I am in Normandy this week visiting relatives and enjoying the peace of this large but quiet, rural corner of France. According to the election results reported by Le Monde, Normandy, usually very conservative politically, voted almost solidly for Emmanuel Macron in last month’s elections. His call for transformation has resonated here as all over France. And Normans now wait, as we all do, now that we have heard him talk the talk to see if he can walk the walk of real transformation.
There is a sort of symmetry in Normandy that may engender its low profile outlook on political life. It comprises about 5% of the territory of France, and its population is about 5% of the French nation. In voting overwhelmingly for Macron, Normandy did what it seems to have done politically for the last 400 to 500 years: follow the lead of the rest of the nation. The days of the Vikings, who took Normandy as a base for raids all along the coasts of Europe, are long gone.
Macron was elected overwhelmingly, raising his new party from scratch in a year, and seemingly destroying the old (sclerotic it might be said) parties of the center-left and center-right. He not only won the presidency in an unprecedented manner, but he then took his new party, which had only a few weeks to organize, to a victory in the parliamentary elections that followed hard on the heels of the Presidential election. His party won a majority of the parliamentary seats. Clearly, Macron has millions of fervent supporters, a large portion of them under the age of 30. Yet in both elections there were record abstentions. Over half of the French voters abstained from the legislative election. From the results, as I read them in the French press, and particularly from the record number of abstentions, I suspect that French voters, like those in many other countries, are tired of the old faces, old parties and the old excuses for inaction and dysfunction, and are willing to give a new young face and his new party a chance to prove themselves.
It will not be easy. What lurks in all those abstentions is certainly not unfettered approval of his program of economic and political modernization. Probably much of the hard left, which has defeated other attempts at economic modernization since 1946 will not roll over easy just because of Macron’s charm or his persuasiveness. His ultimate aim is to bring France to a competitive edge in the global economy. Many of his policies center on freeing up the labor market which in France has been tightly constrained by unionization since WW2. Keeping the unions off the streets will be a key objective, as it has been on those streets that previous reformers have lost their way, and their reforms have been watered down to innocuous.
The labor laws in France, as is so much else, are remnants of the past, the 1940s and 50s, when France was being reconstructed after WW2, and when industrialization seemed to promise a forever rising prosperity. They reflect not only the optimism of that period, but the strong French belief in dirigisme, a strong state voice in managing the economy. They cover wide aspects of working life, not just labor relations, but working hours, vacations, grievances, and many other aspects. They are a historical anomaly, but one which suits Frances labor unions very well.
The unions themselves have their own story of faded glory. Union membership was 30% of the labor force in the 1970s; now it is about 10%. And most union members are now in the public sector, which means that they mainly work in vital sectors like public transportation. Thus even the much-reduced labor union movement can shut down vital sectors of the economy, practically shut down the entire economy, because of its death grip on these key sectors. The number of strikes is far lower that it used to be, as one who remembers the constant labor disruptions of those days can attest, but a general strike of public sector employees is still a potent labor weapon and the threat has continued to block labor reform.
Macron’s program of modernization is intended to give employers more flexibility and freedom in dealing with their employees, from setting hours of work to hiring and firing them, to scheduling their working hours, and other things of this sort. Experts believe, however, that he will not mess with the 35-hour week as it is too much a sacred cow and symbol of union power to try to abolish now, but he will just work around it. Ultimately, Macron would like to transform the labor system in France to one that protects workers not jobs. This would fit the modern world, in which globalization makes counting on any one kind of industry perilous, thus rendering job protection impossible. A system protecting workers would emphasize easing the movement between jobs with flexible unemployment insurance, better worker retraining programs, and perhaps more adaptive apprenticeship programs.
Macron’s reforms would also address the multiplicity of organizations representing workers in the industries, social programs, and in labor tribunals so as to consolidate the voices that speak for the workers. And the other sacred cow, that it seems Macron will take on is to decentralize collective bargaining from the sector to the firm level. The latter will be especially difficult as the unions will view it as a mechanism to reduce their power and influence—which it is—and the militant ones are like to resist with force.
The unions are divided and at least the largest and more moderate one will possibly cooperate with Macron on some reforms, especially if given some influence over their final content. Moreover, Macron knows he must move fast before the unions get organized, which will be after the summer break. He could have many of his policies in place, at least by decree (though they would have to be ratified by Parliament) by the end of September. Consultations with what one would call stakeholders (union and employer groups) are going on in July. Perhaps he will seduce the more moderate union to join his side, but the other two major unions have already dissed his policies publicly, so it is at least a 50-50 probability that one or both will try to close down the country to stop him. But they will be taking on the most popular President and politician in France, and it is a gamble that they will think twice about as if the public back Macron, they will lose big time.
But, of course it is a gamble for Macron too. If the public doesn’t back him, his reform is finished forever, and his fate might be no better than his predecessor, Hollande, who left office with an approval rating of 5%. The stakes are very high. Macron must get the French economy out of its perpetual doldrums and onto a different and modern track that all Europe, but particularly Germany, will respect as a sure signal that France is back in business as a major player in Europe and the world. If he can’t then his even larger objective cannot succeed. That is to gain the respect and knowledge he needs to move forward to the task that is most needed in Europe, working with the Germans to reform the European Union, and especially the core problem for Europe, the Euro Zone, which has gone badly off track, and is doomed to fail without serious overhaul.
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, and a former US diplomat who was Ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh
There is a sort of symmetry in Normandy that may engender its low profile outlook on political life. It comprises about 5% of the territory of France, and its population is about 5% of the French nation. In voting overwhelmingly for Macron, Normandy did what it seems to have done politically for the last 400 to 500 years: follow the lead of the rest of the nation. The days of the Vikings, who took Normandy as a base for raids all along the coasts of Europe, are long gone.
Macron's program of modernization is intended to give employers more flexibility and freedom in dealing with their employees, from setting hours of work to hiring and firing them, to scheduling their working hours, and other things of this sort
Macron was elected overwhelmingly, raising his new party from scratch in a year, and seemingly destroying the old (sclerotic it might be said) parties of the center-left and center-right. He not only won the presidency in an unprecedented manner, but he then took his new party, which had only a few weeks to organize, to a victory in the parliamentary elections that followed hard on the heels of the Presidential election. His party won a majority of the parliamentary seats. Clearly, Macron has millions of fervent supporters, a large portion of them under the age of 30. Yet in both elections there were record abstentions. Over half of the French voters abstained from the legislative election. From the results, as I read them in the French press, and particularly from the record number of abstentions, I suspect that French voters, like those in many other countries, are tired of the old faces, old parties and the old excuses for inaction and dysfunction, and are willing to give a new young face and his new party a chance to prove themselves.
It will not be easy. What lurks in all those abstentions is certainly not unfettered approval of his program of economic and political modernization. Probably much of the hard left, which has defeated other attempts at economic modernization since 1946 will not roll over easy just because of Macron’s charm or his persuasiveness. His ultimate aim is to bring France to a competitive edge in the global economy. Many of his policies center on freeing up the labor market which in France has been tightly constrained by unionization since WW2. Keeping the unions off the streets will be a key objective, as it has been on those streets that previous reformers have lost their way, and their reforms have been watered down to innocuous.
The labor laws in France, as is so much else, are remnants of the past, the 1940s and 50s, when France was being reconstructed after WW2, and when industrialization seemed to promise a forever rising prosperity. They reflect not only the optimism of that period, but the strong French belief in dirigisme, a strong state voice in managing the economy. They cover wide aspects of working life, not just labor relations, but working hours, vacations, grievances, and many other aspects. They are a historical anomaly, but one which suits Frances labor unions very well.
The stakes are very high. Macron must get the French economy out of its perpetual doldrums and onto a different and modern track that all Europe, but particularly Germany, will respect as a sure signal that France is back in business as a major player in Europe and the world
The unions themselves have their own story of faded glory. Union membership was 30% of the labor force in the 1970s; now it is about 10%. And most union members are now in the public sector, which means that they mainly work in vital sectors like public transportation. Thus even the much-reduced labor union movement can shut down vital sectors of the economy, practically shut down the entire economy, because of its death grip on these key sectors. The number of strikes is far lower that it used to be, as one who remembers the constant labor disruptions of those days can attest, but a general strike of public sector employees is still a potent labor weapon and the threat has continued to block labor reform.
Macron’s program of modernization is intended to give employers more flexibility and freedom in dealing with their employees, from setting hours of work to hiring and firing them, to scheduling their working hours, and other things of this sort. Experts believe, however, that he will not mess with the 35-hour week as it is too much a sacred cow and symbol of union power to try to abolish now, but he will just work around it. Ultimately, Macron would like to transform the labor system in France to one that protects workers not jobs. This would fit the modern world, in which globalization makes counting on any one kind of industry perilous, thus rendering job protection impossible. A system protecting workers would emphasize easing the movement between jobs with flexible unemployment insurance, better worker retraining programs, and perhaps more adaptive apprenticeship programs.
Macron’s reforms would also address the multiplicity of organizations representing workers in the industries, social programs, and in labor tribunals so as to consolidate the voices that speak for the workers. And the other sacred cow, that it seems Macron will take on is to decentralize collective bargaining from the sector to the firm level. The latter will be especially difficult as the unions will view it as a mechanism to reduce their power and influence—which it is—and the militant ones are like to resist with force.
The unions are divided and at least the largest and more moderate one will possibly cooperate with Macron on some reforms, especially if given some influence over their final content. Moreover, Macron knows he must move fast before the unions get organized, which will be after the summer break. He could have many of his policies in place, at least by decree (though they would have to be ratified by Parliament) by the end of September. Consultations with what one would call stakeholders (union and employer groups) are going on in July. Perhaps he will seduce the more moderate union to join his side, but the other two major unions have already dissed his policies publicly, so it is at least a 50-50 probability that one or both will try to close down the country to stop him. But they will be taking on the most popular President and politician in France, and it is a gamble that they will think twice about as if the public back Macron, they will lose big time.
But, of course it is a gamble for Macron too. If the public doesn’t back him, his reform is finished forever, and his fate might be no better than his predecessor, Hollande, who left office with an approval rating of 5%. The stakes are very high. Macron must get the French economy out of its perpetual doldrums and onto a different and modern track that all Europe, but particularly Germany, will respect as a sure signal that France is back in business as a major player in Europe and the world. If he can’t then his even larger objective cannot succeed. That is to gain the respect and knowledge he needs to move forward to the task that is most needed in Europe, working with the Germans to reform the European Union, and especially the core problem for Europe, the Euro Zone, which has gone badly off track, and is doomed to fail without serious overhaul.
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, and a former US diplomat who was Ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh