The year 2024 promises to be a year of elections in over 50 countries, tying almost 40% of the world population’s fate to the polling booths. Pakistan is expected to hold national and provincial assemblies’ elections on February 8th, the fourth in 13 years. Among other countries slated for elections this year are the US, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa . Yet in many countries, the elections may not necessarily lead to the advancement of democratic rule.
The significance of focussing on Pakistan lies in it being an illustrative example of how a democratic form is made to serve as a front for rule by an authoritarian establishment, be it the military in Pakistan’s case or a ruling party in others. The country has a long history of direct military rules of the coup variety, 33 years in four spells, which all were brought down by popular protests.
The lesson learnt from those falling military rules has been to set up controlled elected governments subservient to the military’s interests and directions. Thus, elections become a means to lend a façade of democracy to covert military rule. This makes Pakistan a special case, but the tactics used to achieve this outcome are similar in many countries.
To begin with, Pakistan’s political parties are structured around single individuals and their families. They have nominal internal elections, which tend to be more of crowning the leader than an open choice given to party members. The “great leader’ designates relatives as possible successors, turning parties into dynastic corporations.
Although the military’s influence in promoting and removing elected governments has a long history going back to the 1970s and in some ways before, but in recent times it has become more forceful and visible.
Pakistan’s oldest political party, Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) is now a family enterprise of Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shehbaz Sharif. Now Nawaz’s daughter Mariam Nawaz and nephew Hamza Shehbaz have emerged as the national or provincial chief executives in waiting.
The once popular Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), founded by Zulfiqar Bhutto (1928-79), was inherited by his daughter Benazir Bhutto (1953-2007). On her death, it has passed on to her husband, Asif Zardari, and now her son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, who as the co-chair is contesting elections aspiring to be the prospective prime minister.
The one large non-dynastic party is the relatively new Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), whose founder Imran Khan, of charismatic but autocratic inclinations, has broken the hold of the foregoing two parties by appealing to the urban youth. Other political parties have some regional and local sway. Among them are the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in urban Sindh, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), both promising Islamic social order but limited in their appeal. Only these parties really matter, even though 167 parties are registered for elections with the National Election Commission (NEC).
What Pakistan shares with many other countries in political organization is the centrality of persons, rather than of organized parties and ideologies. In Pakistan, the influencing by the military and intelligence agencies has been made easy as it has been just a matter of choosing or removing a person. The covertness of military’s influence has been one of the peculiarities of Pakistan.
Almost everybody knows the part the military plays in national politics, but until recently publicly discussing this connection has been taboo, with consequences for breaking the silence. Threatening night calls, intimidation including violence against intrepid journalists, taping of telephones were some of the practices that kept the military’s role as the nationally known secret. One had to use euphemisms like establishment or invisible forces to hint at the military’s role in governance.
The establishment’s tactics to manage elections and control elected governments include aligning with a pliable leader and the party to form an ‘elected’ government by deploying the administration and police to mobilize local influentials, called electables, to side with the ‘chosen’ party, dragging unfavored leaders in the courts on corruption or drummed up criminal charges, making uncooperative politicians disappear by locking them away until they change their loyalties, anonymously releasing disreputable videos and audios of unfavored leaders, blocking critical social media by cutting off internet services, controlling the press and television services through overt or covert censorship, using the NEC to bar unfavored persons or parties from participating in elections, and pressuring the judiciary to block uncooperative political parties. Pakistani commentators call these tactics political engineering, which practically means a dominant role of the military chief and the commander of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in managing national affairs.
Although the military’s influence in promoting and removing elected governments has a long history going back to the 1970s and in some ways before, but in recent times it has become more forceful and visible. This phase of the parliamentary rule began in 2008 with elections, followed by a change from the PPP’s rule to the PML-N’s government after 2013 elections.
In 2018, another election was precipitated by a parliamentary no-confidence vote against the PML government. This time, Imran Khan of the PTI gained the premiership, introducing a new face in electoral politics. His government was voted out in 2022, by the same maneuver of parliamentary overthrow that brought it into power. The elections this February will be the fourth in about 15 years. The rise and fall of parties in elections is popularly attributed to the changing acceptability of their leaders by the military establishment.
The continuing overlordship of the military establishment has also resulted in compromising most of Pakistan’s institutions, e.g. administration, judiciary, legislature, economy and education.
The preparations for the February elections are in full swing. The military establishment’s hand in managing elections is much more visible; Imran Khan and the PTI are the focus of the establishment’s wrath. His popularity among urban youth is meant to be contained to prevent his return. He has been lodged in jail on many charges, such as corruption, organizing attacks on the military’s institutions and mishandling state documents and secrets. In the past few days, he, his wife and the former foreign minister have been sentenced to 10 plus years of imprisonment. His sentencing has been hurriedly pronounced to signal his removal from the electoral landscape before the February 8th elections.
The PTI has been deregistered by the Election Commission, and its prominent leaders have been coerced into withdrawing from the party. Its members are contesting elections locally as independents, though they present themselves as backed by the rump PTI. Even many of these independents have been prevented by the police from holding public meetings and canvassing for elections. The courts have often ruled against the party’s pleas. In these elections most of the tactics listed above are in full display.
The converse process of picking a favored leader and party is also visible. Nawaz Sharif was ‘voted out’ in the parliament and convicted on corruption charges in 2018, and was subsequently debarred from elections for life. He saved his skin by going into long exile, ostensibly for medical treatment. His comeback is striking, as all convictions have been quickly reversed by superior courts. He is gearing up for a fourth stint as the prime minister through the forthcoming elections.
Whatever results the elections may bring, it is unlikely that a sustainable democracy will emerge. They will only reinforce Pakistan’s hollowed democracy, which has the form of democratic governance, but is drained of substance and purpose. The continuing overlordship of the military establishment has also resulted in compromising most of Pakistan’s institutions, e.g. administration, judiciary, legislature, economy and education.
Elected governments operating at the pleasure of the establishment are seldom secure. Their emasculation results in a quick loss of credibility, and political instability has become a near permanent condition of life in Pakistan. The February elections alone are unlikely to bring a stable and effective government in Pakistan. To conclude, it is worth noting that Pakistan’s situation is not unique. An autocratic rule behind the façade of elected democracy is a condition shared by many countries.