The Russian invasion of Ukraine is driven by three strategic beliefs. First, a sense of paranoia, that a neighboring country may disappear from the Russian orbit. Second, an arrogance that Russia will prevail if it invades. Third, confidence that the war will be short lived.
All three beliefs were at work four decades ago when Russia, then part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, invaded Afghanistan.
When the world woke up on Christmas in 1979, it learned that the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan the night before. The Kremlin made the incredulous claim that the Afghans had “invited them in.”
The Kremlin was not exercising an irredentist claim as it is with Ukraine, since Afghanistan had never been part of Russia. Afghanistan, unliked Ukraine, was not threatening to join NATO, whose members were located in Europe and North America.
So why did the Russians invade? In one word: paranoia. In 1979, Russia was the largest of the 15 republics in the USSR. Of these, six had a majority Muslim population.
Afghanistan was almost entirely Muslim. Since 1973, it had experienced instability and coups. The communists were governing the country as the decade approached its end but their actions had stirred up stiff Islamic resistance.
Russia was concerned that Afghanistan would turn into an Islamic Republic and its revolutionary fervor would soon spread to the Muslim republics in the USSR, precipitating their secession.
The Soviet leadership headed by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was watching these developments with concern. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979 tipped them over the edge. The Communist Party adopted a resolution on Dec. 12, 1979, authorizing the deployment of a “limited contingent of Soviet troops” to Afghanistan. The 40th Army of the USSR crossed the border on December 24, 1979. The goal was to install a competent socialist government and return home a few months later. In actuality, the 40th Army did not return home until Feb. 15, 1989, having failed in its mission.
More than 600,000 Russian troops were rotated in and out of Afghanistan during the 10-year campaign. Much Russian treasure and thousands of lives were lost. Afghanistan lay ruined. The invasion boomeranged on the Russians. All they had done was laid the foundations for an Islamic revival, the exact opposite of what they had hoped to do.
Russia’s invasion, which had met with only light resistance in the beginning, was ultimately thwarted by a homegrown resistance and shifting allegiances which were a hallmark of Afghan history. One analyst noted that in the early stages of the war, “clashes were rare and roads were relatively safe, but the rebels quickly strengthened and ambushes became routine.”
Years later, as Soviet officers began to publish their memoirs, more details emerged. Russia’s strategic objective was to annul the dramatic increase in the influence of Islamic fundamentalism within Afghanistan. One veteran noted, the Soviet leadership’s decision hinged on “the calculation that the presence of our troops in Afghanistan would cool the hot heads of Amin’s supporters, and even those of the opposition forces, and … would prevent possible encroachments by the Americans and stabilize the situation.”
The Soviets lived in fear of dissolution, and wanted to have loyal neighbors all around their frontiers. So why did the invasion fail?
One Soviet officer who was involved in the invasion wrote, “It was impossible to defeat those Afghan bearded men and their sons, with whom we then had to fight. They were ready to fight their whole lives, and they had nothing to lose from it because they had nothing to their name, just like now. This is a proud, freedom-loving people. They have nothing but their faith and the desire to live the way they want and consider to be right.”
Another wrote, “Any interference from the outside is deemed to fail in a country where tribes have struggled against each other for centuries and where nationalism is extremely developed.”
A third noted that Soviet forces would “mop up” areas, “detaining suspected mujahedeen and passing them on to the Afghans, only to encounter the same suspects again during the next mopping-up operation three or four months later. It was most likely that Afghan security agents would simply let these suspects go without investigating them or prosecuting them in court.”
Ahmad Shah Massoud who emerged as a legendary Mujahideen fighter, had “broad networks of informants in the Afghan army and government.” Battle plans did not stay a secret for very long. “Moreover, Afghan soldiers kept deserting to the opposition forces, taking their arms with them, including even howitzers and heavy armored vehicles.”
Desertion was common. Thousands of Afghans deserted from the ministries of defense, security and internal affairs. According to one source, the number of deserters totaled 34,000 in 1983 alone. A few pilots of the Afghan Air Force deserted and flew their warplanes and helicopters to Pakistan. Some of those who stayed behind deliberately dropped their bombs away from the designated targets.
Ahmad Shah Massoud who emerged as a legendary Mujahideen fighter, had “broad networks of informants in the Afghan army and government.” Battle plans did not stay a secret for very long. “Moreover, Afghan soldiers kept deserting to the opposition forces, taking their arms with them, including even howitzers and heavy armored vehicles.”
Some Afghan servicemen tasked with observing enemy positions and providing targeting data would supply coordinates of locations where their personal enemies lived rather than the mujahedeen.
In 1987, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadse wrote that the Afghans no longer had any friendly feelings toward the Soviets. He admitted that the war had killed many Afghans, many of whom were not terrorists. “We have not solved a single problem of the farmers, actually we fought against the farmers.” The Soviets had invaded the country “without a clue as to the psychology of the people” and had no knowledge of the “real situation in Afghanistan” prior to invading it.
A year prior, former Soviet marshal Sergey Akhromeyev had told his superiors:
About 99 per cent of the battles and skirmishes that we fought in Afghanistan were won by our side. The problem is that the next morning there is the same situation as if there had been no battle. The village that we thought we had destroyed the day before was still standing.
Russia’s defeat was a foregone conclusion when the US provided Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Mujahideen, who were trained by the Pakistanis and funded by the Saudi’s. The US also provided F-16 fighters to the Pakistan Air Force which shot down a few Russian fighters that strayed across the border.
Today, as we observe the Russian invasion of Ukraine, paranoia continues to be the dominant motif in the Kremlin. Military failure continues to dog its “special” military operations. The invasion is dragging on. No lessons were learned from the Afghan debacle.