The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is a baloch militant organisation, proscribed by the Pakistani government in 2006. It seeks greater autonomy or independence for Balochistan and has been fighting against the Pakistani government to achieve this goal. It was formed in 2000 and aims to create a state of ‘Greater Balochistan’. Numerous accounts also suggest that the group is a resurgence of past insurgent groups, specifically the Independent Balochistan Movement of 1973 to 1977. It is categorised as a terrorist group by the UK, Iran, China, the European Union, and the US as well. The crucial difference between BLA and the previous phases of the Baloch militancy lies in the fact that the current generation of fighters are mostly educated middle-class professionals who have made a mindful choice to take on the Pakistan armed forces.
Hyrbyair Marri, the fifth son of the Baloch leader Khair Bakhsh Marri, is considered to be the leader of BLA, according to the estimations of the government of Pakistan. Khair Bakhsh was the chief of the Marri Baloch tribe and head of the National Awami Party (NAP). With the vision of Greater Balochistan, Hyrbyair supports the independence of Balochistan from Iran and Pakistan. He has repeatedly stated that both Pakistan and Iran are perpetrating a slow-motion genocide against the Baloch people. Currently, both Jeeyand Baloch and Azad Baloch have been acting as spokespersons for the group. The reported strength of BLA cadres, according to the US Congressional Research Service, is around 1,000. The BLA recruits mostly from tribe members, especially from the Marri and Bugti tribes, which mostly allows the group to gain valuable levels of passive support in Balochistan’s remote rural regions. It is a tactical and conscious step of the organisation to permeate into the interior of the province.
A few of the violent attacks of BLA in the first two months of 2025 include
- February 18, 2025: BLA militants attacked a Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) site in the Nasirabad area in the Kech district setting fire to four heavy-duty vehicles and other machinery. One vehicle and a motorcycle were reportedly seized.
- February 11, 2025: Seven soldiers were killed and four other soldiers sustained injuries when BLA militants ambushed an Army patrol team in the Tump area of the Kech district.
- February 7, 2025: At least 13 soldiers and one BLA militant, Naqeeb Jamaldini, were killed while four soldiers sustained injuries during a clash in the Nushki district.
- January 28, 2025: BLA militants killed one death squad member Riaz, son of Niaz Ahmed, a resident of Meeri, in the Bahman area in the Kech district.
- January 8, 2025: Around 80 BLA militants launched an attack on the main bazaar of Khuzdar district in Balochistan setting fire to multiple Government buildings, including a Levies Force station, NADRA municipal committee offices, and a bank, after seizing control of the area.
The common Baloch people are facing the maximum brunt, as they have to deal with death squads, along with enforced disappearances of near and dear ones, by the security forces
Unfortunately, BLA emerged as a key perpetrator of violence in the year 2024. According to Pakistan Security Report 2024, released by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), while the attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) killed about 300 people during the year, BLA-orchestrated attacks caused 225 fatalities.
August 2024 was a watershed timeframe for BLA. While the militant outfit has long been pursuing a low-level separatist insurgency in Balochistan, the scale and coordination of the August 26 attacks mark a significant increase in its two-decade-old conflict. August 26, 2024, was the 18th death anniversary of Baloch Leader, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed in a military misadventure under the Musharraf regime in 2006. This death acted as a catalyst for the fifth cycle of the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan, which is still ongoing. One of the most disturbing attacks on August 26 occurred in the Musakhel district, near the Punjab border, where BLA militants stopped buses, selectively offloaded passengers, and shot them dead after checking their ID cards. This was the first such attack by any Baloch militant group in Musakhel, demonstrating BLA’s capacity to extend the conflict towards or near Punjab. The same day, BLA also carried out a suicide bombing in Lasbela, which has traditionally remained relatively peaceful. In this incident, the group employed a young female suicide bomber, a law student from the University of Turbat.
Within BLA, the Majeed Brigade, infamous for conducting numerous suicide attacks, is named after two brothers, Majeed Langove Senior and Majeed Langove Junior. Majeed Senior tried to assassinate then-Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto when he was on an official visit to Quetta. He wanted to kill him for dismissing NAP’s government in Balochistan, but Majeed Senior lost his life during the operation. Majeed Junior was killed while saving his associates when Pakistani security forces raided the house where they were staying in Quetta’s Wahdat Colony.
Following Majeed Junior’s killing, BLA’s late leader, Aslam Achu, established the suicide squad and labeled it as the Majeed Brigade. The Brigade carried out its first vehicle-borne suicide attack in December 2011 when Baaz Khan Marri targeted Shafeeq Mengal, the son of former Pakistani federal minister Naseer Mengal, on Quetta’s Arbab Road. Though Mengal escaped unhurt, 13 other people were killed in the attack.
The Brigade has three units: logistics, intelligence, and operations. It is not only a well-organised but also a well-armed lethal sub-group, using sophisticated weapons, including improvised explosive devices (IED), grenades, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and several automatic weapons like M4 rifles as well as BM-12, 107MM, 109MM type rockets. Interestingly, for Majeed Brigade, each suicide attack has three stages and goals. At the first stage: as the suicide bomber blows him or herself up, the political objective is achieved, as it earns publicity for the group by highlighting the Baloch insurgent movement. At the second stage: a video statement of the suicide bomber is released, garnering interest from potential new suicide bombers. At the third stage, if the target is destroyed, the military goals are also achieved.
BLA has been targeting police personnel, non-native Baloch residents, Chinese workers, political leaders, etc. It has used a variety of strategies to achieve its goal. These tactics include the use of car bombs, mortar strikes, rocket strikes, IEDs, landmines, grenades, kidnappings, and arms attacks.
The BLA-led separatist movement has consequently targeted CPEC infrastructure, facilities, and personnel from both Pakistan and China. Not only within Balochistan, but BLA has also targeted Chinese in the neighbouring province of Sindh. The Confucius Centre in Karachi was attacked, and even the Chinese Consulate in Karachi was also attacked by BLA militants. Lately, in October, last year, BLA attacked a Chinese convoy, killing two Chinese nationals near the Karachi International Airport.
BLA is not only re-inventing itself, gradually, but also becoming a persistent source of violence in Balochistan. The common Baloch people are facing the maximum brunt, as they have to deal with death squads, along with enforced disappearances of near and dear ones, by the security forces. The path of relentless violence, as chosen by the BLA militants, is fueling the already restive situation of Balochistan.