Multiple senior army officers including out-going army chief Bajwa have signalled strongly and repeatedly that the army will not interfere in politics any more in the future. Will it stay true to its words this time as such promises have been made repeatedly earlier too? When do armies decide to retreat? Not in wars but in the political arena, that is.
There is near consensus now that army rule or even role in politics is harmful for states and armies. Among politically active armies, the interferences of our army have likely been the third most destructive globally for the country after those of Myanmar and Sudan armies. Almost all of our biggest problems stem directly or indirectly due to army politics, including weak civilian institution and parties, extremism which spread due to Zia and Musharraf-era policies, high population growth due to religiosity spread by Zia, poor external ties with West and regional tensions and low economic and social investments due to large defence budgets etc.
Most politically active armies have withdrawn from politics, e.g., in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Brazil and Chile. Externally, a key facilitating factor was the ability of army dictators to present themselves as pliant clients more suited to superpower’s strategic aims than elected regimes. This gave them access to the foreign aid, arms and political support needed to retain power. So the sharp fall in army rule after the 1990s has much to do with the end of the Cold War which reduced USA and Russian support to army dictators. Yet a few remain active as in the TEMPTS (Thailand, Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, Turkey and Sudan) Club where political power still tempts armies given the huge powers it gives, including the abilities to acquire and freely spend large defence budgets, manage army promotions and run large businesses with little civilian oversight.
Thus, a puzzle for political scientist is the ability of this small number of armies to retain political clout even after the Cold War. A common but lazy explanation is to blame civilian misrule. But it is present in almost all developing states even today. Yet there has been a sharp fall in the incidence of both army rule and role in politics. People say that the armies intervene to clear messes created by politicians. In reality in Pakistan, the military left behind bigger messes in 1971, 1988 and 2007 than what it had inherited in 1958, 1977 and 1999 and civilian rule had to be restored to clear it. While censuring politicians for relatively smaller blunders, the army has gotten away without even minor punishment for the far more numerous and massive blunders that its top brass has committed.
So, analysts look more at the internal make-up of armies and the active survival strategies they adopt to remain dominant. Such analysis firstly identifies the factors that help armies develop and perpetuate strong internal political ideologies. Two key such factors are the roles of major conflicts and intergenerational continuity in army recruitments. Both factors are very relevant in Pakistan. The Pakistani army emerged from the British Indian army whose biggest garrison town was in Rawalpindi as its main challenge then came via nearby northwestern areas from Russia and restive Pakhtun tribes. Naturally much of the recruitment was done from the nearby areas of northern Punjab. Joining the army became an intergenerational tradition there. So, even today a big chunk of the soldiers and officers (including the last three army chiefs) come from there, with many being second and third-generation recruits. This area also saw intense 1947 riots and is close to flashpoint Kashmir from where it has seen much in-migration. These factors helped imbibe a stronger political mission and ideology in these areas and in the army than in the rest of Pakistan.
The second part of the analysis looks at the strategies these armies have adopted to remain dominant even without external support by using their political ideology. These include maintaining i) large and active public relations units that constantly propagate the ideology and the army’s critical and sacrificial role, ii) large spy agencies that permeate society to control its economic, political and social domains and iii) large businesses and welfare schemes as sources of money and patronage.
The army’s role in Pakistani politics has taken many forms since 1958 that varied in terms of its overtness and extent of direct control, including direct rule and four forms of hybrid rule. The most visible and dominant role has been direct rule via coups as under Yahya, Zia (1977-85) and Musharraf (1999-2002). A slight hybrid variation on direct rule was Ayub’s ploy of retiring nominally from army and staying in power for ten years through rigged elections and referendum. Another hybrid variation was the one adopted by Zia (1985-1988) and Musharraf (2002-2008) where they handed over executive powers nominally to a civilian regime brought to power through rigged elections as a façade while real power stayed with the dictator in his dual Presidential and Army Chief roles as they continued to wear their army uniforms. A slightly less overt form of hybrid rule was during the 1990s and 2018-April 2022 where the army rigged elections to install a pliant civilian regime without holding the President’s post but controlling the civilian regime from behind scenes. The weakest form of hybrid rule was during 1988-90, 2008-2018 and post-April 2022 where civilian regimes won elections or no-trust votes fairly but the army was still able to extent indirect control on selected issues covertly through its informal but extensive manipulation powers. This leaves 1947-58 and 1972-77 only as civilian eras without significant army rule or role.
In terms of numbers of years under each form, the situation is as follows:
This picture has meant that since 1958, Pakistan has been ruled either by generals or parties whose founders were brought to power by generals (Bhutto, Nawaz and Imran). Of these, Bhutto and Nawaz later won fair elections on their own. Imran is yet to do that. Even most other, smaller parties in assembly currently were established or are controlled by army, including PML-Q, MQM, BAP, GDA, Awami League (Shaikh Rasheed) and TLP, leaving only a handful of small nationalist parties in KP and Balochistan largely free of army control. The army has rigged 13 out of 15 of our national elections or referenda fully (1958 referendum, 1965 elections, 1985 elections, 1985 referendum; 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2018 elections; 2002 referendum) or partially (1970, 1988, 2008). This leaves the 1977 elections that were partially rigged by politicians (Bhutto) and the 2013 elections that were our most-free elections ever resulting in our one and only fair civilian and peaceful transfer from one fairly elected regime (PPP) to another (PML-N). The regimes that came to power due to army rigging lastd for years; the one brought to power by civilian rigging in 1977 only a few weeks.
Pakistan has witnessed huge dispersions of power gradually over the decades. Military power is dispersed today across the military, religious militants, ethnic militants and criminals. Political and economic power is dispersed across landlords, capitalists and increasingly the middle-class. Soft power is dispersed across the military, judiciary, media, maulvis and civil society. Governmental power is divided across executive, judiciary, military and others. Having seen the army pursuing its own independent agenda which often conflicted with their interests, different classes—landlords (PPP), capitalists (PML-N) and finally middle-classes (MQM and PTI)--gradually started vying for power directly. The USA also opposes military rule now. The army elites have seen further big losses in recent years. Army ties with old patron USA and pet Jihadis like TTP and Afghan Talibans are now tense. It has leashed other Jihadis given FATF issues. A stormy tiff with PTI has robbed it of a pampered middle-class soulmate and many faithful social media trolls, TV anchors and middle-class allies.
So what shape will army links with politics take in the future given these losses? Past army political interference has been in the following areas: 1) rigging elections; 2) controlling media, 3) crushing dissent through killings, jailing and disappearances; 4) controlling domestic legislation and policies; 5) running foreign and security policies; 6) appointing army serving officers or retirees on key civilian posts; 7) running businesses; 8) having wide control over the defence budget; 9) Controlling overall national narratives on key issues like religion, politics and foreign issues; and 10) Actual coup.
There is very little immediate chance now of a coup or of the army rigging elections massively to install a pliant regime. This means that direct army rule or Hybrid Types 1, 2 or 3 are unlikely. This leaves the option of empowered civilian rule as during 1947-51 and 1972-77 which the army is actually promising. But the chances are much higher of Hybrid rule Type 4 where the army informally controls a fairly elected regime in selected areas. The list of such areas may still be extensive. Among the above, it may include selective control of key of foreign policy issues such as ties with India, USA and Afghanistan, and key security issues such as Baloch and Taliban insurgencies, nuclear weapons and intelligence agencies like ISI. It will likely also include financial issues, including its control over its own budgets and its corporate empire. Its control over the national ideological narrative, media, domestic legislation and policies and appointment of army officers on key civilian posts may reduce considerably but not fully. There is also some chance that if future fairly elected regimes do not conform to its expectations, it may install a technocratic regime with constitutional permission from the Supreme Court, as happened in Bangladesh. But as there, the experiment will likely fail as have all its own past political experiments.
Bajwa is arguably the non-coup-making army chief who damaged politics the most other than of course those four army chiefs who ruled directly. The background of the specific person now appointed as new army chief in his place General Asad Munir is not likely to end the continued army political interference. While most officers in the army high command intervene in politics, the most interference is done obviously by intelligence officers. General Munir has previously headed both the MI and ISI, the only person in Pakistan’s history with such heavy intelligence background to be appointed army chief. It seems like an odd choice to make at a time when the army high command is promising and all politicians are demanding that the army pull out from politics.
Thus, only time will tell whether the army truly and fully retreats from politics. It will take much stronger pushback from politicians and also the public, especially the urban middle-class which has supported army politics most in the past. Its new found disillusionment with army political interference after the army’s break with PTI is welcome though questions remain about how genuine and lasting it is. Will they switch back to army if PTI makes up with the army? Even now, while condeming army politics, middle-class people are unwilling to acknowledge or condemn the army or PTI for rigging 2018 elections and installing the subsequent hybrid regime even though these are the most recent example of army political interference. But if the highly articulate and powerful urban middle-class makes a genuine commitment to ending army politics and plays a strong advocacy role in this regard, then we may finally see an end to this unfortunate trend of army politics that has damaged Pakistan more than any other factor.
There is near consensus now that army rule or even role in politics is harmful for states and armies. Among politically active armies, the interferences of our army have likely been the third most destructive globally for the country after those of Myanmar and Sudan armies. Almost all of our biggest problems stem directly or indirectly due to army politics, including weak civilian institution and parties, extremism which spread due to Zia and Musharraf-era policies, high population growth due to religiosity spread by Zia, poor external ties with West and regional tensions and low economic and social investments due to large defence budgets etc.
Most politically active armies have withdrawn from politics, e.g., in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Brazil and Chile. Externally, a key facilitating factor was the ability of army dictators to present themselves as pliant clients more suited to superpower’s strategic aims than elected regimes. This gave them access to the foreign aid, arms and political support needed to retain power. So the sharp fall in army rule after the 1990s has much to do with the end of the Cold War which reduced USA and Russian support to army dictators. Yet a few remain active as in the TEMPTS (Thailand, Egypt, Myanmar, Pakistan, Turkey and Sudan) Club where political power still tempts armies given the huge powers it gives, including the abilities to acquire and freely spend large defence budgets, manage army promotions and run large businesses with little civilian oversight.
While censuring politicians for relatively smaller blunders, the army has gotten away without even minor punishment for the far more numerous and massive blunders that its top brass has committed.
Thus, a puzzle for political scientist is the ability of this small number of armies to retain political clout even after the Cold War. A common but lazy explanation is to blame civilian misrule. But it is present in almost all developing states even today. Yet there has been a sharp fall in the incidence of both army rule and role in politics. People say that the armies intervene to clear messes created by politicians. In reality in Pakistan, the military left behind bigger messes in 1971, 1988 and 2007 than what it had inherited in 1958, 1977 and 1999 and civilian rule had to be restored to clear it. While censuring politicians for relatively smaller blunders, the army has gotten away without even minor punishment for the far more numerous and massive blunders that its top brass has committed.
So, analysts look more at the internal make-up of armies and the active survival strategies they adopt to remain dominant. Such analysis firstly identifies the factors that help armies develop and perpetuate strong internal political ideologies. Two key such factors are the roles of major conflicts and intergenerational continuity in army recruitments. Both factors are very relevant in Pakistan. The Pakistani army emerged from the British Indian army whose biggest garrison town was in Rawalpindi as its main challenge then came via nearby northwestern areas from Russia and restive Pakhtun tribes. Naturally much of the recruitment was done from the nearby areas of northern Punjab. Joining the army became an intergenerational tradition there. So, even today a big chunk of the soldiers and officers (including the last three army chiefs) come from there, with many being second and third-generation recruits. This area also saw intense 1947 riots and is close to flashpoint Kashmir from where it has seen much in-migration. These factors helped imbibe a stronger political mission and ideology in these areas and in the army than in the rest of Pakistan.
The second part of the analysis looks at the strategies these armies have adopted to remain dominant even without external support by using their political ideology. These include maintaining i) large and active public relations units that constantly propagate the ideology and the army’s critical and sacrificial role, ii) large spy agencies that permeate society to control its economic, political and social domains and iii) large businesses and welfare schemes as sources of money and patronage.
The army’s role in Pakistani politics has taken many forms since 1958 that varied in terms of its overtness and extent of direct control, including direct rule and four forms of hybrid rule. The most visible and dominant role has been direct rule via coups as under Yahya, Zia (1977-85) and Musharraf (1999-2002). A slight hybrid variation on direct rule was Ayub’s ploy of retiring nominally from army and staying in power for ten years through rigged elections and referendum. Another hybrid variation was the one adopted by Zia (1985-1988) and Musharraf (2002-2008) where they handed over executive powers nominally to a civilian regime brought to power through rigged elections as a façade while real power stayed with the dictator in his dual Presidential and Army Chief roles as they continued to wear their army uniforms. A slightly less overt form of hybrid rule was during the 1990s and 2018-April 2022 where the army rigged elections to install a pliant civilian regime without holding the President’s post but controlling the civilian regime from behind scenes. The weakest form of hybrid rule was during 1988-90, 2008-2018 and post-April 2022 where civilian regimes won elections or no-trust votes fairly but the army was still able to extent indirect control on selected issues covertly through its informal but extensive manipulation powers. This leaves 1947-58 and 1972-77 only as civilian eras without significant army rule or role.
Years | Form of governance |
| 1947-51 | Elected civilian rule |
| 1951-58 | Unelected civilian bureaucrats rule |
| 1958-69 | Hybrid rule with ex-army COAS ruling as civilian President by winning rigged referendum/elections |
| 1969-71 | Direct army rule |
| 1972-77 | Elected civilian rule |
| 1972-85 | Direct army rule |
| 1985-88 | Hybrid rule with army chief serving as President |
| 1988-90 | Hybrid rule with army controlling fairly elected regime informally |
| 1990-99 | Hybrid rule with army controlling client regime winning through rigged elections |
| 1999-2002 | Direct army rule |
| 2002-08 | Hybrid rule with army chief serving as President |
| 2008-18 | Hybrid rule with army controlling fairly elected regime informally |
| 2018-2022 | Hybrid rule with army controlling client regime winning through rigged elections |
| 2022- | Hybrid rule with army controlling fairly elected regime informally |
In terms of numbers of years under each form, the situation is as follows:
| Type of regime | Number of years |
| Elected civilian rule (with no army politics) | 10: 1947-51; 1972-77 |
| Unelected civilian bureaucrats rule | 6: 1952-58 |
| Direct army rule | 14: 1969-71; 1977-85; 1999-2002 |
| Hybrid rule Type 1: ex-army Chief as executive President | 11:1958-69 |
| Hybrid rule Type 2: army chief as non-executive President | 9: 1985-88; 2002-08 |
| Hybrid rule Type 3: army controlling client civilian regime that won through its rigged elections | 12:1990-99; 2018-2022 |
| Hybrid rule Type 4: army selectively controlling fairly elected regime informally | 13: 1988-90; 2008-2018; 2022-onwards |
This picture has meant that since 1958, Pakistan has been ruled either by generals or parties whose founders were brought to power by generals (Bhutto, Nawaz and Imran). Of these, Bhutto and Nawaz later won fair elections on their own. Imran is yet to do that. Even most other, smaller parties in assembly currently were established or are controlled by army, including PML-Q, MQM, BAP, GDA, Awami League (Shaikh Rasheed) and TLP, leaving only a handful of small nationalist parties in KP and Balochistan largely free of army control. The army has rigged 13 out of 15 of our national elections or referenda fully (1958 referendum, 1965 elections, 1985 elections, 1985 referendum; 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2018 elections; 2002 referendum) or partially (1970, 1988, 2008). This leaves the 1977 elections that were partially rigged by politicians (Bhutto) and the 2013 elections that were our most-free elections ever resulting in our one and only fair civilian and peaceful transfer from one fairly elected regime (PPP) to another (PML-N). The regimes that came to power due to army rigging lastd for years; the one brought to power by civilian rigging in 1977 only a few weeks.
Army ties with old patron USA and pet Jihadis like TTP and Afghan Talibans are now tense. It has leashed other Jihadis given FATF issues. A stormy tiff with PTI has robbed it of a pampered middle-class soulmate and many faithful social media trolls, TV anchors and middle-class allies.
Pakistan has witnessed huge dispersions of power gradually over the decades. Military power is dispersed today across the military, religious militants, ethnic militants and criminals. Political and economic power is dispersed across landlords, capitalists and increasingly the middle-class. Soft power is dispersed across the military, judiciary, media, maulvis and civil society. Governmental power is divided across executive, judiciary, military and others. Having seen the army pursuing its own independent agenda which often conflicted with their interests, different classes—landlords (PPP), capitalists (PML-N) and finally middle-classes (MQM and PTI)--gradually started vying for power directly. The USA also opposes military rule now. The army elites have seen further big losses in recent years. Army ties with old patron USA and pet Jihadis like TTP and Afghan Talibans are now tense. It has leashed other Jihadis given FATF issues. A stormy tiff with PTI has robbed it of a pampered middle-class soulmate and many faithful social media trolls, TV anchors and middle-class allies.
So what shape will army links with politics take in the future given these losses? Past army political interference has been in the following areas: 1) rigging elections; 2) controlling media, 3) crushing dissent through killings, jailing and disappearances; 4) controlling domestic legislation and policies; 5) running foreign and security policies; 6) appointing army serving officers or retirees on key civilian posts; 7) running businesses; 8) having wide control over the defence budget; 9) Controlling overall national narratives on key issues like religion, politics and foreign issues; and 10) Actual coup.
There is very little immediate chance now of a coup or of the army rigging elections massively to install a pliant regime. This means that direct army rule or Hybrid Types 1, 2 or 3 are unlikely. This leaves the option of empowered civilian rule as during 1947-51 and 1972-77 which the army is actually promising. But the chances are much higher of Hybrid rule Type 4 where the army informally controls a fairly elected regime in selected areas. The list of such areas may still be extensive. Among the above, it may include selective control of key of foreign policy issues such as ties with India, USA and Afghanistan, and key security issues such as Baloch and Taliban insurgencies, nuclear weapons and intelligence agencies like ISI. It will likely also include financial issues, including its control over its own budgets and its corporate empire. Its control over the national ideological narrative, media, domestic legislation and policies and appointment of army officers on key civilian posts may reduce considerably but not fully. There is also some chance that if future fairly elected regimes do not conform to its expectations, it may install a technocratic regime with constitutional permission from the Supreme Court, as happened in Bangladesh. But as there, the experiment will likely fail as have all its own past political experiments.
Even now, while condeming army politics, middle-class people are unwilling to acknowledge or condemn the army or PTI for rigging 2018 elections and installing the subsequent hybrid regime
Bajwa is arguably the non-coup-making army chief who damaged politics the most other than of course those four army chiefs who ruled directly. The background of the specific person now appointed as new army chief in his place General Asad Munir is not likely to end the continued army political interference. While most officers in the army high command intervene in politics, the most interference is done obviously by intelligence officers. General Munir has previously headed both the MI and ISI, the only person in Pakistan’s history with such heavy intelligence background to be appointed army chief. It seems like an odd choice to make at a time when the army high command is promising and all politicians are demanding that the army pull out from politics.
Thus, only time will tell whether the army truly and fully retreats from politics. It will take much stronger pushback from politicians and also the public, especially the urban middle-class which has supported army politics most in the past. Its new found disillusionment with army political interference after the army’s break with PTI is welcome though questions remain about how genuine and lasting it is. Will they switch back to army if PTI makes up with the army? Even now, while condeming army politics, middle-class people are unwilling to acknowledge or condemn the army or PTI for rigging 2018 elections and installing the subsequent hybrid regime even though these are the most recent example of army political interference. But if the highly articulate and powerful urban middle-class makes a genuine commitment to ending army politics and plays a strong advocacy role in this regard, then we may finally see an end to this unfortunate trend of army politics that has damaged Pakistan more than any other factor.