Robert J McMohan writes the following in his essay Disillusionment and Disengagement in South Asia: "During his very first week in office, LBJ delivered [a] message personally to the Pakistani Foreign Secretary Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was in Washington for the Kennedy funeral. In characteristically forceful language, Johnson warned Bhutto that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's upcoming state visit to Pakistan, slated for February 1964, would cause serious 'public relations' problems for the United States. The president voiced concern that the visit would spark an adverse reation from Congress and implied that this latest demonstration of Sino-Pakistani friendship might jeaopardize congressional support for future US economic and military aid to Pakistan. LBJ told Bhutto that he was a friend of Pakistan and would continue to be one - 'if Pakistan would let him'. According to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern ad South Asian Affairs Phillips Talbot, who was present in the meeting, the Pakistani diplomat appeared 'deeply upset and disturbed' by Johnson's blunt words. Bhutto tried to defend the Pakistani-Chinese relationship as a protective measure necessitated by American's strengthening of India, which he said was 'driving Pakistan to the wall'. But his American interlocutor remained unmoved by what they considered a weak rationalization for an indefensible affront to American interests. As the Pakistani foreign minister left the Oval Office, Under Secretary of State George Ball recalled, 'He turned on me furiously' to complain about the 'discourteous reception' he had received. 'Bhutto was asking for it,' a White house aid remarked after the stormy session.”
Zhou Enlai with the young Bhuttos
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Marshal Chen Yi and Zhou Enlai with Benazir, Murtaza, Sanam and Shahnawaz Bhutto in an undated photograph likely taken during the Chinese leaders' 1964 visit to Pakistan.
Robert J McMohan writes the following in his essay Disillusionment and Disengagement in South Asia: "During his very first week in office, LBJ delivered [a] message personally to the Pakistani Foreign Secretary Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was in Washington for the Kennedy funeral. In characteristically forceful language, Johnson warned Bhutto that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's upcoming state visit to Pakistan, slated for February 1964, would cause serious 'public relations' problems for the United States. The president voiced concern that the visit would spark an adverse reation from Congress and implied that this latest demonstration of Sino-Pakistani friendship might jeaopardize congressional support for future US economic and military aid to Pakistan. LBJ told Bhutto that he was a friend of Pakistan and would continue to be one - 'if Pakistan would let him'. According to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern ad South Asian Affairs Phillips Talbot, who was present in the meeting, the Pakistani diplomat appeared 'deeply upset and disturbed' by Johnson's blunt words. Bhutto tried to defend the Pakistani-Chinese relationship as a protective measure necessitated by American's strengthening of India, which he said was 'driving Pakistan to the wall'. But his American interlocutor remained unmoved by what they considered a weak rationalization for an indefensible affront to American interests. As the Pakistani foreign minister left the Oval Office, Under Secretary of State George Ball recalled, 'He turned on me furiously' to complain about the 'discourteous reception' he had received. 'Bhutto was asking for it,' a White house aid remarked after the stormy session.”
Robert J McMohan writes the following in his essay Disillusionment and Disengagement in South Asia: "During his very first week in office, LBJ delivered [a] message personally to the Pakistani Foreign Secretary Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was in Washington for the Kennedy funeral. In characteristically forceful language, Johnson warned Bhutto that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's upcoming state visit to Pakistan, slated for February 1964, would cause serious 'public relations' problems for the United States. The president voiced concern that the visit would spark an adverse reation from Congress and implied that this latest demonstration of Sino-Pakistani friendship might jeaopardize congressional support for future US economic and military aid to Pakistan. LBJ told Bhutto that he was a friend of Pakistan and would continue to be one - 'if Pakistan would let him'. According to Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern ad South Asian Affairs Phillips Talbot, who was present in the meeting, the Pakistani diplomat appeared 'deeply upset and disturbed' by Johnson's blunt words. Bhutto tried to defend the Pakistani-Chinese relationship as a protective measure necessitated by American's strengthening of India, which he said was 'driving Pakistan to the wall'. But his American interlocutor remained unmoved by what they considered a weak rationalization for an indefensible affront to American interests. As the Pakistani foreign minister left the Oval Office, Under Secretary of State George Ball recalled, 'He turned on me furiously' to complain about the 'discourteous reception' he had received. 'Bhutto was asking for it,' a White house aid remarked after the stormy session.”