In a Veterans Day speech on October 1, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said that there was no “‘expiration date… or final point after which we would stop resisting and fighting, except for one — our victory.”
He has stood his ground in a war thrust on Ukraine, as have the Ukrainians, so what he said cannot be dismissed lightly. Even so, Ukraine is on the clock and Zelenskiy is aware of that.
In June this year, he sat down with ABC News’ Martha Raddatz and spoke about the “‘dangerous signals’ in US politics about reducing aid for Ukraine at a critical time in the conflict.” Earlier, his military commanders had told the visiting William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that the primary aim of the Ukrainian counteroffensive was to approach the Crimean boundary and force President Vladimir Putin into negotiating.
In other words, Kyiv is aware of the importance of negotiations from a position of strength, an appreciation that while force is vital, it’s a means towards an end. Whether Ukraine can force Russia to negotiate is of course another debate but let’s assume it can. To that end, time is of essence and that’s where the clock comes in.
According to the Council for Foreign Relations, the US has disbursed USD76.8 billion in humanitarian, financial and military assistance to Ukraine during the period January 24, 2022 to July 31, 2023. About 61% of this is military aid. On the European side, according to the Kiel Institute for World Economy, a German research organisation, the EU’s €50 billion “Ukraine Facility,” a multiyear support package to be delivered until 2027, has doubled the EU’s contribution. This is in addition to individual multiyear support as promised by Germany or Norway’s Nansen Support programme. Other European countries have also been funding Ukraine bilaterally.
This is sizeable support by any benchmark. But there are three issues with this level of support. One is the obvious question of whether Ukraine can sustain its military activity at the current levels without this support. The answer is no. Second, whether, given a number of developments this level of support can be sustained by the supporting countries. Third, related to second, the monies that are in hand, as also the equipment that is coming in, are different from multiyear commitments that can be impacted by other developments.
Unless a primacist who favours US global engagement and its leadership role becomes the next US president, assuming Biden is ousted in the next vote, Europe will have to tend for itself. That, given what’s happening in Europe — current help to Ukraine notwithstanding — will be a tall order.
Take the United States, so far the biggest donor. Opposition among Republicans to continue aiding Ukraine is rising. The problem Zelenskiy spoke about in June, the “dangerous signals”, has only exacerbated. This week, despite having blocked new aid for Ukraine, Kevin McCarthy, the Republican US House Speaker, was ousted by a group of Republicans voting with the Democrats to see McCarthy’s back. Matt Gaetz, who led the Republican rebellion, had spoken days before the vote on the floor of the House, accusing McCarthy of making a secret deal with President Joe Biden: “What was the secret side deal on Ukraine?” he asked.
Gaetz was referring to Biden’s statement to CBS News. When asked by CBS News if Biden would trust McCarthy “when the next deal comes around?” Biden had responded with a “We just made one about Ukraine. So, we'll find out.” Even though McCarthy dropped the ball on the $6 billion package, Gaetz and the Democrats still axed him.
That said, the issue is much bigger than just eight Republicans swinging the vote against McCarthy. As Majda Ruge, a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council for Foreign Relations wrote in August this year, “The candidates for the Republican primaries hold diverging views on the future of US foreign policy. In the event of a Republican victory, Europeans must prepare for an end to American support to Ukraine.”
She went on to describe the Republican presidential candidates’ foreign policy positions as primacists, restrainers, and prioritisers, “each holding different views on the United States’ role as a global leader and the threats posed by China. These diverging positions define their respective views on US support for Ukraine.”
In other words, unless a primacist who favours US global engagement and its leadership role becomes the next US president, assuming Biden is ousted in the next vote, Europe will have to tend for itself. That, given what’s happening in Europe — current help to Ukraine notwithstanding — will be a tall order.
Most analyses talk about the EU as a single entity. It is not. Late last September, Bulgaria’s parliament voted to supply Ukraine some defective surface-to-air missiles for the Russian-made S300 air defence system and small-calibre ammunition discarded by the country’s interior ministry. Even this attracted criticism, because support for Ukraine is unpopular in the country. Bulgaria’s President, Rumen Radev, didn’t endear himself to Kyiv when he remarked last July that Ukraine wants to keep fighting a war for which Europe has to foot the bill.
No matter which way one slices it, the trends do not look promising and if the US pulls back, the fault-lines in Europe will deepen.
Slovakia is another example. Electoral victory for Robert Fico, who in the past was opposed to Slovakia joining NATO, saying it would “mean the beginning of World War III”, is another indicator of divisions within Europe. Fico’s win was not unexpected. A poll in September last year and then in March this year indicated that barring in Bratislava, nearly 51% of Slovaks were not only opposed to aid for Ukraine but desired a win for Russia.
Hungary’s Viktor Orban hasn’t been squeamish about his opposition to EU sanctions against Russia, Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO, NATO expansion and continued support for Ukraine. He has also advocated against antagonising Russia. In March this year at the Qatar Economic Forum, Orban said that “The war can be stopped only if the Russians can make an agreement with the US. In Europe, we are not happy with that, but it’s the only way out.” He went on to say that “looking at the reality, the figures, the surroundings, the fact that NATO is not ready to send troops, it is obvious that there is no victory for the poor Ukrainians on the battlefield.” Orban has also refused to break ties with Russia.
Let’s travel south from Hungary to the Balkans. No one outside the small club of observers or the region's analysts is paying much attention to what's happening there, especially how the Kremlin and Serbia are fomenting secession in Bosnia-Herzegovina through Republika Srpska; or how Belgrade (again with active Russian backing) is fomenting trouble in the northern Serbian municipalities of Kosovo.
Recently, even Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, likened Ukraine to a drowning person who will pull the rescuer down. That may be because he is facing a parliamentary election on October 15 but it is telling in how domestic politics can impact foreign and security relations. Last July, then UK Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, advised Ukraine about the importance of gratitude and said the UK was not an “Amazon” for weapons systems. The usage might have been clumsy, but indicated an increasing risk of war fatigue.
No matter which way one slices it, the trends do not look promising and if the US pulls back, the fault-lines in Europe will deepen.
This is not to say that US-EU support for the war is about to come to an end. If anything, it will increase in the short term. The issue is longer-term. Speaking virtually at the World Economic Forum at Davos on May 23 last year, former US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, made two important points with reference to the ongoing Russo-Ukraine war: it is time to think of a diplomatic solution to end the war and such solution will likely involve territorial concessions to Russia, even though “Ideally, the dividing line should be a return to the status quo ante”; “pursuing the war beyond that point would not be about the freedom of Ukraine, but a new war against Russia itself.”
It is time for a serious push for a settlement. That is something only the US, in collaboration with its Western European allies, can do.
He was roundly abused. But he is not someone to be taken lightly. While it is important to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, most analyses since February 24 last year tend to begin with that date. The aggression has also made a settlement increasingly difficult and currently none of the factors important for war termination is in place. Even so, both for the sake of some kind of settlement and a nonpartisan analysis, it is important to appreciate the situation as much from Russia’s as Ukraine’s perspective. Ignoring Russia’s concerns amount to situating the appreciation in a Western security framework rather than appreciating the situation.
There were multiple warnings since the early 1990s about NATO expansion. More discerning analyses pointed to the imperative of including Russia in a collective European security arrangement. But history, and the memory of the Cold War, came in the way of more sober analyses. President George Bush’s 2008 remarks in Kyiv about Georgia and Ukraine further vitiated the atmosphere.
Brave words aside, Kyiv knows that the time is running out. Its counteroffensive is going much slower than was expected. Analyses surprised by that are surprising in themselves in terms of an operational assessment. For more details see my article.
Russia has learnt from its mistakes. It has decided to dig in and wait it out. Breaking through its defensive lines is not easy, as is obvious now — some tactical gains on the ground notwithstanding. The initial thinking that Russia could be isolated or its economy squeezed through sanctions has proven wrong. The West has also managed to proxy-test its weapons and platforms in real battle conditions. It is time for a serious push for a settlement. That is something only the US, in collaboration with its Western European allies, can do.
Realistically speaking, that’s unlikely to happen just yet. That outcome, ceteris paribus, may well be decided by US domestic politics.