curiosity that might have taken birth in our educational institutions after initial encounters with Western theories about the origins of the state. Pakistan came into being as a post-colonial state. The obscurantism that took deep root in our society ignored this fact. We inherited the state structure directly from British colonial authorities, who created the colonial state through sheer military force and treachery. Hence, I developed a deep aversion to the institution of state during my student years, and this feeling continued to define my political attitude even after I took the plunge to pursue a journalistic career.
Contact with the state machinery distorts the image of simplicity one wants to present to society and the world at large
After the Islamic revivalist and Marxist influences, the third intellectual trend which influenced my thinking on political questions was American liberalism, which again contains a strain of aversion and deep-rooted suspicion of the institution of the state. My intellectual development came into deep conflict with my career — as intellectually I was averse to the state and its institution, viewing them with a deep feeling of suspicion and as a source of all exploitation in society, but the demands of my profession required me to make compromises and adjustments with the state machinery and collaborate with them in each step of my career.
Journalism is not possible without some kind of collaboration and compromise with the state machinery. So, I developed a dual personality of intellectual rebellion and professional compromise. All this changed dramatically when I was forced to resign from a local television under pressure from parts of the state machinery some nine years back. I became a recluse. I disconnected all contact with the state machinery, officials, bureaucrats, generals, and diplomats, primarily because I realised that contact with the state machinery distorts the image of simplicity one wants to present to society and the world at large. I stopped entertaining directives from my editors — of those publications which were still publishing me — to get an official version of the government departments on my stories related to the government or its policies. I devoted myself to reading and writing about the state — multiple theories about its origins, its functioning, its class-oriented and exploitative nature, and the nature of its coercive apparatus within the society on which it is presiding and its external character or foreign policy in the light of the geo-strategic and geo-political situation. I also studied the vital role violence plays in maintaining the dominance of state structures or, in other words, of dominant classes over the society on which it presides. All that this nine years' study has given is clarity on the point that a state is primarily an exploitative structure, no matter what its origins are, its nature, its geographical location, or its type.
The state is intensely and unashamedly in bed with the dominant classes. The irony is that our media and intellectuals present this shameless scene as something necessary to solve the problems faced by the Pakistani masses
However, there are examples in human history when state structures are reformed to mitigate the exploitative nature of the institution of the state or to share the economic pie and resources of the society on a more equitable basis. Classic examples are the social welfare states of Northern Europe. In Northern Europe, the societies gave rise to socially more responsible dominant classes — it is not that the welfare states of Norway and Denmark are no more exploitative.
On the other hand, in Pakistan, the dominant classes which control the state and its machinery are too irresponsible and completely alienated from the society on which they are presiding. Flight of capital from our economy is an outcome of this alienation. Our political elite, after it came under the influence of the neo-liberalism paradigm, started presenting operations of big money as a solution to our problems. Our intellectuals do not want to miss the race. They present these big-money operations as the only panacea to our ills. The completely unregulated operations of this big money under the tutelage of the Pakistani state are one of the biggest stories of our times, which nobody is ready to narrate to Pakistani people after the traditional left almost died in our society. The state is intensely and unashamedly in bed with the dominant classes. The irony is that our media and intellectuals present this shameless scene as something necessary to solve the problems faced by the Pakistani masses.
Does it make sense to oppose the state in such a hopeless situation? No. There are several reasons why we should try to learn from the examples of North Europe. I am not saying we should bodily lift North European examples and implement them in Pakistan.
Poverty and social and economic inequalities in Pakistani society are not ordained by God. They are a product of bad colonial and post-colonial economic policies
First, North European societies are economically affluent, whereas Pakistan is not. Secondly, even in the societies of Norway and Denmark, the very concept of the welfare state is facing scathing criticism primarily because it gave rise to large bureaucracy and huge public expenditure, which is increasingly becoming unfashionable even in Europe. However, learning how they mitigated the exploitative nature of the state would give us several valuable lessons. I think confronting the state will ensue violent outcomes — which will be less valuable than making a decisive political attempt to reform the state, something akin to political reforms in North European societies that resulted in the formation of welfare states there.
I will cite two reasons why reforming the state would be a more valuable effort and the one which is likely to pay more dividends. First, through the constitutional and legal path of the state, a political attempt could be made to re-distribute the society's economic resources. The Pakistani state distributes society's economic resources among dominant groups and classes, like Santa Claus, distribute sweets and toffees among his favourites on Christmas Eve. Poverty and social and economic inequalities in Pakistani society are not ordained by God. They are a product of bad colonial and post-colonial economic policies. Pakistan's ruling classes, from day one, adopted economic and social policies, which created large segments of have-nots or losers in the economic game for whom life has been difficult, if not impossible. The state largesse has always been meant for Pakistani ruling classes — that includes army generals and their cronies, bureaucrats and their cronies, feudal and a top layer of politicians. These were the classes which emerged as the prime beneficiaries of the process of distribution of resources. The decade of the 1990s saw the emergence of the middle class as the dominant social class in our society. Now, state resources are mostly directed to satisfying the needs of the middle classes.
First, because behind this middle-class dominance is the rise of generals, judges and politicians who are themselves middle-class or they are dependent on the votes of the middle classes to get into power. Generals and judges, the two powerful players in the power struggles in Islamabad, and the rise of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan, the two Punjab-centric — where the majority of middle classes reside — political leaders, led to the allocation of resources to cater to the needs of middle classes. Poor and downtrodden have no place in the scheme of things of the Pakistani state. Reforming the state could mean re-distribution of resources in our society. Secondly, Pakistan needs an effective and strong state to survive the impact of climate change — we are already facing the calamities which are a product of climate change and in a decade's time, we will be severely hit by climate change. A weak state cannot withstand the pressure that climate change will spawn. In fact, we need a strong military force which, in the future, could prevent the Pakistani state from derailing.
The multitude has no identity, no direction, and no political aims. Yet every political leader wants a chunk of followers from this mass of people to serve as their foot soldiers in the power struggles that have become a new normal in Islamabad
Most international experts argue that the impact of climate change will not be similar throughout the world. It will impact different regions differently and at various times. Pakistan will be severely hit in ten years' time. Then, we will need a strong military. But not the type that is engaged in a power struggle and that keeps its institutional interests above the social, political, and economic interests of the society and whose leaders themselves are part of the social groups engaged in the economic exploitation of public resources. A mindless radicalism, of the type that prevails in our society, will not do either. We must reform our institutions to survive. We cannot destroy them with our mindless radicalism and political activism.
Time is running out. A mass of people with no set direction to move forward and with immense political capacity to disrupt normal civic life. The multitude has no identity, no direction, and no political aims. Yet every political leader wants a chunk of followers from this mass of people to serve as their foot soldiers in the power struggles that have become a new normal in Islamabad.
The Pakistani ruling classes have created this monster through their greed-based economic policies. They devoured what was available within Pakistan and what came into Pakistan in the form of foreign economic assistance. No fiscal space was left to cater to the needs of the economically downtrodden. The mass of poor in Pakistani society can unleash forces which can destroy existing economic, political, military, and social structures. I am not saying a revolution is imminent in Pakistan society. But we are sitting on a powder keg. We must get rid of economic and social inequalities. We must feed the poor. We must create a more socially and politically harmonious society in our midst. Our stated and dominant classes could have gone on this path of deep exploitation indefinitely in case we had not come face to face with the dangers of climate disaster. Climate change has the potential to change the structure of the societies we are living in. When it destroys the existing mode of production and survivability, it will generate new structures. What the shape of those new structures will be — only God knows.