The two-and-a-half-week (at the time of writing) ‘dharnas’, led by the leader of a major political party and the lethal cleric from Mississauga, have only served to divert public attention from the numerous real-life issues of the state. The most central of these is the military action in process in North Waziristan, Khyber Agency, and Kurram Agency.
We shall not argue here as to whether or not this operation was undertaken on the initiative of our elected sovereign Parliament or the political leadership or the Army on its own. The point is that it constitutes the minimum First Action against the most egregious agents of state failure anywhere. Much more needs to be undertaken, and, of course, there is much beyond military campaigns needed to rescue the country from these rabidly murderous and uniquely savage insurgents, whose existence is a symptom of deeper disease. There are fatal flaws within the elites that our beautiful but tragedy-ridden land has been obliged to suffer: blind spots, dishonourable motives, absence of real morality. These are distinct from the societal fault lines (of ethnicity, class, sect, tribe, whatever), so beloved of political analysts. The kinds of fatal flaws that lie deep within the psyche of our ruling groups, have led to the violence, bloodshed and social breakdown we face. They prominently include a deep contempt for constitutional principles and the rule of law. The Islamabad Events bear witness!
Pakistan stands as, if not a ‘failed’ state, at least a ‘failing’ one – although the term has now been replaced by the term ‘fragile’. Well, whether ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’, we know that the country has scored poorly for a number of years now on the Fragile States Index (FSI) of the Fund for Peace. Now, one may scoff at the value of such indices, but that does not change the fact of Pakistan’s extreme instability and, yes, fragility.
What is it that happens when a state does ‘fail’, as Pakistan (along with South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, Yemen and Haiti) may be doing? Well, for one thing, state failure is not a terminal moment. The sundry million inhabitants do not disappear; their lives go on.
One ‘failure’ scenario is that of political break-up along ethnic or regional lines. Some examples are British India in 1947, Yugoslavia, the USSR and, of course, Pakistan itself in 1971. Now, such processes may be painful and, all too often, bloody. However, political break-up may not be the worst of fates for the citizens of a collapsing state... not if it leads to a cessation of disorder and the emergence of more viable national entities – as, for example, Bangladesh or the numerous Soviet successor states.
[quote]The USSR was a dictatorship and it disintegrated; Brazil and India, on the other hand, have achieved the benefits
of democracy[/quote]
A second ‘failure’ scenario comprises the lawless ferment that precedes a successful revolution. A decrepit ancien regime must collapse before a new revolutionary administration can emerge from the rubble. The street fighting, upheavals, bloodshed and armed struggles during the transition may be relatively short (Iran in 1979) or may be prolonged over many decades (China, prior to 1949). Beyond the revolution itself, as the new regime consolidates itself and begins its societal transformation processes, further disorder, bloodshed and new kinds of tyranny are usual. Such societies remain traumatised as successive waves of seemingly irrational behaviour sweep across these countries. France, USSR, China, and Iran are informative examples. However, sooner or later, the revolution ceases to devour its children and a new kind of social order does emerge.
Coming now to the third kind of state failure, let me suggest that the worst, the most hopeless, condition is that of sustained collapse of political authority. With political disintegration, society itself collapses into a febrile, continued anarchy. Afghanistan for much of the last thirty years, Somalia, Sudan, Congo and Iraq are examples that come to mind. In this scenario, institutionalised state authority, whether malign or benevolent, has collapsed and no valid authority or political order has come together. This is the conceptual territory of Thomas Hobbes and his “war of each against all”. People’s lives are “poor, nasty, brutish and short”, for the atomised society is dominated by its most brutal and violent members: urban turf warriors, village ‘Jaggas’, warlords, bandits. The ungoverned spaces of our own tribal areas, in which the Taliban and others have emerged, are examples.
To return to the FSI rankings, these are based on twelve indicators of state fragility: Demographic pressures; massive movement of displaced persons; atrocities against communal groups; sustained human flight; uneven regional or ethnic development; economic decline and the growth of hidden economies; corruption of ruling elites; deterioration of public services; authoritarian or military rule; security apparatus as a ‘state within a state’; use of communal political rhetoric by ruling elites; and intervention of other states or non-state actors in the affairs of the state.
Now, before my readers start ticking off which of these indicators is applicable to Pakistan, let me record that they all are. The point is to note the extent to which they are strictly relative and contingent. After all, many of these indicators would also be applicable in, say, Brazil or India today. But no-one would suggest that either of these two countries is on the brink of state failure. On the other hand, few of these indicators would have been considered as descriptive of the then Superpower Soviet Union…prior to its spectacular collapse as a state entity in 1991.
Why? Oh, that’s simple. The USSR was a dictatorship, and it disintegrated as a military coup d’état was taking place. Brazil and India, on the other hand, have achieved the benefits of democracy, the rule of law, a vigorous civil society and functioning state institutions.
Returning to the drama playing itself out in Islamabad, this has descended from theatre of the absurd to outright farce, from farce to tragedy, and is thence heading towards simple anarchy. As with all drama, we who observed were treated to a series of revelations, insights into motives and character, both implied and explicit, as successive curtains of dissimulation fell away from the various actors. What it has highlighted more than anything else is the frightening spectacle of state institutions that have failed to function in a manner to contain conflict or that are functioning at cross purposes and, indeed, in conflict with one another. That way lie chaos and collapse.
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
We shall not argue here as to whether or not this operation was undertaken on the initiative of our elected sovereign Parliament or the political leadership or the Army on its own. The point is that it constitutes the minimum First Action against the most egregious agents of state failure anywhere. Much more needs to be undertaken, and, of course, there is much beyond military campaigns needed to rescue the country from these rabidly murderous and uniquely savage insurgents, whose existence is a symptom of deeper disease. There are fatal flaws within the elites that our beautiful but tragedy-ridden land has been obliged to suffer: blind spots, dishonourable motives, absence of real morality. These are distinct from the societal fault lines (of ethnicity, class, sect, tribe, whatever), so beloved of political analysts. The kinds of fatal flaws that lie deep within the psyche of our ruling groups, have led to the violence, bloodshed and social breakdown we face. They prominently include a deep contempt for constitutional principles and the rule of law. The Islamabad Events bear witness!
Pakistan stands as, if not a ‘failed’ state, at least a ‘failing’ one – although the term has now been replaced by the term ‘fragile’. Well, whether ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’, we know that the country has scored poorly for a number of years now on the Fragile States Index (FSI) of the Fund for Peace. Now, one may scoff at the value of such indices, but that does not change the fact of Pakistan’s extreme instability and, yes, fragility.
What is it that happens when a state does ‘fail’, as Pakistan (along with South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Sudan, Chad, Afghanistan, Yemen and Haiti) may be doing? Well, for one thing, state failure is not a terminal moment. The sundry million inhabitants do not disappear; their lives go on.
One ‘failure’ scenario is that of political break-up along ethnic or regional lines. Some examples are British India in 1947, Yugoslavia, the USSR and, of course, Pakistan itself in 1971. Now, such processes may be painful and, all too often, bloody. However, political break-up may not be the worst of fates for the citizens of a collapsing state... not if it leads to a cessation of disorder and the emergence of more viable national entities – as, for example, Bangladesh or the numerous Soviet successor states.
[quote]The USSR was a dictatorship and it disintegrated; Brazil and India, on the other hand, have achieved the benefits
of democracy[/quote]
A second ‘failure’ scenario comprises the lawless ferment that precedes a successful revolution. A decrepit ancien regime must collapse before a new revolutionary administration can emerge from the rubble. The street fighting, upheavals, bloodshed and armed struggles during the transition may be relatively short (Iran in 1979) or may be prolonged over many decades (China, prior to 1949). Beyond the revolution itself, as the new regime consolidates itself and begins its societal transformation processes, further disorder, bloodshed and new kinds of tyranny are usual. Such societies remain traumatised as successive waves of seemingly irrational behaviour sweep across these countries. France, USSR, China, and Iran are informative examples. However, sooner or later, the revolution ceases to devour its children and a new kind of social order does emerge.
Coming now to the third kind of state failure, let me suggest that the worst, the most hopeless, condition is that of sustained collapse of political authority. With political disintegration, society itself collapses into a febrile, continued anarchy. Afghanistan for much of the last thirty years, Somalia, Sudan, Congo and Iraq are examples that come to mind. In this scenario, institutionalised state authority, whether malign or benevolent, has collapsed and no valid authority or political order has come together. This is the conceptual territory of Thomas Hobbes and his “war of each against all”. People’s lives are “poor, nasty, brutish and short”, for the atomised society is dominated by its most brutal and violent members: urban turf warriors, village ‘Jaggas’, warlords, bandits. The ungoverned spaces of our own tribal areas, in which the Taliban and others have emerged, are examples.
To return to the FSI rankings, these are based on twelve indicators of state fragility: Demographic pressures; massive movement of displaced persons; atrocities against communal groups; sustained human flight; uneven regional or ethnic development; economic decline and the growth of hidden economies; corruption of ruling elites; deterioration of public services; authoritarian or military rule; security apparatus as a ‘state within a state’; use of communal political rhetoric by ruling elites; and intervention of other states or non-state actors in the affairs of the state.
Now, before my readers start ticking off which of these indicators is applicable to Pakistan, let me record that they all are. The point is to note the extent to which they are strictly relative and contingent. After all, many of these indicators would also be applicable in, say, Brazil or India today. But no-one would suggest that either of these two countries is on the brink of state failure. On the other hand, few of these indicators would have been considered as descriptive of the then Superpower Soviet Union…prior to its spectacular collapse as a state entity in 1991.
Why? Oh, that’s simple. The USSR was a dictatorship, and it disintegrated as a military coup d’état was taking place. Brazil and India, on the other hand, have achieved the benefits of democracy, the rule of law, a vigorous civil society and functioning state institutions.
Returning to the drama playing itself out in Islamabad, this has descended from theatre of the absurd to outright farce, from farce to tragedy, and is thence heading towards simple anarchy. As with all drama, we who observed were treated to a series of revelations, insights into motives and character, both implied and explicit, as successive curtains of dissimulation fell away from the various actors. What it has highlighted more than anything else is the frightening spectacle of state institutions that have failed to function in a manner to contain conflict or that are functioning at cross purposes and, indeed, in conflict with one another. That way lie chaos and collapse.
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
(From The Second Coming by William Butler Yeats)