A suicide bomber killed at least 100 people inside a mosque in Peshawar on January 30. Soon after the attack, the TTP announced that its breakaway faction, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), which has links with al-Qaeda, especially its slain leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had led the attack.
Writing in the Long War Journal American, counter-terrorism expert Bill Roggio, challenges the concept of a split. He argues that the two groups broke away in 2014 to remerge in 2015. Since then, the TTP-JuA have attacked several targets in Pakistan. The recent attack in Peshawar, followed by an attempt on a police station in Mianwali, ought to be seen in the context of resurgence of militancy in Pakistan’s tribal belt, the result of a changed geo-political scenario after American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, and gaps in Pakistan’s counterterrorism (CT) versus counter-violent extremism (CVE) strategies and capacity.
In 2020, when the US and Taliban signed the Doha agreement that allowed for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan looked more confident as it had almost managed to control the terrorism problem in the country. The military operation Radd-ul-Fasaad launched in February 2017 aimed at building on gains made during the earlier exercise, Zarb-e-Azb initiated in 2014.
The terrorism-related data in 2020 helped conclude that Pakistan’s CT was in good shape. The number of terror-related incidents had reduced from about 4,000 in 2013 to around 319 in 2019. However, it was too early to assume that terrorism was dead, as violent extremism remained alive and so did problems with the state approach – which seems to haunt the country now.
As the US withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan underwent major political and geo-political developments. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) came to power, which was comparatively more sympathetic of the inherent drift of Pakistan’s overall CT approach – target those that attack the country and engage with others like the Afghan Taliban or even other groups that refrained from attacking Pakistan.
The PTI was not an originator of the policy but a sympathizer. In fact, former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent talk on a policy to settle the Taliban in the country referred to conversations that went on in Islamabad in 2016-17. This was an extension of the approach to draw a line between manageable militants versus those out of control from times of the Swat operation in 2009.
I remember a conference organized by the German Heinrich-Boll Stiftung in Islamabad in 201l, when some civilian allies of the security establishment even talked against targeting Malik Ishaq of Lashkar-e-Jhangavi. It denoted a hurried application of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) theory in Pakistan-Afghanistan context that was more applicable in the African context where states had collapsed and there were runaway soldiers or militaries.
I remember many columnists then wrote about the necessity of this approach – give jobs to militants and extremists to integrate them in the society.
In 2017, a few of us did not support the DDR approach to tackle Pakistan’s terrorism problem because no thought was given to extremist ideology spreading inside the mainstream law enforcement and security organizations and no programme was in place to counter their ideology, where any minor deviation from their school of thought could accuse one of committing blasphemy.
This strategy collapsed as the Afghan Taliban returned to Kabul as victors and left Pakistan in a power vacuum in the region. It also left the tribal areas to face repercussions of the return of militant organizations.
The power vacuum was not just created by the exit of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan but also because Pakistan did not allow civil society movements, such as the Pushtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), to strengthen. Pakistan hoped it could solve the problem by talking to the TTP through its friends in the Afghan Taliban.
According to Antonio Gustozzi, a UK based expert on ISIS-Khorasan and other militant groups in Afghanistan, in the last year or so the TTP has moved into the Southeastern region controlled by the Haqqani Network that is supposed to have better understanding with Pakistan’s establishment. Negotiations carried out in 2022 brought down the temperature temporarily but did not bring any resolution. There is little that Pakistan can depend on in terms of help to stop the TTP.
There is no sense in getting lost in semantics of an internal split. Whether it is those from the TTP or sister organization, the JuA, which have targeted Pakistan since 2014. In March 2016, for instance, it successfully carried out an attack in Lahore’s public park, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, killing about 72 people. The pattern is visible – it goes for mass terror and has capacity to infiltrate. This is also not a moment to ignore other extremist groups with deeper support base in plains of Pakistan that are protected yet put in the category of militant organizations that do not target Pakistan. Though the JuA and TTP remain largely a tribal phenomenon, its continued categorization as a Pushtun phenomenon is bound to create other political problems.
Poverty caused by prevailing economic hardships may further contribute to the conflict. However, it is important to be warned that poverty has remained a contributory factor and not the driver. Flaws in the state policy are the biggest drivers of CT and CVE.
This is not a battle that can be fought with military options, especially when attacking Afghanistan could result in expansion of war inside Pakistan. The TTP wants to implement sharia in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Strengthening domestic intelligence and its cautious use compounded with effective law enforcement is the real solution. But the biggest gap in implementation is created by a state policy that allows for viewing militants as policy tools – this gap must be closed if Pakistan is to be saved from threats.
Writing in the Long War Journal American, counter-terrorism expert Bill Roggio, challenges the concept of a split. He argues that the two groups broke away in 2014 to remerge in 2015. Since then, the TTP-JuA have attacked several targets in Pakistan. The recent attack in Peshawar, followed by an attempt on a police station in Mianwali, ought to be seen in the context of resurgence of militancy in Pakistan’s tribal belt, the result of a changed geo-political scenario after American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, and gaps in Pakistan’s counterterrorism (CT) versus counter-violent extremism (CVE) strategies and capacity.
In 2020, when the US and Taliban signed the Doha agreement that allowed for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan looked more confident as it had almost managed to control the terrorism problem in the country. The military operation Radd-ul-Fasaad launched in February 2017 aimed at building on gains made during the earlier exercise, Zarb-e-Azb initiated in 2014.
The terrorism-related data in 2020 helped conclude that Pakistan’s CT was in good shape. The number of terror-related incidents had reduced from about 4,000 in 2013 to around 319 in 2019. However, it was too early to assume that terrorism was dead, as violent extremism remained alive and so did problems with the state approach – which seems to haunt the country now.
As the US withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan underwent major political and geo-political developments. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) came to power, which was comparatively more sympathetic of the inherent drift of Pakistan’s overall CT approach – target those that attack the country and engage with others like the Afghan Taliban or even other groups that refrained from attacking Pakistan.
The PTI was not an originator of the policy but a sympathizer. In fact, former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent talk on a policy to settle the Taliban in the country referred to conversations that went on in Islamabad in 2016-17. This was an extension of the approach to draw a line between manageable militants versus those out of control from times of the Swat operation in 2009.
“The recent attack in Peshawar, followed by an attempt on a police station in Mianwali, ought to be seen in the context of resurgence of militancy in Pakistan’s tribal belt, the result of a changed geo-political scenario after American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, and gaps in Pakistan’s counterterrorism (CT) versus counter-violent extremism (CVE) strategies and capacity.”
I remember a conference organized by the German Heinrich-Boll Stiftung in Islamabad in 201l, when some civilian allies of the security establishment even talked against targeting Malik Ishaq of Lashkar-e-Jhangavi. It denoted a hurried application of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) theory in Pakistan-Afghanistan context that was more applicable in the African context where states had collapsed and there were runaway soldiers or militaries.
I remember many columnists then wrote about the necessity of this approach – give jobs to militants and extremists to integrate them in the society.
In 2017, a few of us did not support the DDR approach to tackle Pakistan’s terrorism problem because no thought was given to extremist ideology spreading inside the mainstream law enforcement and security organizations and no programme was in place to counter their ideology, where any minor deviation from their school of thought could accuse one of committing blasphemy.
This strategy collapsed as the Afghan Taliban returned to Kabul as victors and left Pakistan in a power vacuum in the region. It also left the tribal areas to face repercussions of the return of militant organizations.
The power vacuum was not just created by the exit of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan but also because Pakistan did not allow civil society movements, such as the Pushtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), to strengthen. Pakistan hoped it could solve the problem by talking to the TTP through its friends in the Afghan Taliban.
According to Antonio Gustozzi, a UK based expert on ISIS-Khorasan and other militant groups in Afghanistan, in the last year or so the TTP has moved into the Southeastern region controlled by the Haqqani Network that is supposed to have better understanding with Pakistan’s establishment. Negotiations carried out in 2022 brought down the temperature temporarily but did not bring any resolution. There is little that Pakistan can depend on in terms of help to stop the TTP.
There is no sense in getting lost in semantics of an internal split. Whether it is those from the TTP or sister organization, the JuA, which have targeted Pakistan since 2014. In March 2016, for instance, it successfully carried out an attack in Lahore’s public park, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, killing about 72 people. The pattern is visible – it goes for mass terror and has capacity to infiltrate. This is also not a moment to ignore other extremist groups with deeper support base in plains of Pakistan that are protected yet put in the category of militant organizations that do not target Pakistan. Though the JuA and TTP remain largely a tribal phenomenon, its continued categorization as a Pushtun phenomenon is bound to create other political problems.
Poverty caused by prevailing economic hardships may further contribute to the conflict. However, it is important to be warned that poverty has remained a contributory factor and not the driver. Flaws in the state policy are the biggest drivers of CT and CVE.
This is not a battle that can be fought with military options, especially when attacking Afghanistan could result in expansion of war inside Pakistan. The TTP wants to implement sharia in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Strengthening domestic intelligence and its cautious use compounded with effective law enforcement is the real solution. But the biggest gap in implementation is created by a state policy that allows for viewing militants as policy tools – this gap must be closed if Pakistan is to be saved from threats.