Of the many trends in these elections, the results of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Sindh were most surprising. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s (PTI) government had returned to power with a greater majority in KP. Contrary to the claims of PTI enthusiasts that KP never elects the same party, this feat was achieved by Awami National Party (ANP) as well in the 1990s. What is more important, however, is the scale of PTI’s victory, even though no major improvement in infrastructure could be seen. Based on a survey of voters from KP published in Herald, however, it is clear that voters could see marked improvement in health, education and police services during the PTI’s tenure. The Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) scored well for governance in the case of the Punjab. But achieving these goals in the Punjab was always going to be easy since it had historically been a well-oiled machine. In case of KP, there were visible frustrations in the PTI’s ranks to establish a similar machinery - or some kind of corporate model of governance which Shahbaz Sharif had managed in the case of Punjab. By hiring such professionals as Umer Saif and Salman Sufi, Sharif’s government could introduce e-governance in the province, sponsor social legislation for the protection of women, and oversee large scale reconstruction of the educational network in the province with the help of DFID. It was perhaps this ‘service delivery’ which helped the PML-N retain a sizeable number of its votes in the Punjab. But this service delivery and corporate governance still did not help win the bulk of the new middle class. This is because no matter what he does, Shahbaz Sharif will remain a symbol of the status-quo – a part of Pakistan’s ‘traditional’ dynastic politics responsible for ruining the country. The same holds true for Bilawal Bhutto, even if he can introduce and implement a service delivery structure in Sindh.
Now that Imran Khan has the well-oiled machine that is Punjab, he will be able to continue with the corporatist mode of governance with much more ease than in KP. In KP itself, he gained considerable support for at least trying to deliver. Now that politics has largely been replaced by a language of governance, even the worst critics of the PTI are going to judge the new government based on its ‘performance’ and ‘delivery’. Similarly, even as critics of naya Pakistan, many of them share the excitement of induction of ‘people like us’ (aka professionals, foreign educated and non-feudal backgrounds) as ministers and heads of government institutions. Illegitimacy of the entire process that brought Imran Khan to power has now been lost on even his critics, most of whom were thoroughly impressed with his first address to the nation. In his address, he touched upon such issues as food security, water shortage, environment, forestation, and a range of themes which have been popular jargons in the post-political, neo-liberal order globally. The professionals working for various policy making organizations, advocacy groups and NGOs quickly overlooked the illegitimacy of the electoral process, and hinted at ‘giving him a chance’ to fulfill the agenda set out in the speech. This, obviously, will mean more consultancies and paid assignments for the professional classes.
Illegitimacy of the entire process that brought Imran Khan to power has now been lost on even his critics, most of whom were thoroughly impressed with his first address to the nation
This lack of concern for legitimacy poses an additional challenge to the mode of politics practiced by nationalist parties, such as the ANP. Since the colonial period, the ANP (then affiliated with Congress under Abdul Ghaffar Khan and called Khudai Khidmatgars) has been on the receiving end of state oppression. This trend continued well into the postcolonial period as well when the leaders of the movement were considered suspect because of their opposition to the creation of Pakistan. Abdul Ghaffar Khan eventually ended up in exile in Afghanistan where he died and was buried. His son Abdul Wali Khan continued to play the role of the opposition and was put behind the bars many times in the process. It was only in the 1990s that ANP finally became mainstream. To this day, it remains the most successful example of an ethno-nationalist movement becoming part of federalist politics, through giving up much of its secessionist rhetoric. This had much to do with the Afghan Jihad which helped the Pakistani military strengthen religious opposition in Pashtun areas to the secular politics of ANP, and the economic integration of the Pashtuns who largely depended on Lahore and Karachi for their commercial interests. After decades of oppression and fighting with the state, the ANP mode of governance was still centred mostly on identity politics. Even if it tried, it could not have gone beyond the theatrics of naming the Peshawar airport after Abdul Ghaffar Khan or other similar steps. This is not to deny the attempts made by ANP to connect with the larger political society aimed at policy measures which benefitted their voters. Amidst all this, between 2008 and 2013, the party faced the specter of militancy that was unprecedented – even for a region ravaged by conflict for more than two decades. The party was unable to take a clear stand on the simmering issue of US atrocities in Afghanistan, and lost its own voter-base by toeing a loyalist, pro-military line in support of the military operation.
In case of Sindh, the military establishment had been pursuing the agenda of state formation by supporting the network of Deobandi madrassahs in the region. An Islam-based polity, the establishment believes, helps create a citizen devoid of ethnic identity or linguistic politics. This scheme had worked well in case of Pashtun areas of KP and Baluchistan, where the emergence of religious parties – deriving support from extensive madrassahs networks in the region – helped offset the secular politics of ethno-nationalist political parties. The same could happen in case of interior Sindh. One striking example of this phenomenon is the contest between Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and Rashid Soomro in Larkana. One would have expected Bilawal to return unopposed to his ancestral seat; as it turned out, he only won the seat with a winning margin of 35,000 votes. His opponent scored a whopping 50,000 votes in comparison to his tally of 85,000.
conflict for more than two decades
Other than the success of military establishment’s agenda of creating a ‘religious-citizen-as-ideal-citizen’, this shows a gradual decline of identity politics in general. The Pakistan People’s Party has failed to ‘deliver’ in Sindh. This is clear from the voter’s responses which show dissatisfaction with the Party’s performance in the last five years, in fact, the ten years since 2008. What is forgotten from public memory or not recorded in this data is that PPP’s mandate has been stolen repeatedly since 1988. The military establishment paid for the formation of Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI) in 1988 to consolidate the anti-PPP rightwing vote to dilute PPP’s electoral victory as democracy was restored after General Zia-ul-Haq’s death. The PPP has not been allowed to have its own chief minister in the Punjab, even when ruling the central government. With this fractured mandate and an incessant campaign maligning the party for its bad governance, the PPP governments were dismissed twice – in 1990 and then in 1996 – after barely a few years in power. Finally, Benazir Bhutto herself was assassinated in 2007 in Rawalpindi. My point is that it is unfair to expect from a political party like the PPP, or even the ANP, to able to ‘deliver’, or to run a Punjab-style corporate governance model, when they are subject to a series of trials and tribulations. Even when they come to power, much of the time and energy is spent in redeeming symbolic capital through assertion of identity politics. It is, therefore, unfair to compare their performance with those political parties which have come to power and governed with full support of the military establishment. This should not be read as an apology for ANP or PPP, but a line of reasoning to be considered in evaluating their ‘performance’ in the provinces, and a caution against falling for the language of governance in evaluating the strengths and weakness of a democratic polity. Sticking to the language of governance and emptying discussions of ideological content, will deprive the critics of PTI ability to challenge the undemocratic nature of the current regime, especially when it is being run by those they can relate to on the basis of class, profession and background.
Finally, I would again refer to Akbar Zaidi’s work in which he has referred to the emergence of a ‘Pakistani identity’ as a shorthand for middle class interests. Instead of harping on the usual denial of ‘national rights,’ there are increasing trends among Pashtuns and Sindhis to demand access to the centre. The real catch, however, is that even if PPP and ANP go beyond identity politics and adopt governance models for service delivery, they would still be loathed by the new middle class which identifies them as corrupt and part of the status-quo. They would still condemn them for wooing the political society by such ‘spectacles’ as female health workers program in rural areas and an income support program for the poor. This is because the logic of these programs is lost on the class that does not need them. Also, despite not saying it out loud anymore, these parties know that in the absence of a political consensus on democratic federal polity, catering to the aspirations of their regional middle classes, aligned with the centre in pursuit of their selfish interests, will only lead to a reiteration of statist hegemony. What’s worst, they even lose the crucial support of the middle class required for contesting the state on a range of legitimate issues.
It is unfair to expect from a political party like the PPP, or even the ANP, to able to ‘deliver’, or to run a Punjab-style corporate governance model, when they are subject to a series of trials and tribulations. Even when they come to power, much of the time and energy is spent in redeeming symbolic capital through assertion of identity politics
By trying to play the ‘service delivery’ card, these parties will at least get those voters back who shared their sense of grievance and persecution. This is the only way in which they will be able to fight the challenge posed by the military establishment’s new, formidable pawn in the field.
I am not saying that identity politics has lived its life or become completely irrelevant. The military establishment might think that Pashtuns have been mainstreamed and that their interests are so well served in Pakistan that it has made ethnic politics redundant. As a result, they manipulated elections to keep the ANP, Fazlur Rehman and Mehmud Khan Achakzai out of the parliament. This is a huge miscalculation. Already, the ANP is reconsidering its position vis-a-vis federalist politics and support for the military. My fear is that now, when the nationalists have been pushed to the wall, if they make a comeback they will be doing so based on a massively popular movement, and they may no longer be under compulsion to stick to federalist politics.
Concluding remarks
More important than Imran Khan’s electoral victory are the structural changes in Pakistan’s economy that have enabled his victory, and the fact that there is now a political party in Pakistan that helps to articulate the ambitions and aspirations of a new middle class. Such a systematic shift, engineered by the military establishment, will be the decisive mode of politics in Pakistan for some time. Elsewhere in the region, similar political expressions of an assertive, corporatized civil society are waiting to happen. The recent disturbances in Bangladesh are an example of this. While there is incredible outburst of energy and resentment against the old regime, there is no effective platform through which to channel it; Just being the face of opposition does not help Khalida Zia to emerge as an alternative. Like Asif Zardari in Pakistan or Sonia Gandhi in India, she is despised by the new middle class as part of the problem, not a solution.
As for the current political set up, one can only guess about the longevity of the current coalition under Imran Khan. Even the most pliant of civilian leaders installed by the military have not been able to serve their complete term. Such is the nature of the job, as Najam Sethi wrote in an op-ed, that sooner or later they develop a degree of friction with the military establishment. While many political commentators believe that this situation might arise rather quickly in the case of Imran Khan due to his authoritative and temperamental personality traits, I have a different opinion. Over the years, Khan has gone out of his way to compromise on numerous occasions and bend his way into power corridors. Given that he has a tainted personal past and there are pending court cases that may implicate his party in acquiring foreign funding illegally, it will be difficult for Imran Khan to take a maverick stance on the issues where the military establishment has a clear policy. The test case will be his approach towards India. The military establishment would like him to take a hawkish stance towards India, especially in the speeches he delivers at international forums like the UN General Assembly and Davos Economic Forum.
The bottom line is that the elections of 2018 are reflective of a structural transformation coupled with overt political manipulations which put serious question marks over the future of democracy in Pakistan. After successive elections, a smooth transfer of power, and uninterrupted democracy have failed to transform Pakistan’s polity or reduce the power of military establishment, the future of the country is looking menacingly bleak.
The author teaches history at LUMS. He tweets @AU_Qasmi