After several months of trying to build bridges with Pakistan, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani arrived in New Delhi on April 27 for his first official trip to India. While Washington, Beijing and the region will be interested in the outcome of his trip, it is Islamabad (or to be precise Rawalpindi) that is nervously watching Ghani’s actions.
To understand the India-Afghan-Pakistan relationship we need to go back in history. Pakistan has always been wary of close ties between its two immediate neighbors, India and Afghanistan. The belief from 1947 that India and Indian leaders did not accept partition and the creation of Pakistan led to the perception of India as an existential threat to Pakistan. In order to prevent any strategic encirclement (‘pincer movement’) of Pakistan it was therefore critical that Afghanistan, the neighbor on the west, be an ally. Close ties between Afghanistan and India have been seen as extremely dangerous to Pakistan’s very survival.
As I lay out in my book Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India, (Routledge, 2011) Pakistani concerns about India-Afghan ties also have an ideological tinge. Pakistan, a state built on ideology, felt challenged by two neighbors — India and Afghanistan — both of whom shared historical and civilizational ties, seemed hostile to its very existence and emphasized their ethno-linguistic identities. Periodic Afghan support initially for Pashtun and later Baluch irredentism as well as close India-Afghan ties further reinforced the fear of a pincer movement.
Viewing Afghanistan through its ideological tint Pakistan’s security establishment never trusted the primarily non-Pashtun led Northern Alliance and preferred one of the Pashtun mujahideen leaders as a future head of Pakistan. Ties between Kabul and Islamabad (especially Rawalpindi) were frosty during the two terms of former President Hamid Karzai. Karzai was seen as too pro-India to be pro-Pakistan. India was one of the leading bilateral donors to Afghanistan with $2 billion in aid and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in 2011.
When elections took place in Afghanistan in 2014, the Pakistani establishment backed Dr Ghani and not Dr Abdullah Abdullah. The rationale: Dr Abdullah was a close associate of Ahmed Shah Masood, who led the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and was perceived as antagonistic towards Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan. Dr Ghani, an academic and technocrat, with no close ties to India was seen as preferable.
When Dr Ghani took over as President it appeared like he was moving away from Karzai’s policy of close ties with India. A number of high level trips took place between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Pakistan army chief visiting Afghanistan, President Ghani visiting Pakistan and just recently the Afghan army chief attended the passing out parade at Pakistan’s Military Academy in Kakul.
Further, Afghan army cadets were sent to Pakistan for training instead of the previous practice of sending them to India. When the December 2014 terror attack on a school in Peshawar took place, Afghanistan helped locate and handed over to Pakistan the culprits responsible for the attacks. Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States have also been having discussions about how to take the process of the Taliban peace talks forward.
What appears is that President Ghani came into office prepared to give his counterparts in Pakistan a chance in order to see if Pakistan’s security establishment would actually come through on its promises. From his end Ghani has done more than was required. But his visit to India demonstrates how disenchanted he and his government are with Pakistan. From Kabul’s vantage point, Delhi provides a counterweight to Islamabad-Rawalpindi. Afghan leaders have always resented the Pakistani view that the Pakistanis know what is best for Afghanistan. Further, Afghanistan needs resources to rebuild the country and investment to move it forward. India has the resources and the investment, Pakistan does not. With this in mind it is only natural for India and Afghanistan to come closer.
India’s ties with Afghanistan date back to the early 1950s when the two countries signed a treaty of friendship. For Delhi, there were not only historical and civilizational ties with Afghanistan but strategic and economic ones as well. Further realpolitik dictated that antagonistic relations with Pakistan meant close ties with Afghanistan were critical.
Today India is fourth largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, pledging $2 billion in aid since 2002. Indian has spent around $1 billion for humanitarian assistance, capacity building, or infrastructure projects. These include construction of a power line from Pul-i-Khumri to Kabul, the parliament building, the Salma Dam and rehabilitation of the Delaram-Zaranj road. They also include food assistance to primary school children, including a program administered through the World Food program whereby daily children are provided with fortified biscuits. India also provides over 1300 scholarships for students as well as Afghan civil servants and has to date trained 30 Afghan cadets at its military academy.
Trade is another key part of India-Afghan ties both for bilateral reasons but also because for India, Afghanistan is the gateway to Central Asian markets and energy resources. The possibility that the Iran deal will lead to an end to economic sanctions will benefit India-Afghan ties. This is because Pakistan does not allow transit trade between India and Afghanistan and India has been forced to trade via Iran using the Chabhahar port. Indian companies have invested in Afghanistan and a consortium of Indian steel companies led by Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) was awarded a block in the Hajigak iron ore mines in 2013.
Countries have close ties when their relationship moves beyond simply security or economics to people to people ties. These ties exist between India and Afghanistan for decades and the educational ties will only deepen these further. Just recently President Ghani stated that he would like India to allow the Afghan team to use grounds and facilities to improve their potential.
Afghanistan is important and its stability critical for India’s own security and stability. India has no exit strategy in Afghanistan and is there for the long haul. For Kabul, while Beijing and Washington are important, it is Delhi that could provide what Afghanistan seeks: economic resources and investment and noninterference in internal affairs.
Aparna Pande is Director, Initiative on the Future of India & South Asia at Hudson Institute, Washington DC. She holds a PhD in Political Science from Boston University and is the author of ‘Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India’ (Routledge, 2011)
To understand the India-Afghan-Pakistan relationship we need to go back in history. Pakistan has always been wary of close ties between its two immediate neighbors, India and Afghanistan. The belief from 1947 that India and Indian leaders did not accept partition and the creation of Pakistan led to the perception of India as an existential threat to Pakistan. In order to prevent any strategic encirclement (‘pincer movement’) of Pakistan it was therefore critical that Afghanistan, the neighbor on the west, be an ally. Close ties between Afghanistan and India have been seen as extremely dangerous to Pakistan’s very survival.
As I lay out in my book Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India, (Routledge, 2011) Pakistani concerns about India-Afghan ties also have an ideological tinge. Pakistan, a state built on ideology, felt challenged by two neighbors — India and Afghanistan — both of whom shared historical and civilizational ties, seemed hostile to its very existence and emphasized their ethno-linguistic identities. Periodic Afghan support initially for Pashtun and later Baluch irredentism as well as close India-Afghan ties further reinforced the fear of a pincer movement.
Viewing Afghanistan through its ideological tint Pakistan’s security establishment never trusted the primarily non-Pashtun led Northern Alliance and preferred one of the Pashtun mujahideen leaders as a future head of Pakistan. Ties between Kabul and Islamabad (especially Rawalpindi) were frosty during the two terms of former President Hamid Karzai. Karzai was seen as too pro-India to be pro-Pakistan. India was one of the leading bilateral donors to Afghanistan with $2 billion in aid and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in 2011.
When elections took place in Afghanistan in 2014, the Pakistani establishment backed Dr Ghani and not Dr Abdullah Abdullah. The rationale: Dr Abdullah was a close associate of Ahmed Shah Masood, who led the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and was perceived as antagonistic towards Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan. Dr Ghani, an academic and technocrat, with no close ties to India was seen as preferable.
When Dr Ghani took over as President it appeared like he was moving away from Karzai’s policy of close ties with India. A number of high level trips took place between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Pakistan army chief visiting Afghanistan, President Ghani visiting Pakistan and just recently the Afghan army chief attended the passing out parade at Pakistan’s Military Academy in Kakul.
Further, Afghan army cadets were sent to Pakistan for training instead of the previous practice of sending them to India. When the December 2014 terror attack on a school in Peshawar took place, Afghanistan helped locate and handed over to Pakistan the culprits responsible for the attacks. Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States have also been having discussions about how to take the process of the Taliban peace talks forward.
What appears is that President Ghani came into office prepared to give his counterparts in Pakistan a chance in order to see if Pakistan’s security establishment would actually come through on its promises. From his end Ghani has done more than was required. But his visit to India demonstrates how disenchanted he and his government are with Pakistan. From Kabul’s vantage point, Delhi provides a counterweight to Islamabad-Rawalpindi. Afghan leaders have always resented the Pakistani view that the Pakistanis know what is best for Afghanistan. Further, Afghanistan needs resources to rebuild the country and investment to move it forward. India has the resources and the investment, Pakistan does not. With this in mind it is only natural for India and Afghanistan to come closer.
India’s ties with Afghanistan date back to the early 1950s when the two countries signed a treaty of friendship. For Delhi, there were not only historical and civilizational ties with Afghanistan but strategic and economic ones as well. Further realpolitik dictated that antagonistic relations with Pakistan meant close ties with Afghanistan were critical.
Today India is fourth largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, pledging $2 billion in aid since 2002. Indian has spent around $1 billion for humanitarian assistance, capacity building, or infrastructure projects. These include construction of a power line from Pul-i-Khumri to Kabul, the parliament building, the Salma Dam and rehabilitation of the Delaram-Zaranj road. They also include food assistance to primary school children, including a program administered through the World Food program whereby daily children are provided with fortified biscuits. India also provides over 1300 scholarships for students as well as Afghan civil servants and has to date trained 30 Afghan cadets at its military academy.
Trade is another key part of India-Afghan ties both for bilateral reasons but also because for India, Afghanistan is the gateway to Central Asian markets and energy resources. The possibility that the Iran deal will lead to an end to economic sanctions will benefit India-Afghan ties. This is because Pakistan does not allow transit trade between India and Afghanistan and India has been forced to trade via Iran using the Chabhahar port. Indian companies have invested in Afghanistan and a consortium of Indian steel companies led by Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) was awarded a block in the Hajigak iron ore mines in 2013.
Countries have close ties when their relationship moves beyond simply security or economics to people to people ties. These ties exist between India and Afghanistan for decades and the educational ties will only deepen these further. Just recently President Ghani stated that he would like India to allow the Afghan team to use grounds and facilities to improve their potential.
Afghanistan is important and its stability critical for India’s own security and stability. India has no exit strategy in Afghanistan and is there for the long haul. For Kabul, while Beijing and Washington are important, it is Delhi that could provide what Afghanistan seeks: economic resources and investment and noninterference in internal affairs.
Aparna Pande is Director, Initiative on the Future of India & South Asia at Hudson Institute, Washington DC. She holds a PhD in Political Science from Boston University and is the author of ‘Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India’ (Routledge, 2011)