Unlike their previous regime in the 1990s, the Afghan Taliban have been much smarter since they captured Kabul, and subsequently, power in Afghanistan in the wake of the American withdrawal. The Taliban regime in Kabul inherited a well-oiled and functioning state machinery so painstakingly constructed by the US military and nation-building experts and consultants from Washington and other western capitals. The Taliban cleverly retained those parts left behind by the Ashraf Ghani regime which suited their survival.
For instance, they retained the Finance Ministry structures and state bank machinery. But did away with the Ministry of Women Affairs. This time around, the Taliban is not facing any internal military threats, like the legendary commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, the ‘lion of Panjshir’ who led the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance in the 1990s was provided military and financial support by regional countries like Iran, Russia and India. This time, these states have chosen not to provide assistance to Ahmed Shah Masood’s son, who is based in Tajikistan (or occasionally in Europe) and pretends to be leading military groups in opposition to Taliban rule. The Northern Alliance also acted as a front organization of the American military when they started their invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as American air strikes were coupled with the Northern Alliance’s advances against Taliban controlled Kabul in 2001 on land. This time, it appears that regional countries don’t want to weaken the Taliban, as they aggressively pursue a military campaign against ISIS-K in Afghanistan—a campaign that has the backing of regional powers, including Russia and Iran.
Last but not the least, there are indications that the Taliban are somewhat behaving like a government since they came to power in August 2021. According to international experts who are monitoring the state of the economy in Taliban ruled Afghanistan, “Taliban macroeconomic management has been better than expected, as evidenced by the stable exchange rate, low inflation, effective revenue collection and rising exports.” Some reports suggest that Pakistani financial experts are helping the Taliban regime in managing the finances of the Afghan state.
United States Institute of Peace’s Afghan expert, William Byrd, in a recent piece on Afghan economy opined that “there is no comparison at all with their non-management of the economy during the Taliban’s previous 1996-2001 rule. That regime had no control over the Afghani currency and there was hyperinflation; government revenue was negligible; the Afghan economy was largely moribund, especially after the Taliban’s first opium ban in the year 2000; people’s incomes were less than $200 average per-capita; and social indicators such as maternal and child mortality were terrible.” “This time around, the Taliban have benefited from learning while facing adversity during their nearly 20 years as an insurgency. For example, they collected significant revenue in competition with the previous government, provided transporters tax receipts to prevent multiple taxation at their various road checkpoints, and issued mining and other permits.”
Perhaps all these regional powers accepted Taliban as fait accompli, as a lesser of the evils in the face of the rise of more radicalized groups like ISIS-Khorasan. In the face of a paucity of authentic information, it would be useless to speculate as to who played what role in paving the way for the Taliban’s path to power.
With the help of hindsight, it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that the Taliban takeover of Kabul was all staged managed - the Afghan National Army, painstaking trained and funded by the Americans - didn’t put up any resistance, the proven military effectiveness of the Northern Alliance evaporated into thin air and none of the staunchly anti-Taliban countries like Iran, Russia and Central Asian states were ready to feed anti-Taliban forces within Afghan society with weapons and finances.
To the contrary, Iran and Russia were eager to obtain pledges from the Afghan Taliban that they would effectively deal with the threat of the rise of Sunni extremist groups in Afghan society. It would however be far-fetched to draw the inference from all this that Russia, Iran and the United States cooperated to bring the Taliban into power. But perhaps all these regional powers accepted Taliban as fait accompli, as a lesser of the evils in the face of the rise of more radicalized groups like ISIS-Khorasan. In the face of a paucity of authentic information, it would be useless to speculate as to who played what role in paving the way for the Taliban’s path to power.
However, we can still analyze the possible longevity of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s persistence as a group seeking to manage a functioning state will largely depend on the Taliban’s ability to maintain a cohesive military presence, and to manage the state of economy in Afghan society. “Afghanistan’s GDP is hard to measure, but it is estimated to have dropped by around 20 percent in the aftermath of August 2021, further increasing hunger and privation in an already very poor country.”
Taliban Supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada is facing a very serious and potent challenge to his authority from Taliban leaders who are militarily relevant to the situation. And according to UN estimates, “6 million people in Afghanistan now face ‘emergency’ levels of food insecurity (one step away from famine) - one of the world’s highest figures.” Lastly, how effectively the Taliban regime handles the threat from more radicalized Sunni extremist groups like ISIS-Khorasan will have an outsized impact on the conduct of their foreign policy and how Afghanistan is treated in the region’s capitals.
Power struggle
As the power struggle within the loosely knitted umbrella organization called the Afghan Taliban has intensified after the militant group took over power in Kabul in August 2021, stories, rumors and unconfirmed reports about deep divisions dividing the Taliban down the middle have become part of the daily routine of Afghan people. Afghan experts - especially those of Afghan origins - journalists and observers, are full of stories about divisions in the Taliban ranks.
Some of these differences between top Taliban leadership came to the surface when in February 2023, the leader of the Haqqani faction of the Taliban, Sirajuddin Haqqani, made critical comments about the situation in Afghanistan during a public event.
“The current situation is intolerable. If the public situation becomes worse and unstable, it is our responsibility to bring them closer to us,” Haqqani said. Afghan experts interpreted this statement in the background of two parallel developments that were taking place in Afghan society at that point in time. Firstly, Afghan society was struggling with humanitarian and economic crises that have left millions without lifesaving support. Haqqani’s statement followed a highly restrictive directive issued by the Taliban Supreme leader targeting women “that are seen as further isolating the country from the international community.”
Around the same time, the Acting Defense Minister and son of the movement’s revered founder Mullah Omar, Muhammad Yaqoob said that the Taliban must always listen to “legitimate demands of the people.” Several Taliban leaders who were part of the government made similar comments. This was a direct challenge to the authority of Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, who was issuing all these restrictive edicts and was leading a group of hardline Taliban leaders opposed to any kind of regular contact with the West.
Internal conflicts among the Afghan Taliban reveal the complex dynamics and power struggles within the group. These conflicts arise from a variety of factors, including ideological differences, regional and tribal rivalries, personal ambitions of key leaders, and divergent approaches to governance and external relations.
“Incessant disagreements and power struggles can potentially lead to further divisions, rendering the so-called Islamic Emirate unable to even take off on matters of governance and service delivery to the Afghan population. Likewise, the Taliban’s ability to maintain its influence and negotiate with external actors may also be compromised, further complicating the already volatile political landscape in Afghanistan.”
Many experts on Afghan affairs opine that differences and conflicts between different factions of Afghan Taliban are nothing new. Many experts claim that ever since the death of the Afghan Taliban’s founding leader, Mullah Omar, factional infighting between Taliban groups has remained a norm, “internal fault lines rooted in ideology, tribal loyalties, regional affiliations, control over resources, including the narcotics business etc. defy the myth of the Taliban being a united and cohesive organization,” writes an Islamabad based Afghan expert Ahmed Ali. “Within the Emirate, those relative moderates clash with hardliners in a continuous battle to gain a greater say over the matters of the state, including the overall course of the organization. While some advocate for a changed approach to governance that offers some semblance of moderation, others stick to rigid interpretation of Islamic principles, unwilling to back off from their uncompromising stance. The gulf between these factions remains unbridged.”
Internal conflicts among the Afghan Taliban reveal the complex dynamics and power struggles within the group. These conflicts arise from a variety of factors, including ideological differences, regional and tribal rivalries, personal ambitions of key leaders, and divergent approaches to governance and external relations. “One of the main sources of internal conflict is the clash between hardliners and pragmatists. Hardliners push for rigid policies and resist compromise, mirroring their policies from the 1990s. On the other hand, pragmatists prioritize practical considerations and political expediency, seeking negotiations and engagement with external actors. This divide leads to conflicting policies and approaches within the group as exemplified by the contrasting debate over girls’ education and the acceptance of former government officials into the Islamic Emirate’s fold.”
On the other hand, many Western experts and diplomats believe that the differences between different factions of Taliban that have surfaced recently are unprecedented and likely to disrupt Taliban’s ability to govern and act as a cohesive group.
One Kabul based Afghan expert, on the condition of anonymity, told The Friday Times that the Taliban have a tendency to demote or silence critics with the use of force or through coercive methods. They point out the examples of former Taliban ambassador Abdul Salam Zaeef, ex-foreign minister Abdul Wakeel Muttawakil, and moderate Taliban leader Agha Jan Motassim, all of whom were demoted for expressing dissent. Meanwhile, Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi, who dissented in 2015, was killed in a suicide bombing last year.
The myth of the Taliban organization as a monolithic entity is an invention by western media. It was never a united force. It was only because they had a common enemy in the shape of the US military that they acted or seemed to have acted as a united force. That’s not the case any longer.
One Pakistani expert opines that there are regional, ideological, as well as tribal rivalries within the Taliban organization. Some tribes occupy more prominent positions within the Taliban organization and in the process attract jealousy. “The Durrani tribe, for instance, has played a significant role within the Taliban, with sub-tribes like the Noorzai and Ishaqzai involved in managing financial affairs and promoting the opium trade. Such tribal dynamics often intersect with ideological differences, exacerbating internal tensions,” writes Ahmed Ali.
“Moreover, external influences and relationships add another layer of complexity to internal conflicts. Some Taliban leaders have had connections with neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran, which can influence their perspectives and actions. These external alliances may contribute to divisions within the group as different factions align themselves with different foreign actors.”
One Kabul based Afghan expert, on the condition of anonymity, told The Friday Times that the Taliban have a tendency to demote or silence critics with the use of force or through coercive methods.
It seems Taliban leaders have found another enemy in the shape of ISIS-Khorasan to create cohesion within the organization. But in the past, Taliban cadres have defected from their mother organization towards the more radical ISIS-Khorasan. That is another aspect of the problem with deep fissures within the Taliban organization.
Economic situation
The Taliban inherited a largely functioning government and well-oiled institutions like the Finance Ministry and State Bank. This was in complete contrast with their previous stint in power, when the country was completely destroyed by years of civil war. In contrast, the stoppage of $8 billion in foreign aid per year, equivalent to around 40 percent of GDP, was a severe shock for Afghan economy. “The shock was exacerbated by the stoppage of international financial transactions, ongoing collapse of the banking system, existing US and UN sanctions against Taliban leaders, and the freezing of Afghanistan’s some $9 billion of foreign exchange reserves”.
“After a few months of free-fall, the economy showed signs of stabilizing at a lower level of activity, reflecting in part UN cash shipments to pay for humanitarian assistance, averaging some $40 million per week, that started at the end of 2021.” However, according to a USIP report, the Taliban’s successful opium cultivation ban is depriving Afghans of $1 billion in incomes, mostly agriculture and opium trade incomes. The bans on female education and prohibitions against Afghan women working in NGOs and the UN will be extremely damaging to Afghanistan’s longer-term economic and social development, according to the report. Extremely high level of brain drain of educated women and men is taking place in Afghan society. The United States, UN and other Western countries are not willing to contribute substantially to Afghan relief efforts, as in their opinion it will legitimize the Taliban regime. There is every possibility that in the years ahead, the Afghan economy will further shrink.
Terror threat
After the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover of Kabul, fears grew that Afghanistan will again become a hub of international terrorism. However, the Taliban was not the source of this fear. Rather, fear emanated from the rise of groups like ISIS-Khorasan (ISKP hereafter) in Afghanistan’s north and eastern regions. Immediately before the American withdrawal, ISIS-Khorasan was deprived of its bases in the Northern and Eastern part of Afghanistan primarily, due to US Air Force bombing raids.
The secret of the Taliban’s survival is hidden in the fact that everybody – the Americans, Iranians and the Russians - want the Taliban to go after ISIS. ISIS-Khorasan seems to be strictly focused on targeting Afghan Taliban leadership in Afghanistan for now. It has abandoned any plans to control territory after they lost control of parts of Eastern Afghanistan as a result of US aerial bombing between 2016-1019.
There is another type of terror group in Afghanistan, the kind that enjoys excellent relations with the Afghan Taliban government in Kabul. The list includes the TTP, Al-Qaeda and militant groups from Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan. Reports suggest that Taliban intelligence, under the leadership of Interior Minister Siraj-ud-din Haqqani, is responsible for keeping contact with these groups and guiding them on how to behave inside Afghan territory.
“ISIS-Khorasan activities are now strictly focused on engaging in urban warfare and urban terrorism,” said a Pakistani security expert. In Pakistan, ISIS-Khorasan is engaging in anti-Shia attacks in the province of Balochistan.
In the early stages of its formation in this region, the ISIS-Khorasan was functioning under unified administrative control. However, in 2019, the ISIS leadership announced the formation of two distinct organizations for Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISIS-Khorasan has recently developed differences with the Tehrik-e-Taliban leadership after the former successfully recruited a large number of the TTP cadre into its organizational fold. Recently, the ISIS-Khorasan and TTP leadership have exchanged accusations in the media, with both of them accusing the other for working as stooges of foreign intelligence agencies. TTP accused ISIS-Khorasan for working as a stooge of Pakistani intelligence. ISIS-Khorasan accused the TTP for working as a stooge of Indian intelligence agencies. There are reports that both the organizations are now engaged in open hostilities, with the assassination of each other’s leadership as the preferred strategy.
In Afghanistan, ISIS is strictly focused on terror attacks on Afghan Taliban leadership. Experts say that ISIS-Khorasan seemed to be focused on proving the Afghan Taliban to be a failure as far as their promise to the world community is concerned that they would not allow Afghan territory to be used in launching terror attacks on regional countries and the United States. ISIS-Khorasan has brazenly been launching attacks on regional countries, including Pakistan, Iran and central Asian states.
It is precisely for these reasons that Western countries’ policy planning is focused on the rise of ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan. Regional players, including Iran, Russia and China also want the Pakistani military and intelligence services to play a greater role in preventing the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan. ISIS-Khorasan announced an intensification of urban warfare in Afghanistan and Pakistan after losing control of their territories in Eastern and Northern Afghanistan. An attack carried out in August 2020 by an 11-member suicide squad on the Nangarhar Central Prison in the provincial capital of Jalalabad emphasized the scale of that threat. The attack resulted in the release of around 1,000 prisoners, including approximately 280 ISKP inmates.
Over 80 percent of IS-KP attacks targeted Taliban fighters. Before 2021, ISKP was much less likely to attack members of the Taliban. In 2020, only 7 percent of its attacks targeted the Taliban, but that rose to 33 percent in 2021 and to 72 percent in 2022. After the American withdrawal, ISIS-Khorasan’s activities in Afghanistan have dramatically risen in intensity. However, in Pakistan, they have failed to intensify their terror campaigns.
There is another type of terror group in Afghanistan, the kind that enjoys excellent relations with the Afghan Taliban government in Kabul. The list includes the TTP, Al-Qaeda and militant groups from Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan. Reports suggest that Taliban intelligence, under the leadership of Interior Minister Siraj-ud-din Haqqani, is responsible for keeping contact with these groups and guiding them on how to behave inside Afghan territory. For instance, Afghan intelligence recently forced Chinese separatist groups stationed in Afghanistan to locate themselves away from the Chinese border. They also made an attempt to relocate TTP away from the Pakistan border, which was not successful. The same Taliban intelligence is responsible for chasing, arresting and killing ISIS-Khorasan members on Afghan territory.
If the humanitarian situation further deteriorates, if divisions in the Taliban’s ranks further sharpen up and if the ISIS-Khorasan threat is more sinister, Afghanistan might take another plunge into chaos. If the political challenge to the Taliban’s supreme leader’s authority assumes a military character, the chaos that will ensue after armed violence breaks out might see Taliban splinter factions and ISIS-Khorasan carving up Afghan territory among themselves.