Leaders of Pakistan and the United States sent to each other signals of flexibility this week to end the impasse in the relationship triggered by the Trump Administration’s South Asia and Afghanistan strategy.
Defense Secretary James Mattis’ visit to Pakistan was perhaps the last high-level interaction between the two sides in a series of exchanges that was initiated after the announcement of the South Asia policy. The twin objectives were following up on policy goals and expectations and at the same time averting a break-up.
The Pakistan Army’s ISPR probably shared the most optimistic description of the outcome of the trip that lasted a few hours. It was described by the mainstream media as a day-long visit. It was noted that both sides agreed to “specific and sustained” actions to address each other’s concerns. The concerns on the American side are that terrorist sanctuaries exist on Pakistani territory from where the Taliban are sustaining their insurgency in Afghanistan and they have to be ended. Pakistan is apprehensive about India being propped up in the region at the cost of its strategic interests, and the presence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Jamaat-ul Ahrar sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
Nothing has been said about what those “specific and sustained” measures would be. But, at least, as the ISPR suggests, a beginning has been made with Pakistan agreeing to look into the US complaints about the “possibility” of Pakistani soil being misused by terrorists despite maintaining its stated position that sanctuaries have been fully dismantled in counter-terrorism operations. This development was indeed significant when seen in the context of assertions that Pakistan has done enough and it was now for others to do more. These assertions had come to characterize Islamabad’s response to the harshly phrased South Asia policy.
Gen Mattis had come to Pakistan for what he described as “finding more common ground”. He was said to have indicated American readiness to “address Pakistan’s legitimate concerns”. He reportedly also told Pakistani leaders to cooperate with the US and “others” on facilitating the peace process in Afghanistan and contributing to regional security.
This is not to say that the ‘do more mantra’ has gone away. Rather, it is now a permanent feature of all US press statements on Pakistan. The US Department of Defense said on Mattis’ trip: “Pakistan must redouble its efforts to confront militants and terrorists operating within the country”.
And then there were, of course, pledges and vows to “broaden the engagement” and “deepen cooperation” on shared goals of defeating terrorism. To that end the visit was a good one, but implementing these understandings would be the real test. Lest one forget, the real problem in this complicated relationship is the divergence of interests and objectives. It may probably be over-simplifying the situation to say that what Pakistan needs is a better understanding from the US of Pakistani problems and concerns. That may only happen once the strategic interests of the two align.
Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif offered the best assessment when asked if Mattis’ softer approach helped narrow the trust deficit. He said a “trust deficit of decades cannot go away in a few hours”.
Therefore, this apparent softening of public stances on both sides is driven by the realization that Pak-US ties may be dysfunctional, which some like calling a troubled marriage, but a divorce would be even more painful and hence not an option for either. The US needs “ground lines of communications” passing through Pakistan to remain open for sustaining its troops in Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan needs the US for political, economic, and military support. To put it simply, the transactional character of ties would remain.
But, having said that, there is no room for complacency either. The days ahead will undoubtedly be tougher for a couple of reasons; firstly, because of the Trump Administration’s preference for hard power and an aggressive approach, and; secondly, its frustration over continuing conflict in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this engagement has exclusively focused on security aspects instead of being broad-based.
It has nearly been four months since the South Asia strategy was unveiled. Washington would now move towards an assessment of the situation and would particularly be taking a look at Pakistan’s role. The appraisal up till now is by no means positive. NATO Resolute Support Mission Commander in Afghanistan Gen John Nicholson has publicly stated that Islamabad has not fulfilled “clear” demands made by Washington. Meanwhile, CIA director Mike Pompeo warned last weekend that in case of non-compliance, “We are going to do everything we can to ensure that safe havens no longer exist.”
There is no defined timeline for this review of the situation, but it could be taking place ahead of next spring. To cut it short, the window is too narrow for both sides to correct some of the fundamental problems in ties.
The writer is a freelance journalist in Islamabad and can be reached at mamoonarubab@gmail.com
@bokhari_mr
Defense Secretary James Mattis’ visit to Pakistan was perhaps the last high-level interaction between the two sides in a series of exchanges that was initiated after the announcement of the South Asia policy. The twin objectives were following up on policy goals and expectations and at the same time averting a break-up.
The Pakistan Army’s ISPR probably shared the most optimistic description of the outcome of the trip that lasted a few hours. It was described by the mainstream media as a day-long visit. It was noted that both sides agreed to “specific and sustained” actions to address each other’s concerns. The concerns on the American side are that terrorist sanctuaries exist on Pakistani territory from where the Taliban are sustaining their insurgency in Afghanistan and they have to be ended. Pakistan is apprehensive about India being propped up in the region at the cost of its strategic interests, and the presence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Jamaat-ul Ahrar sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
Nothing has been said about what those “specific and sustained” measures would be. But, at least, as the ISPR suggests, a beginning has been made with Pakistan agreeing to look into the US complaints about the “possibility” of Pakistani soil being misused by terrorists despite maintaining its stated position that sanctuaries have been fully dismantled in counter-terrorism operations. This development was indeed significant when seen in the context of assertions that Pakistan has done enough and it was now for others to do more. These assertions had come to characterize Islamabad’s response to the harshly phrased South Asia policy.
Gen Mattis had come to Pakistan for what he described as “finding more common ground”. He was said to have indicated American readiness to “address Pakistan’s legitimate concerns”. He reportedly also told Pakistani leaders to cooperate with the US and “others” on facilitating the peace process in Afghanistan and contributing to regional security.
This is not to say that the ‘do more mantra’ has gone away. Rather, it is now a permanent feature of all US press statements on Pakistan. The US Department of Defense said on Mattis’ trip: “Pakistan must redouble its efforts to confront militants and terrorists operating within the country”.
And then there were, of course, pledges and vows to “broaden the engagement” and “deepen cooperation” on shared goals of defeating terrorism. To that end the visit was a good one, but implementing these understandings would be the real test. Lest one forget, the real problem in this complicated relationship is the divergence of interests and objectives. It may probably be over-simplifying the situation to say that what Pakistan needs is a better understanding from the US of Pakistani problems and concerns. That may only happen once the strategic interests of the two align.
Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif offered the best assessment when asked if Mattis’ softer approach helped narrow the trust deficit. He said a “trust deficit of decades cannot go away in a few hours”.
Therefore, this apparent softening of public stances on both sides is driven by the realization that Pak-US ties may be dysfunctional, which some like calling a troubled marriage, but a divorce would be even more painful and hence not an option for either. The US needs “ground lines of communications” passing through Pakistan to remain open for sustaining its troops in Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan needs the US for political, economic, and military support. To put it simply, the transactional character of ties would remain.
But, having said that, there is no room for complacency either. The days ahead will undoubtedly be tougher for a couple of reasons; firstly, because of the Trump Administration’s preference for hard power and an aggressive approach, and; secondly, its frustration over continuing conflict in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this engagement has exclusively focused on security aspects instead of being broad-based.
It has nearly been four months since the South Asia strategy was unveiled. Washington would now move towards an assessment of the situation and would particularly be taking a look at Pakistan’s role. The appraisal up till now is by no means positive. NATO Resolute Support Mission Commander in Afghanistan Gen John Nicholson has publicly stated that Islamabad has not fulfilled “clear” demands made by Washington. Meanwhile, CIA director Mike Pompeo warned last weekend that in case of non-compliance, “We are going to do everything we can to ensure that safe havens no longer exist.”
There is no defined timeline for this review of the situation, but it could be taking place ahead of next spring. To cut it short, the window is too narrow for both sides to correct some of the fundamental problems in ties.
The writer is a freelance journalist in Islamabad and can be reached at mamoonarubab@gmail.com
@bokhari_mr