First and foremost, the tension that began on May 5/6 and which went underreported for the first two weeks has now been acknowledged by the highest levels of Indian government. The Chinese government, while downplaying it, has also issued statements through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson.
Second, the recent episode began with skirmishes between soldiers on both sides in which several Indian troops, including some officers, were injured. Indians allege that their troops were assaulted by PLA soldiers with batons. Reports also suggest the PLA troops captured two Indian soldiers from a patrol party but were later released.
Third, the standoff involves five key nodes, moving south to north from Demchok to Pangong Tso (a high-altitude lake), Gogra Post, Galwan River basin and the northern-most point (quiet so far), Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), also known in Indian military maps as sub-sector north. DBO is about 8 km south of Karakoram Pass.
Four, since 2000, India has been constructing a road which connects Leh to Durbuk, Shyok and goes right up to DBO. However, in 2011 it was found that there was a problem with the alignment of the DSDBO Road and work had to be initiated to realign it. Most of it was completed in 2019. The Road runs fairly close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Five, while the border between China and Indian occupied Ladakh is unmarked with both sides making claims on the basis of their own maps, there is a general understanding of the line. The problem lies in both sides also having their claim lines. While India’s claim line tries to push eastward, China’s claim line, predictably, tries to push westward. This is done through patrolling and there are times when patrols come across each other. There has been more frequent jostling since a 2017 episode.
Six, some WhatsApp analyses in Pakistan are weaving a tapestry, using the standoff, to argue that Chinese have done this because India was planning to invade Gilgit-Baltistan and cut off the CPEC route. These analyses assign to Gwadar a significance that has nothing to do with Gwadar’s capacity or that of the road link with China and lack understanding of the fact that the sea-lanes of communication are a much better and faster option for freight to western and southern China. They also lack military-operational understanding of the resources India would require to cut off the Karakoram Highway. The best way to deal with such analyses is to use the delete option.
Seven, reports suggest that PLA troops have pushed west of their claim line, using patrol boats in the Pangong Lake and troops in the area where the Galwan Valley mouth links up with Shyok River. This second node is important, because if the report about Chinese presence and consolidation is correct, then they can dominate the DSDBO Road through artillery fire. Reports also suggest the presence of Chinese armour and Infantry Fighting Vehicles as well as aerial activity by Chinese fighter jets. Reason: DBO has an air landing strip used by Indian Air Force for C-130 landings. This landing ground is crucial for the Indian Army for fast deployment of equipment and troops in the area. One of the reasons for the DSDBO Road is to access the landing ground as it is otherwise difficult to approach from the west. The DSDBO Road itself is strategically important for Indian Army deployments and reinforcements in the event of a conflict.
Eight, China has been observing the inauguration of an all-weather bridge at 15,000 feet by India. The bridge and the DSDBO Road cut travel time for troops from two days to six hours. Troops also no longer have to ford the river. The bridge can also take heavy equipment and vehicles.
Ninth, India has been trying to improve infrastructure because its defences along the LAC, unlike at the Line of Control, do not physically dominate the line. The approaches are covered by forward Indo-Tibetan Border Police posts and also through patrolling. The patrolling points are also a matter of dispute.
But all this is geography and tactics. This activity has been going on for long. There have also been skirmishes, as happened in 2017 at one of the fingers area along Pangong Tso when PLA troops clashed with ITBP troops. Why have the Chinese decided to push westward of their claim line now.
One possible reason is India’s annexation of Ladakh as Union Territory. This changes the nature of the dispute. Second, the present Indian government has undertaken several infrastructure projects along the LAC both in the western and eastern sectors. This activity is an essential part of India’s decision to raise a mountain strike corps, XVII Corps, dedicated against China. The corps was raised on 1st January 2014. As per Indian reports, it is supposed to have integral air assets (attack and transport helicopters, UAVs), an armoured regiment, an artillery regiment with light, transportable howitzers and a component of Special Forces. India already has three strike corps, 1, 2, 21, which are operationally configured against Pakistan. Third, China is closely observing US-India relations and India’s strategic partnership with the US.
Fourth, and possibly most importantly — this links up with India’s annexation of Ladakh — China is deeply concerned about India’s issuance of new maps. This would in fact be in line with what happened in the run-up to the month-long conflict in 1962. This is what Iftikhar Gilani, an eminent Kashmiri journalist, wrote for Anadolu Agency on May 29:
“India believes that it all [the 1962 conflict] began with the Chinese onslaught on their forward posts. But over time, new material made public [has] suggested that it was India’s flirtation with maps and claiming territory, which even British had not marked, [which] led to the war and tension in the region. It [is] precisely [for] these reasons that even after five decades, India has not released [the] Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report [which] documented the factors that led to the war…Wajahat Habibullah, the only civilian… who has seen this report [told this scribe that] contradictory maps presented by India in the 1950s and 1960-61 had led to the war.”
Habibullah also told Gilani that “I still believe the report should not be declassified. From 1962, the deployment of our armed forces has not substantially changed in these areas. So, declassifying [it] will lead to supplying the Chinese with defence information. Moreover, the report on the role of the Indian army is so scathing that it would have a demoralising effect on the forces even now.”
Fifth, given the overall tenor of relations and India’s general belligerence, China seems to have undertaken this push as a signalling exercise. Contrary to what the aforementioned WhatsApp analyses argue, this is a minor move on the broader Chinese chessboard. Nonetheless, its significance lies in how India will react to it. Will India fight it out or lump it? Both options are risky for New Delhi. In other words, China wants to test India through this tactical prick.
India’s response so far has been to (a) initially remain mute and play it down; and, (b) invoke the mechanism for working out the LAC disputes. There has already been a military-to-military meeting on June 2 and another is scheduled for June 6 (tomorrow). The first did not succeed in breaking the impasse. The issue has also gone to the diplomatic level. The third and the highest level is contact between Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping.
For now, the PLA troops are consolidating positions in the Galwan sector (where they have secured the heights), in Pangong Tso where they have secured the area between Finger 4 and 8 and in Gogra where the Indian post is surrounded. PLA troops are also linking up with their logistics infrastructure in the rear. India, if it opts to fight, will have to bring in troops. That activity will be monitored by China. The Indian defence minister, Rajnath Singh, while telling the media that the army is prepared to defend Indian territory has, nevertheless, been keen to point out that “the alignment of the LAC, and therefore the ownership of territory, is unclear in this area.”
It will be interesting to watch how the situation unfolds. It will also be interesting to see what kind of quid pro quo Beijing might demand if it decides to pull the PLA troops back to its claim line.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider