Historically speaking, the centres of political power always leave a deep imprint on the culture of the society it presides over. The government, the power structures, laws, coercive machinery of the state and dominance of the state on the economic and financial means of society, all have a decisive impact on the society, its culture, character, morals of its people and social and political groups that reside therein.
There has been a very lively debate in political theory about how society, and the social and political groups within it, reflect on the character of the state and its coercive and administrative machinery or whether it is the state and its machinery that reflect on the character of the society and morals of its people. Again, historically speaking, in Pakistani society the political and social groups have come to reflect the opportunism of state machinery and its functionaries.
Our state and its functionaries have always functioned on the axiom that there is no moral principle that could not be sacrificed at the altar of naked and ruthless self-aggrandizement. Moral, scruples and political principles and ideas should not come in the way of attaining personal and private interests. Our state and its structures have never been able to rally political and social groups around a common point of convergence. Prosecution of political and religious groups and individuals at the hands of state machinery and groups allied with the state created a sense of alienation among prosecuted groups and individuals. In such situations, what is moral and ethical within the framework of Pakistan’s national life is readily and unscrupulously violated by all and sundry and especially by those who are facing prosecution at the hands of state machinery.
Nazimuddin had no scruples about the fact that independence from English colonial rule was only six years old. He never considered for a moment how his act of demanding the British Queen to dismiss the Governor General would impact the nascent state's national sovereignty and independence
Let me give you an example of such opportunism in the initial years after the formation of Pakistan in 1947. Khawaja Nazimuddin, the second prime minister of the country, went straight to the British High Commission in Karachi to request the British Queen to intervene on his behalf in Pakistan’s political scene after his government was dismissed by the then Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. Nazimuddin had no scruples about the fact that independence from English colonial rule was only six years old. He never considered for a moment how his act of demanding the British Queen to dismiss the Governor General would impact the nascent state's national sovereignty and independence. While analysing Nazimuddin’s act, we cannot ignore the fact that when his cabinet was dismissed, he, as prime minister still enjoyed a simple majority in the constituent assembly which had elected him as prime minister in the first place. The Pakistani state’s history is full of such acts of opportunism — an opportunism in the practice of which Pakistan state functionaries even forgot that they have a duty towards the society upon which they are presiding. Since then, our national political discourse revolves around the debate whether Khawaja Nazimuddin’s act of approaching the British Queen was a bigger political sin than Governor General Ghulam’s act of dismissing an elected government in 1953? This debate has since continued in the context of other events, decisions and acts of state functionaries, political leaders, Prime Ministers, and the President. Unfortunately, we have not been able to arrive at a definite conclusion to this debate.
Not surprisingly, we are witnessing the same debate in the context of seemingly bogus cases against former prime minister Imran Khan — in which he has been sentenced to long imprisonment — and now overly enthusiastic appeals and entreaties of his partymen for the newly-elected US President Donald Trump to intervene in Pakistani political scene and secure the release of their leader from Pakistani prison. Since our political discourse on this point remains inconclusive till date, we cannot judge which one is the bigger sin: whether Imran Khan and his party’s expectations from Donald Trump are bigger sins or whether Imran Khan, who has been alienated so thorough because of the treatment that has been meted out to him by the state and its machinery, that he is justified in looking for options outside the country.
Origins of American influence in Pakistani politics, security and foreign policy making processes and its decisive influence on civil-military relations itself is a multi-faceted story of opportunism of Pakistani state machinery and its functionaries
Imran Khan’s turn around seems more deeply unethical on account of the anti-American stance he adopted at the time of the no-confidence motion against his government when he openly accused the Joe Biden Administration of bribing Pakistani legislators to oust him from power. In those days, addressing a press conference, Imran Khan accused renegade legislators of being in contact with US diplomats in the American embassy in Islamabad. He asserted that the contact between Pakistani legislators and US diplomats amounts to treason. Now, this seems hilarious when his partymen openly say that Donald Trump has assured Pakistani Americans that he would intervene and secure the release of Imran Khan. So American intervention was bad and immoral when it was conducted to oust Imran Khan from power but would be fine if it was conducted to bring Imran Khan back into power.
The origins of American influence in Pakistani politics, security and foreign policy making processes and its decisive influence on civil-military relations itself is a multi-faceted story of opportunism of Pakistani state machinery and its functionaries. And Punjab-centric political leadership including Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif are clownishly inclined to perform the function of quintessential opportunists of Pakistani history, faithfully copying the behaviour of their mentors in the state machinery. In this regard Imran Khan particularly stands out. His politics is completely reliant on opportunistic relations: first with military leaders, their intelligence services, then with the equally opportunistic judges of superior courts and now he is faithfully and opportunistically hoping for the American intervention to secure his release. The other side of the story is that Imran Khan and his party has been pushed to the wall. He does not deserve to be in jail, especially on clumsy grounds such as dates of his wedding with Bushra Bibi. Where should he go? From where he should seek justice? Despite all the clamour of the government that the judiciary is supporting Imran Khan, fact of the matter is that he is still languishing in jail. He sees American intervention as his only hope. Making popular political leaders desperate is a dangerous move which can produce sinister outcomes.
The edifice of Imran Khan’s popularity might come crumbling down in case Trump openly intervenes and secures his release. Interestingly, Imran Khan and his party’s display of opportunistic behaviour is something that will endear them to the Pakistani state
Imran Khan’s hopes of American intervention in his support in themselves are ill-founded. In Washington, Pakistan comes second to every other issue that confronts the new administration of Donald Trump. Even during the election campaign, both the Democrats and Republicans agreed that India is their ally in the region which the US should prop up as a counterweight to China. Foreign policy experts agree that if ever Pakistan would appear on the radar of the Trump Administration it would be with regards to either the situation in Afghanistan — where the rise of radical Sunni groups like ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) is still a cause of concern for the Americans — and secondly, Pakistan’s seeming inclinations to put all its eggs in the Chinese basket.
Rest of the issues related to Washington’s Pakistan policy would not even bother President Trump. These are purely military in nature, and they are dealt with at the level of military commanders and spy chiefs. Washington has ceased to be a source of major financial or military assistance to the Pakistani state and therefore its influence in Islamabad and Rawalpindi has dwindled. Interestingly, Imran Khan’s partymen are making too much out of the fact that Trump during his first presidency — when Imran Khan visited him in the White house as Prime Minister — called Imran Khan a close friend. Please note that this was the time when President Trump was executing his policy to chalk out a plan to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan. Americans needed Pakistani connections to talk to the Taliban in Afghanistan, which the our Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was facilitating. Calling the prime minister of a country — whose intelligence services were proving to be a vital link in the American desperation to get out of Afghanistan — a close friend, is routine diplomatic jargon to make the personal rapport as charming as possible. Reading too much into this will be naivety of extreme order.
I think if Donald Trump intervenes and secures the release of Imran Khan, it would be a huge favour to the Pakistani military establishment. Imran Khan has amassed a vast political capital since his ouster from power three and a half years ago. Part of his popularity is the outcome of an anti-American stance (it was clearly a hoax) that he embraced when the no-confidence motion against his government was tabled in the National Assembly. Since then, military leaders have been feeling the heat of Imran Khan’s popularity. The edifice of Imran Khan’s popularity might come crumbling down in case Trump openly intervenes and secures his release. Interestingly, Imran Khan and his party’s display of opportunistic behaviour is something that will endear them to the Pakistani state. This must be the moment when people sitting behind closed doors would realise that Imran Khan is just like them, despite all the rhetoric of hardline and principled position he takes for public consumption.
The sooner we reach a conclusion about the debate that started with Khawaja Nazimuddin's decision to approach the British Queen to intervene in Pakistani politics on his behalf, the better. We must conclude that we will not push political and religious groups and individuals to the extent that they start feeling alienated from the state and society. We will not alienate them to the extent that they start looking for crutches from outside Pakistani state structures and machinery. Pakistani groups and individuals should find solace and justice from within the system. Otherwise, the outcomes could be extremely sinister. Keeping Imran Khan behind bars on clumsy charges could prove to be a deathblow for the legitimacy of our political system. This will have a corrosive effect on our political system. The thing to do for the authorities is to make this political system function by making the two major Punjab-centric parties — the PML-N and PTI — to arrive at an arrangement that could lead to establishment of a working relationship between them. The geo-politics of the region and Washington’s plans for this region are likely to put the Pakistani state in a tight corner. Then we will need a stable political system with all the stakeholders occupying positions of responsibility within the system.