The latest Russia aggression against Ukraine throws light on two key issues – one, the security assurances provided to Ukraine by the US, the UK and Russia; and two, Belarus’ renunciation of its non-nuclear-armed status in a referendum held on February 27, 2022.
So, what happened when former Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991? After the collapse, the nuclear weapons were stationed on territories of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This dramatic increase in the number of nuclear armed states led to intense negotiations, which resulted in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. According to the memorandum, Belarus, Kazakistan and Ukraine agreed to relinquish nuclear arsenal and transfer them to Russia. All three joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By 1996 they had completed the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia, leaving Russia as the only successor of Soviet nuclear arsenal.
There were misgivings among the Ukrainian official circle about foregoing its inherited nuclear arsenal. Although, the operational control of arsenal remained with Russia, Ukraine declared the administrative control and claimed the ownership of warheads. The Ukrainian parliament, Rada, passed a resolution on November 18, 1993, stating that Ukraine would dismantle, with foreign aid, 42 percent of warheads and 36 percent of delivery systems, and the rest would be under the Ukrainian custody. It demanded assurances from Russia and the US to never use nuclear weapons against Ukraine.
This resulted in the Trilateral Statement signed on January 14, 1994. Ukraine agreed to relinquish world’s third largest nuclear arsenal consisting of about 1900 strategic warheads in order to evade potential international isolation along with political and economic consequences. In exchange, Ukraine got the assurance that Russia will compensate Ukraine for the commercial value of highly enriched uranium stored in nuclear warheads that could be used for peaceful purposes after blending it down. The US, under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, shared the burden of elimination of strategic nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and strategic bombers stationed in Ukraine. The US, Britain and Russia provided security assurances “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against the country.
The irony is that those assurances played key role in reducing the number of nuclear armed states, which was crucial at the time for the indefinite extension of the NPT, but could not stop Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and repeated aggression against Ukraine. This brought security assurances provided under the memorandum under renewed scrutiny.
One can argue that the assurances pledged under the memorandum are not guarantees, as Article 5 of the NATO does not impose any obligations on the US and Britain to intervene in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and commit their military power beyond the condemnation of Russian attack and keep economic and political pressure on Russia. Likewise, the repeated use of the word “reaffirm” in document doesn’t imply that all three states entered into novel security commitments that require British or American military to respond to Russian violations. Further, the memorandum is not a legally binding treaty.
So, if these assurances don’t obligate Britain and the US to come forward with military might for Ukraine then how can they bind Russia to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity? The US and the UK though fulfilled the assurances in letter by bringing Russian annexation of Crimea to the UNSC and, along with Ukraine, convened consultations -- which Russia did not participate in.
Regardless of various assurances, the US, Britain and Russia must value the security assurances and negotiate for future agreements, especially involving nuclear proliferation issues.
The case of Belarus however is different. Belarus changed its strategic posture by shunning its neutrality and nuclear weapons free status codified under the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for economic aid and loan guarantees from Russia.
Belarus President Lukashenko, in November last year, expressed his intention of hosting Russian nuclear weapons if NATO moved American nuclear arsenal from Germany to Eastern Europe. Lukashenko recognised Russian annexation of Crimea and observed, alongside Putin in Kremlin, the nuclear drills and missile test launches at different ranges.
But, Belarus remained concerned about any possible change in NATO’s strategic deployment pattern.
Before finalising the transfer of weapons to Russia in November 1996, Lukashenko had threatened twice to retain nuclear weapons deployed within its borders if NATO deployed nuclear weapons in Poland. According to Lukashenko, it was Boris Yeltsin’s personal pressure which had led him to agree to return SS-25s to Russia -- under the Nunn-Lugar CTR programme. As a result of human rights violations, Bill Clinton administration ended the US work in Belarus in March 1997, leaving behind 81 SS-25 launch sites intact.
Germany’s new government maintained credible deterrent potential based on nuclear sharing that killed the rationale for Lukashenko to host Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. Yet he chose to nuclear share. The Belarusian referendum and new constitution reflects public and domestic support to change its strategic posture. Comparatively, the absence of foreign policy issues from election debates in Germany could indicate lack of political and domestic consensus under new “traffic lights” coalition government on nuclear sharing.
Regardless of domestic politics, the stationing of Russian and American nuclear weapons in Europe would further heighten the risks on the European continent and across Atlantic. The risks are increasing due to divergent nuclear policies and postures of nuclear-armed states. Germany, if eager to continue with nuclear sharing, requires replacement of its Tornado aircrafts that are to carry US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany.
On the contrary, the coalition treaty, following Norway, wants Germany to attend the TPNM’s Conference of the Parties as an observer. British Integrated Review lifts cap on its nuclear warheads and maintains nuclear ambiguity. In 2020, France organised a EU dialogue on the role of nuclear weapons in EU security and offered EU countries to participate in French nuclear exercises. Russia and China are investing in modernising its nuclear arsenal. An increased salience on nuclear weapons is expected in NATO Strategic Concept 2022 and the US concept of Integrated Deterrence.
In any case, European countries need to recover from economic pitfalls of Coronavirus pandemic and need to accumulate enough political and strategic capital to deal with increasing risks to trans-Atlantic security and interests.
So, what happened when former Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991? After the collapse, the nuclear weapons were stationed on territories of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This dramatic increase in the number of nuclear armed states led to intense negotiations, which resulted in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. According to the memorandum, Belarus, Kazakistan and Ukraine agreed to relinquish nuclear arsenal and transfer them to Russia. All three joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By 1996 they had completed the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia, leaving Russia as the only successor of Soviet nuclear arsenal.
There were misgivings among the Ukrainian official circle about foregoing its inherited nuclear arsenal. Although, the operational control of arsenal remained with Russia, Ukraine declared the administrative control and claimed the ownership of warheads. The Ukrainian parliament, Rada, passed a resolution on November 18, 1993, stating that Ukraine would dismantle, with foreign aid, 42 percent of warheads and 36 percent of delivery systems, and the rest would be under the Ukrainian custody. It demanded assurances from Russia and the US to never use nuclear weapons against Ukraine.
This resulted in the Trilateral Statement signed on January 14, 1994. Ukraine agreed to relinquish world’s third largest nuclear arsenal consisting of about 1900 strategic warheads in order to evade potential international isolation along with political and economic consequences. In exchange, Ukraine got the assurance that Russia will compensate Ukraine for the commercial value of highly enriched uranium stored in nuclear warheads that could be used for peaceful purposes after blending it down. The US, under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, shared the burden of elimination of strategic nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and strategic bombers stationed in Ukraine. The US, Britain and Russia provided security assurances “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against the country.
The irony is that those assurances played key role in reducing the number of nuclear armed states, which was crucial at the time for the indefinite extension of the NPT, but could not stop Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and repeated aggression against Ukraine. This brought security assurances provided under the memorandum under renewed scrutiny.
The irony is that those assurances played key role in reducing the number of nuclear armed states, which was crucial at the time for the indefinite extension of the NPT, but could not stop Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and repeated aggression against Ukraine. This brought security assurances provided under the memorandum under renewed scrutiny.
One can argue that the assurances pledged under the memorandum are not guarantees, as Article 5 of the NATO does not impose any obligations on the US and Britain to intervene in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and commit their military power beyond the condemnation of Russian attack and keep economic and political pressure on Russia. Likewise, the repeated use of the word “reaffirm” in document doesn’t imply that all three states entered into novel security commitments that require British or American military to respond to Russian violations. Further, the memorandum is not a legally binding treaty.
So, if these assurances don’t obligate Britain and the US to come forward with military might for Ukraine then how can they bind Russia to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity? The US and the UK though fulfilled the assurances in letter by bringing Russian annexation of Crimea to the UNSC and, along with Ukraine, convened consultations -- which Russia did not participate in.
Regardless of various assurances, the US, Britain and Russia must value the security assurances and negotiate for future agreements, especially involving nuclear proliferation issues.
The case of Belarus however is different. Belarus changed its strategic posture by shunning its neutrality and nuclear weapons free status codified under the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for economic aid and loan guarantees from Russia.
Belarus President Lukashenko, in November last year, expressed his intention of hosting Russian nuclear weapons if NATO moved American nuclear arsenal from Germany to Eastern Europe. Lukashenko recognised Russian annexation of Crimea and observed, alongside Putin in Kremlin, the nuclear drills and missile test launches at different ranges.
But, Belarus remained concerned about any possible change in NATO’s strategic deployment pattern.
Before finalising the transfer of weapons to Russia in November 1996, Lukashenko had threatened twice to retain nuclear weapons deployed within its borders if NATO deployed nuclear weapons in Poland. According to Lukashenko, it was Boris Yeltsin’s personal pressure which had led him to agree to return SS-25s to Russia -- under the Nunn-Lugar CTR programme. As a result of human rights violations, Bill Clinton administration ended the US work in Belarus in March 1997, leaving behind 81 SS-25 launch sites intact.
Germany’s new government maintained credible deterrent potential based on nuclear sharing that killed the rationale for Lukashenko to host Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. Yet he chose to nuclear share. The Belarusian referendum and new constitution reflects public and domestic support to change its strategic posture. Comparatively, the absence of foreign policy issues from election debates in Germany could indicate lack of political and domestic consensus under new “traffic lights” coalition government on nuclear sharing.
Belarus changed its strategic posture by shunning its neutrality and nuclear weapons free status codified under the Budapest Memorandum in exchange for economic aid and loan guarantees from Russia.
Regardless of domestic politics, the stationing of Russian and American nuclear weapons in Europe would further heighten the risks on the European continent and across Atlantic. The risks are increasing due to divergent nuclear policies and postures of nuclear-armed states. Germany, if eager to continue with nuclear sharing, requires replacement of its Tornado aircrafts that are to carry US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany.
On the contrary, the coalition treaty, following Norway, wants Germany to attend the TPNM’s Conference of the Parties as an observer. British Integrated Review lifts cap on its nuclear warheads and maintains nuclear ambiguity. In 2020, France organised a EU dialogue on the role of nuclear weapons in EU security and offered EU countries to participate in French nuclear exercises. Russia and China are investing in modernising its nuclear arsenal. An increased salience on nuclear weapons is expected in NATO Strategic Concept 2022 and the US concept of Integrated Deterrence.
In any case, European countries need to recover from economic pitfalls of Coronavirus pandemic and need to accumulate enough political and strategic capital to deal with increasing risks to trans-Atlantic security and interests.