Nation-states are fundamentally Hobbesian. The template on which behaviour among nation-states functions is of two significant arguments: mutual trust and mutual respect. The unsettled relationship between India and Pakistan has consumed more than 75 years of conflict. Since the nature of the conflict is not just territorial, the challenges remain protracted. Any conflict should be seen through the prism of three critical elements: direct, structural and cultural. The India-Pakistan conflict has all three such elements, but the provisional choices of peace-building between the two hostile nation-states have been formally dissociative: ceasefires, diplomacy and state-level meetings. None of the approaches, however, addressed structural and cultural aspects, barring a few ad-hocisms like opening the Kartapur corridor.
The story, in a nutshell, is that normalcy between India and Pakistan is impossible. If one takes a critical overview of the conflict's history, two major conclusions can be easily drawn. For India, terrorism and dialogue can't continue in parallel, and for Pakistan, Kashmir remains the motherboard of all conflicts.
Recent remarks by India's external affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, on the era of uninterrupted dialogue is over, and the ball is in Pakistan's court because India is managing its affairs by making Pakistan an irrelevant player in the region. For Pakistan, Kashmir remains a disputed territory, and it is not the question of terrorism; rather, it is about human rights, and India can't overlook its wrongdoing. Article 370 and the 'high politics' surrounding it are heard in both New Delhi and Islamabad, as well as across the high tables of whosoever matters on the status of Kashmir.
Since its inception, they have chosen a path for creating a structure for peace through dialogues, academic propositions, policymakers' arguments and politicians' framework. These efforts notably picked up in the post-1990s when India took a liberal approach, particularly during Manmohan Singh's government, which continued till the Vajpayee government in India and Musharraf's offer after the realisation of the big Kargil moment.
India then followed the US policy approach towards China, a post-Cold War phenomenon, a unipolar moment and a liberal approach through economic engagements to create a democratic China. A sense of interdependency. But the Indian approach failed due to non-compliance with the ideological base in Pakistan. The idea of Pakistan sustained its ideological apparatus much deeper than its Islamic status. Democracy never reached the streets, and the Pakistani Army remained strong and hostile. Somehow, they didn't understand that war and conflict would hardly help their motives of snatching Kashmir through non-state actors.
The methods of war have been exhausted, and nation-state actors' methods have crippled the state. Therefore, to meet the condition of conflict transformation, Pakistan, including its army, needs to reposition itself; there is a need for civilian supremacy without interventions
At present, the search for peace does not meet with common sense. Both hostile partners neither respect each other nor trust each other.
Pakistan is struggling to remain relevant and hardly knows how to become an independent nation. Its over-dependency on the US and China has made it a client state, but it remains determined to become hostile to India to its fall promises. On the contrary, the belief in New Delhi is to sustain its approach of cornering Pakistan by maintaining a ceasefire at the border but disallowing any serious search for peace won't bring structural peace.
Is there a way out?
Peace is a necessity for any society's development, well-being, security and survival. Therefore, dialogue is critical. But looking at the history of the relationship between India and Pakistan over the past seven decades, what could be serious conditions and a way for both hostile neighbours to seriously search for arriving at common sense? Before the possible scenarios, one important intervention would be what could be so different in their approach that hasn't been done or laid out previously. The fact is, there is less realisation than the current situation is offering. The cycle of violence is continuing, and there is no end to it, at least none for any non-hyper nationalists.
Arguably, three significant approaches need to be taken.
The first ought to be a rethinking of the nature of the conflict. For any transformation of conflict, a state-centric approach, including diplomacy, will fetch less positive outcomes if the state is not serious or has dubious intentions. For the Pakistani establishment, war is a currency that survives their unaccountable existence. The dynamics of its behaviour are fatal to the existence of Pakistan. Forget 1971, the current situation in Balochistan or the everyday war at the Afghan border, while economically the state is on the verge of default. The situation's demands are logical, i.e., peace with India. The methods of war have been exhausted, and nation-state actors' methods have crippled the state. Therefore, to meet the condition of conflict transformation, Pakistan, including its army, needs to reposition itself; there is a need for civilian supremacy without interventions.
A democracy, even if not so liberal, considering the idea of the state would fetch more possibilities in managing the trust deficit with India. The people's choices make a difference, and that would help India rethink that the era of dialogue is not over. It is ambitious and, to many circles, would be taken as impractical, but the fact is that for the state's survival and well-being, the rigidity to remain hostile would be suicidal in the long run. The fate of Gaddafi and Mubarak may be a moment of truth.
For India, Pakistan should be disengaged from its domestic politics. Populism has been hovering and it has been overused for electoral gains. It certainly damages its democratic credentials and, more so, any possibility of normalcy. The age of social media can't be seen as the age of reason; therefore, the current BJP government needs to rethink as well. A stronger Pakistan tomorrow, if it remains hostile to India, would bring the same cycle of violence and reduce India's chances of leading the global south. India spends too much on defence and has a catalogue of social challenges that demand serious attention. If India needs to develop by 2047, then there should be no free passage without normalising its relationship with Pakistan.
Since India and China are rivals for many reasons, any role of the undisputed third party could be Saudi Arabia in close contact with the UAE. Saudi Arabia has more power than any of the parties when it comes to bringing sensibilities to Pakistan and its establishment
The second condition could be the possibility of cultural propositions.
The people-to-people dialogue shapes normalisation much deeper than diplomacy. India and Pakistan are the only two countries in the neighbourhood where the cultural possibilities are maximum. Vajpayee's initiative and, later, the opening of the Kartarpur corridor are reference points. Art, culture and sports are sometimes more important weapons than nuclear statuses. Both societies have shared roots of cultural proximity, which is a genuine condition. The community of spoilers from both sides is heavily militarised and equally radicalised, but if the larger voice needs to be given more importance, then the conflict can slide and open the gateway of common sense.
The third would be controversial and less possible in the current settings. But if the earlier two conditions were to be met, then the third condition could be a critical contributor, i.e., a third party. India wants to resolve this bilaterally, but Pakistan, for its habit of self-harm, still argues in favour of external actors such as UN resolutions and US intervention.
In the past, the World Bank did the best job as a third party in resolving water disputes, but Kashmir is more about sentiments, prestige, ego and political survival than just water. The case for the UN's role is over; Kashmir has almost lost its relevance within the UN charter despite Pakistan finding it relevant for its cause. Secondly, its resolutions are mapped out in favour of India, and after China's presence in Kashmiri territory, the era of any talk of UN resolutions is over. The US role is more dubious than of any help. It's in the US' favour that India and Pakistan are locked into a permanent battlefield. It's the continuation of the age-old British Policy. The US arms industry needs conflicts, particularly in South Asia, as they are one of its biggest buyers.
Since India and China are rivals for many reasons, any role of the undisputed third party could be Saudi Arabia in close contact with the UAE. Saudi Arabia has more power than any of the parties when it comes to bringing sensibilities to Pakistan and its establishment. The worry from the religious outfits would be heavily controlled if Saudi Arabia came into the picture. Although India won't accept any third party, its policy of business as usual will reduce its possibility to grow as a developed nation. It can't fight both China and Pakistan uninterrupted. It needs peace to become developed. For carrying the burden of 1.5 billion people, it needs a serious rethink of its approach towards Pakistan. India shares cordial relations with Saudi Arabia without any baggage, which would play an important part if there is any possibility of common sense to prevail. Saudi Arabia can be an important partner in the peace-making process, and India shouldn't mind itself to come out from the rigid position of no talks. It hasn't worked thus far, and won't work in the long run either. It can deal with Pakistan, but it can't with China if it doesn't maintain a sense of peace at the border.
India rivals China, but it still manages to maintain a strong economic relationship, similar to how China has been doing with Taiwan. The reason has been the less ideological formation of historical baggage. Unlike Pakistan, China is not a domestic factor and, therefore, doesn't affect India's internal challenges. The same applies to Pakistan. India has done its bit by offering Pakistan the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) status in the past, but again, the hawkish foreign policy in Pakistan punctures its growth.
Neighbours do fight for many reasons, but not the civilised ones. Peace is a possibility if there is a balancing act of trust and respect, but it needs a top-down and bottom-up approach. Civilian supremacy would give a permanent possibility to peace if Pakistan thinks itself to survive the horror of its poor strategic thinking. For India, dialogue is not a choice but a gateway to achieve its larger goal of becoming a developed nation and a voice of the global south. Even if the Saudi Arabian route is required, New Delhi should not mind taking the help. It won't reduce its growing status, but it can bring a sea of opportunities. Let's search for that common sense.