In the past two months, Pakistani think-tank, the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) —a subsidiary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, produced three papers which reflect the fear in Pakistan's strategic and military circles over recent military developments on the Indian side of the border which would undermine Pakistan's nuclear deterrence or would completely destabilise the nuclear deterrent relations between Pakistan and India.
The first of these papers, published in August 2024, pointed out that India seemed to be in a hurry to put together and deploy a missile defence system, which, according to the conclusions of the paper, would, "undermines Pakistan's deterrence". The second paper, published in September 2024, predicted that the latest endeavours to equip their missile systems "with Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology have further destabilised the nuclear landscape of South Asia". The third paper, published again in September 2024, clearly stated that, "Deterrence stability in the South Asian region has always been under threat not only due to India's marine military buildup but more importantly due to India's nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean and growing undersea nuclear capabilities."
"India's modernisation of its undersea nuclear capabilities is shifting the South Asian arms race to the sea, underscored by the recent commission of its second Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN), INS Arighat is a development that would undermine nuclear deterrent stability in the region". Though three different analysts authored the papers, they pointed out that the cornerstone of deterrence was the mutual vulnerability to retaliation, which is undermined by military developments such as ballistic missile defence. Similarly, submarine-based ballistic missile capability undermines deterrent stability in South Asia. In the same vein, the introduction of MIRV technology in the region will undermine deterrence stability in the region.
The ISSI is an old think-tank funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is currently headed by a former foreign secretary. Although none of the authors of these reports are well-known analysts or former diplomats, the fact that they have been published by a semi-official research organisation adds a lot of meaning to the contents of these papers. We do not know what the official position of the Pakistani government and its relevant institutions is towards these military and nuclear developments in India. However, the ISSI papers give us some hints about what and how Pakistani officialdom must be thinking with regard to these developments, which can potentially change the nature and content of deterrence relations between Pakistan and India.
Some experts believe that Pakistan's development of Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology is an answer to India's ballistic missile defence capability as this technology allows Pakistani missiles to carry multiple warheads that could be simultaneously launched
All three military developments noted in ISSI papers clearly reflect India's unease with stable deterrence relations with Pakistan. With Indian plans to acquire sea-launched ballistic missile capability, its efforts to make Pakistani nuclear weapons capability and its delivery systems redundant by developing a ballistic missile defence and its development and induction of Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology into its military formations, all indicate that India is not satisfied with the shape of deterrence relations with Pakistan that came into existence after its May 1998 nuclear explosions.
Pakistan has also developed Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology and is making efforts to equip its conventional submarines with cruise missiles which can be mounted with nuclear warheads. So far, Pakistan has not shown any interest in ballistic missile defence. Some experts believe that Pakistan's development of Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology is an answer to India's ballistic missile defence capability as this technology allows Pakistani missiles to carry multiple warheads that could be simultaneously launched. Can Pakistani submarines equipped with cruise missiles that can be mounted with nuclear warheads give it second strike capability is debatable. So far, I have not come across a comprehensive answer to this from Pakistani experts.
The political import of all these developments could be summed up by two points: a) India is not happy with the deterrent relations with Pakistan that took shape in 1998 and is using its financial muscles to change the nature and content of the relations, b) secondly, India is developing technologies aimed at making Pakistani nuclear weapons capability and its delivery systems redundant and useless. There are experts who claim that sea-launched second strike capability could push the two hostile neighbours towards a state where they start flirting with the idea of pre-emptive strikes.
After the May 1998 nuclear explosions by Pakistan and India, South Asia witnessed one military conflict in Kargil (Kashmir) and another military standoff in 2002 after a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. The 2008 Mumbai attacks were not followed by a military standoff, but Indian leaders did threaten Pakistan with military consequences. In all these three instances, the Pakistani leadership backed off and took conciliatory steps to mitigate the military threat emanating from across the border. Backed by a military threat, India employed a compellence strategy—when a state uses the threat of use of force to compel the opponent to take certain steps. It seemed Washington was helping India to enforce its will on Pakistan. "Scott D. Sagan wrote that President Clinton had told [Nawaz] Sharif that he could not come to Washington unless he was willing to withdraw the troops back from the Line of Control. The Indian ruling elites' interpretation, however, was that Indian threats of military escalation, that a counterattack across the international border would be ordered if necessary, forced Pakistan to retreat".
Despite the jingoistic behaviour of Pakistani elites at the domestic level, its nuclear capability never gave it the kind of confidence needed to withstand the Indian military pressure on its international borders, as their response in 1999, 2002, and 2008 made this point clear
"In 2002, President Musharraf, on various occasions, stated to not allow Pakistan" s territory to be used against India. In both cases, Islamabad had to call off some overt and covert actions which were underway," wrote an eminent security expert and professor of International Relations at the Quaid-e-Azam University in a paper on Pakistan-India deterrent relations.
"The foregoing discussion brings out that in the case of Kargil, Pakistan visibly succumbed to compellent actions which caused a loss of prestige and national humiliation. However, in 2001-2002 Islamabad took some steps to accommodate Indian concerns without compromising on its prestige. In response to the Mumbai terrorist attacks, Islamabad adopted an explicitly accommodating policy. It accepted that its territory was used by the terrorists to engineer attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. It immediately arrested some members of the alleged and already banned militant organisation Jamat-ul-Dawa and closed its offices in Pakistan".
Indian compellence strategies have worked in each instance of military confrontation since the May 1998 nuclear explosions. This was the time when Indians must have realised that military pressure worked on Pakistan's political and military leadership and in such situations, their nuclear capability is of no use to them. Despite the jingoistic behaviour of Pakistani elites at the domestic level, its nuclear capability never gave it the kind of confidence needed to withstand the Indian military pressure on its international borders, as their response in 1999, 2002, and 2008 made this point clear.
Pakistani leadership can put forward the excuse that they were under tremendous diplomatic pressure from Washington and Western capitals to pay heed to India's demands in the wake of the 2002 parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Moreover, they can argue that they did not succumb to Indian military pressure; they listened to what their Western allies were saying. Whatever may have been the case, the military consequences of the timid behaviour of Pakistani leadership during these crises were clear enough for the world to see. Indians started harping on the theme of limited war—a war which would punish Pakistan militarily but would fall short of provoking a nuclear response from Pakistan. Indians concluded that there was a stage in the process of applying military pressure on Pakistan up to which Pakistan would not go for a nuclear response. Till this stage is reached in the process, the Indian military could inflict a severe punishment on Pakistan that could downgrade its military capability.
We have not realistically and dispassionately started debating what kind of behaviour we should expect from New Delhi in case it succeeds in its technological and strategic ambitions
We see a clear pattern in Indian behaviour—they want to change the situation where, according to Pakistani claims, Pakistan's nuclear deterrent prevents India from using its conventional superiority in a military conflict with Pakistan. Ballistic missile defence, sea-launched second strike capability and applying military pressure short of provoking a nuclear response from Pakistan are clearly manifestations of a thought process that feels uneasy with the nuclear and military status quo in South Asia. We see a clear, new strategic scenario unfolding before our eyes. Recently inducted technologies, which are new in our region at least, are making the old thinking obsolete. For instance, Pakistan military leaders and strategic elite can no longer rely on the notion that just by possessing nuclear warheads, we can ensure the sanctity of our territorial integrity. We have spent billions on our nuclear deterrent, and we will be spending billions again in the new situation that is developing in the region. India's acquisition of modern technologies, in the words of several experts, can cause Pakistan's nuclear capability in its existing shape to be redundant for stable nuclear deterrence relations in South Asia.
We have not yet started debating what options are available to us in our present state of economic and financial insolvency and political disarray. We have not realistically and dispassionately started debating what kind of behaviour we should expect from New Delhi in case it succeeds in its technological and strategic ambitions. We are too busy with our political nonsense. In fact, we do not even have the required level of expertise in our political parties which can engage in a debate over the security implications of new strategic situations emerging in our region. Our existing political leadership, if we dispassionately analyse their abilities and rhetoric, do not even qualify to run a municipal corporation of a large city, what to talk about running the affairs of the state in a tough neighbourhood. And again, we will leave the debate and decision to the military and civil bureaucrats who have repeatedly failed us.
I do not know what Pakistan's response to the new emerging military and strategic situation in the region should be. I think no single person would have an answer to this question. Instead, we should initiate a debate. We have a situation at hand, and we cannot remain oblivious to it. The debate should be based on the following principles: a) Pakistan's military security is of utmost importance, therefore our response should not be robust b) Secondly, we are near financial insolvency, and therefore we cannot allocate more resources to develop a response, c) We should develop a political response based on diplomatic initiate and should make world powers like USA and Japan aware that their military ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region were endangering Pakistan's security and the region's stability, d) We should make sure that our response to this challenge should not overly strengthen institutions within our state machinery—an institution that can potentially outgrow the state and society while we are feeding them to prepare a response to Indian challenge. This has happened in the case of the Pakistani military and its affiliated intelligence services.
We should never lose sight of the fact that it is the people who are the most essential elements that form the state—the other two being law and territory. What we thus mean by national security is the security of these people. So, security is not more important than the people themselves. This new military pressure is confronting us at a time when we are face-to-face with financial insolvency. Security of the territory and security of the military equipment is meaningful if people living within this territory are secure.
Let us never forget this!