The cancellation of the meeting between the national security advisers of India and Pakistan did not come as a surprise to many. In July 2014, the Modi government unilaterally called off talks between the two countries’ foreign secretaries citing their objection to Hurriyat Conference leaders from Kashmir meeting the Pakistani High Commissioner and the visiting Pakistani leaders. The two sides should have discussed the issue before the meeting planned in August to find a solution to the recurring problem. Instead, the entire drama played out on TV.
The way the talks were canceled brought to the fore the harsh reality that New Delhi and Islamabad have lost trust in each other.
I was in Islamabad when these dramatic developments were taking place. Journalists were glued to TV screens as usual when Pakistan’s National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz addressed a live news conference, taking exception to separatist leader Shabir Shah’s detention and Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Sawraj’s press conference in which she invoked the Shimla agreement to insist that Kashmiris should stay away from the Pakistani leadership, and in a way declaring them a “third party”.
Dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad has always been a tricky affair, except in the period from 2003 to 2007. But in the year and a half of Narendra Modi’s rule, there has been no clarity on how this process will even begin.
After the talks were called off last year, Modi called his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in February, conveying that he was sending his Foreign Secretary Jaishankar on a ‘SAARC yatra’. But there was no significant headway until the Ufa declaration in June.
If my sources are to be believed, the Ufa meeting was also initiated by New Delhi. The joint statement released after the meeting was acceptable to Delhi, since Kashmir was omitted from the text, except as a part of “all outstanding issues”. But the air continued to remain polluted with a lack of trust.
Nawaz Sharif had to face criticism in Pakistan when he returned from Ufa. The fact that there was no mention of Kashmir enraged the constituency that is wedded to the issue. It was like Manmohan Singh retracting from the Sharm el Sheikh declaration with then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, in which they had agreed to include Pakistani concerns about Balochistan.
Key indicators suggest that neither of the two countries did any homework before Ufa, or even the meeting of the national security advisers, to remove possible irritants. According a top official in Pakistan’s Foreign Office, the plan of the meeting with Hurriyat leaders was “conveyed well during the dates finalized for these talks”.
“We were in fact ready for foreign secretary level talks on the sidelines, and our foreign secretary was accompanying our NSA,” said the official. “But Delhi did not respond until August 21, and on that day said that these talks were not possible.”
Indian officials say the Pakistan High Commission was told a meeting with Kashmiri leaders could create problems.
One important outcome of the debacle was that Nawaz Sharif earned support in Pakistan even from those who disagree with him. Irrespective of who is to be blame for the cancellation of the talks – since both sides have their own arguments – Pakistanis seemed united on the issue. The military, the government, political parties, the civil society and the media were all on the same page, praising the Nawaz government for what they believe was an act of defiance against Indian dictation.
Even the doves among the journalists were speaking a different language, accusing Modi of “deceiving” Sharif and not reciprocating his desire to move forward on the peace process.
In fact, the day the Ufa declaration was announced, former Indian ambassador KC Singh had made an interesting comment during a TV debate – that if there has been any consistency in India-Pakistan relations in the last year and a half, it has come from Sharif and not from Modi.
Policymakers in Delhi may not agree with this, but the fact is that Kashmir remained in focus during this week-long drama, getting more attention than it would have if it had been discussed in the talks.
To make an issue out of the meeting between Pakistani delegates and Kashmiri leaders in 2014 was a result of misplaced priorities. Hurriyat leaders have been meeting visiting Pakistani leaders since 1995 – not only under the Congress rule but also during Vajpayee’s years in power. Once when a minister was asked why it was allowed, he said: “they are meeting them as Indian citizens”.
The cancellation of the meeting has helped Nawaz strengthen his position in Pakistan, and also brought back glory to the Kashmiri separatists, making them relevant. Not recognizing the separatist leadership is in itself a big mistake that New Delhi is making. Unless a two-track process of dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad and New Delhi and Hurriyat Conference (and others) is initiated, no significant change can be expected on the ground in Kashmir.
The alienation of the Kashmiri people, despite a 71 percent voter turnout in the elections, has been increasing after a sense of despondency that is shadowed by a renewed phase of violence.
It seems that Modi’s policy on Kashmir and Pakistan is not that same as that of Vajpayee. Modi has a dream of emerging as a south Asian leader, which he indicated when he organized a grand ceremony for his oath taking. But he cannot achieve more than Vajpayee by creating war hysteria. The way Pakistan rejected the conditions for the talks makes it clear that Islamabad has regained its confidence after a semblance of stability within the country. After it launched the Operation Zarb-e-Azab and being able to largely control internal militancy, Pakistan has a new confidence which reflects in its posturing towards India.
The only way forward for both the countries is to hold dialogue, but only after removing any foreseeable glitches, for which they must find out-of-the-box solutions. They cannot begin talking without laying the groundwork.
They must also put an end to the madness on the Line of Control and the international border, where their forces are playing with mortars and guns like toys. It is in fact political hostility that makes them trigger-happy, thus killing innocent civilians. That must end, and peace must prevail, even if formal talks take time to begin.
The author is a veteran journalist from Srinagar and the editor-in-chief of Rising Kashmir
Email: shujaat7867@gmail.com
The way the talks were canceled brought to the fore the harsh reality that New Delhi and Islamabad have lost trust in each other.
I was in Islamabad when these dramatic developments were taking place. Journalists were glued to TV screens as usual when Pakistan’s National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz addressed a live news conference, taking exception to separatist leader Shabir Shah’s detention and Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Sawraj’s press conference in which she invoked the Shimla agreement to insist that Kashmiris should stay away from the Pakistani leadership, and in a way declaring them a “third party”.
They are playing with mortars and guns like toys
Dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad has always been a tricky affair, except in the period from 2003 to 2007. But in the year and a half of Narendra Modi’s rule, there has been no clarity on how this process will even begin.
After the talks were called off last year, Modi called his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in February, conveying that he was sending his Foreign Secretary Jaishankar on a ‘SAARC yatra’. But there was no significant headway until the Ufa declaration in June.
If my sources are to be believed, the Ufa meeting was also initiated by New Delhi. The joint statement released after the meeting was acceptable to Delhi, since Kashmir was omitted from the text, except as a part of “all outstanding issues”. But the air continued to remain polluted with a lack of trust.
Nawaz Sharif had to face criticism in Pakistan when he returned from Ufa. The fact that there was no mention of Kashmir enraged the constituency that is wedded to the issue. It was like Manmohan Singh retracting from the Sharm el Sheikh declaration with then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, in which they had agreed to include Pakistani concerns about Balochistan.
Key indicators suggest that neither of the two countries did any homework before Ufa, or even the meeting of the national security advisers, to remove possible irritants. According a top official in Pakistan’s Foreign Office, the plan of the meeting with Hurriyat leaders was “conveyed well during the dates finalized for these talks”.
“We were in fact ready for foreign secretary level talks on the sidelines, and our foreign secretary was accompanying our NSA,” said the official. “But Delhi did not respond until August 21, and on that day said that these talks were not possible.”
Indian officials say the Pakistan High Commission was told a meeting with Kashmiri leaders could create problems.
One important outcome of the debacle was that Nawaz Sharif earned support in Pakistan even from those who disagree with him. Irrespective of who is to be blame for the cancellation of the talks – since both sides have their own arguments – Pakistanis seemed united on the issue. The military, the government, political parties, the civil society and the media were all on the same page, praising the Nawaz government for what they believe was an act of defiance against Indian dictation.
Even the doves among the journalists were speaking a different language, accusing Modi of “deceiving” Sharif and not reciprocating his desire to move forward on the peace process.
In fact, the day the Ufa declaration was announced, former Indian ambassador KC Singh had made an interesting comment during a TV debate – that if there has been any consistency in India-Pakistan relations in the last year and a half, it has come from Sharif and not from Modi.
Policymakers in Delhi may not agree with this, but the fact is that Kashmir remained in focus during this week-long drama, getting more attention than it would have if it had been discussed in the talks.
To make an issue out of the meeting between Pakistani delegates and Kashmiri leaders in 2014 was a result of misplaced priorities. Hurriyat leaders have been meeting visiting Pakistani leaders since 1995 – not only under the Congress rule but also during Vajpayee’s years in power. Once when a minister was asked why it was allowed, he said: “they are meeting them as Indian citizens”.
The cancellation of the meeting has helped Nawaz strengthen his position in Pakistan, and also brought back glory to the Kashmiri separatists, making them relevant. Not recognizing the separatist leadership is in itself a big mistake that New Delhi is making. Unless a two-track process of dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad and New Delhi and Hurriyat Conference (and others) is initiated, no significant change can be expected on the ground in Kashmir.
The alienation of the Kashmiri people, despite a 71 percent voter turnout in the elections, has been increasing after a sense of despondency that is shadowed by a renewed phase of violence.
It seems that Modi’s policy on Kashmir and Pakistan is not that same as that of Vajpayee. Modi has a dream of emerging as a south Asian leader, which he indicated when he organized a grand ceremony for his oath taking. But he cannot achieve more than Vajpayee by creating war hysteria. The way Pakistan rejected the conditions for the talks makes it clear that Islamabad has regained its confidence after a semblance of stability within the country. After it launched the Operation Zarb-e-Azab and being able to largely control internal militancy, Pakistan has a new confidence which reflects in its posturing towards India.
The only way forward for both the countries is to hold dialogue, but only after removing any foreseeable glitches, for which they must find out-of-the-box solutions. They cannot begin talking without laying the groundwork.
They must also put an end to the madness on the Line of Control and the international border, where their forces are playing with mortars and guns like toys. It is in fact political hostility that makes them trigger-happy, thus killing innocent civilians. That must end, and peace must prevail, even if formal talks take time to begin.
The author is a veteran journalist from Srinagar and the editor-in-chief of Rising Kashmir
Email: shujaat7867@gmail.com