Post-Uri powerplay

How should we interpret the political developments after September 18

Post-Uri powerplay
Since September 18, when an Indian army base was attacked at Uri and 19 soliders were killed, India and Pakistan relations have been at a low point. There have been many developments since, including those on the SAARC front. The Friday Times asked a former diplomat, Najmuddin Shaikh, to briefly help clarify some aspects of what has been happening.

TFT: Could you shed light on the response from the SAARC members to the recent tensions? Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka have, according to one reading, “bowed” to Indian pressure and joined its decision not to attend the Saarc summit. Is this a sign of Pakistan’s growing isolation? Add to this the Susan Rice-Ajit Doval phone call and US stance. 

Najmuddin Shaikh: There is no doubt that the decision by the countries you have mentioned to join India in seeking a postponement of the SAARC summit was a significant regional development. It was not necessary for these countries to do so since the absence of even one head of state/government would have sufficed to secure a postponement under the SAARC constitution. This, as you know, has happened before when India chose to refuse to participate. Afghanistan and Bangladesh may have done so because of what they see as their differences with Pakistan. For the others, I am not sure whether this reflects a bowing to Indian pressure or if it reflects a desire on the part of at least some of these countries to be seen on the right side of the larger international community with regard to terrorism.

It is this perspective of the Susan Rice-Ajit Doval conversation that we should focus on. By calling the Uri attack “cross border” terrorism, Susan Rice, speaking for the White House, endorsed the Indian position and negated our demand for an impartial international investigation and in a sense cast their vote towards supporting a boycott call.

TFT: How should we read India’s knee-jerk reaction/threat to abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty? China has blocked a tributary of the Brahmaputra to build a dam—is it being a good ally? What does this move mean?

NS: I think we should refrain from reading too much into the blocking of one of the tributaries of the Brahmaputra to permit the building of the hydropower dam the Chinese are constructing. As far as I can tell from the reporting, the Chinese are constructing a run-of-the-river power generation plant and this will mean that the water flow will be stopped only for a short period to allow for the limited storage a run-of-the-river plant requires.

The Indians have done this when they were constructing dams on the Chenab. They did it at a time when it affected Pakistan badly but that was something that they later apologized for. In the Chinese case, I do not have solid information but I believe that this is the start of the construction and this may require other stoppages from time to time until an alternate channel has been built to keep the water flowing while the dam is being built. The Indians are imputing all sorts of motives to the Chinese but I think the Indian apprehensions are not well founded.

TFT: How should Pakistan read India’s claim of a ‘surgical strike’? Is this part of a wider Modi strategy and how should Pakistan ideally be responding? Matters seem to be further complicated with news of a Baramulla attack. How do you gauge the army and Nawaz government’s response so far and what should they be doing?

NS: The falsity of India’s claim of having carried out a surgical strike has been established. To my mind, cross-LoC artillery and small arms fire was propagated as such to placate Prime Minister Modi’s hard-line supporters. What was significant in the announcement was that this was from the Indian perspective the end of the matter. They said they did not intend on carrying out any further strikes. You could read this as saying to Pakistan, “We have said what we have said. We will not carry it further. You too should just let it rest at that”.

This was a serious miscalculation. Pakistan too has public sentiment to consider and the exposure of the Indian claim as bogus was bound to happen.

Obviously, if the Baramulla attack has happened this adds another serious dimension to the strains in Indo-Pak relations if the Indians choose to attribute this to cross-border infiltration and put the blame on Pakistan’s government organs for having facilitated this infiltration. What I would hope for is that this time India will make no charges but will carry out a full investigation.

The problem is that Kashmir is burning. The hartals and the assembling of stone-throwing youth in the streets of the valley’s cities and towns continue even after 86 days. This does not appear to be going away. India does not wish to accept that it is at fault and will therefore continue to seek ways to blame Pakistan for what is a purely indigenous uprising by Kashmiri youth. [These young people] have now shown with greater intensity than earlier protests the degree to which the Kashmiri people are alienated from the occupation forces and the degree to which they resent the violence that the Indian forces have visited upon the Kashmiris in their own homes.

TFT: There have been developments in Islamabad as the Nawaz government has reacted. What do you think of them so far and what is the way forward?

NS: The series of meetings convened by the PM and the decision to implement in full the NAP (national action plan) with the support of all political parties is the essential first step towards setting our internal house in order and deriving therefrom the foreign policy advantages that are bound to accrue.

Najmuddin Shaikh has served as ambassador to the US and Iran, and as foreign secretary, among other key appointments. He lectures at NDU and has written extensively on Pakistan and international relations