Never in its history has South Asia needed visionary leadership more than it needs it now to battle the geopolitical and strategic challenges that lay ahead. Away from everyone’s attention and common knowledge, Pakistan and India are treading dangerous strategic and military paths. The region requires leadership which can rise above domestic electoral politics and its impact on perceptions, attitudes and policies, and instead take into account the dangerous strategic and military trends that define the relations in the South Asian nuclear dyad.
The media does not discuss these military and strategic trends, and they are not part of our regular political discourse. Yet, these trends are visible to all attentive observers, and they form an intrinsic part of our strategic environment.
Ironically, the political leaderships in the two countries are not on talking terms amidst this tense strategic environment, in spite of the fact that we have never required more regular political contacts between the two countries than we do right now. Immediately after the May 1998 nuclear explosions, the Americans came running to both Islamabad and New Delhi, coaxing and cajoling the leadership there to maintain regular political contacts. They came with handbooks from the Cold War experience on how to maintain hotlines at the technical, bureaucratic and political levels to make a nuclear deterrence relationship functional. The Americans were clear that it is absolutely essential to maintain somewhat lukewarm personal relations between the political leaders of Pakistan and India for a stable strategic environment in the South Asian region. American diplomats in Islamabad and New Delhi used to pontificate in the years immediately following nuclear explosions about the need to harbor warm and close personal relations; the cordiality between then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was partially the handiwork of serving top diplomats at the US State Department.
Fast forward to July 2023, and the strategic environment is much more dangerous than it was in the years immediately following the nuclear explosions. Since then, we have witnessed a direct military conflict in the alpine heights of Kargil and a ten months long eyeball to eyeball confrontation between the militaries of the two countries in 2002 immediately following the terror attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001. The military confrontation was militarily very frustrating for Indians. It took them 3 weeks to mobilize their strike formations and reach the areas close to the international border. This was a time which was utilized by the Americans, French and British to pressurize the Indian government to back off from punishing Pakistan for its alleged role in the attack on the Indian parliament.
Two developments in the strategic realm made South Asia an extremely dangerous place. Firstly, the Indian military flirted with the idea of a limited war in order to punish Pakistan militarily, below its threshold for where it would be forced to employ its strategic nuclear weapons in the war. Pakistan has not made its nuclear doctrine public, but it is generally perceived that Pakistan would be forced to use its nuclear option only if its existence as a sovereign and independent country would be at stake. Faced with the threat of cross border terrorism, the Indian military flirted with the idea that they would punish Pakistan by destroying part of its military assets, below the level where it would be backed into a corner to use nuclear weapons. To facilitate this limited war concept, the Indian military developed the Cold Start Doctrine in the light of its frustrating experience of the 2001 military confrontation, when its military took a cumbersome three weeks to mobilize.
The Cold Start Doctrine facilitates the placement of Indian strike formations—both land forces and Air Force assets—close to the international border. As if this was not dangerous enough. Pakistan came up with its own response to the Cold Start Doctrine: tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Some Pakistani analysts claim that these tactical nukes and their delivery systems, which have been repeatedly flight tested by Pakistan, have been made part of Pakistan military war plans. This means any Indian armored formation entering Pakistani territory would be pulverized with the help of tactical nukes.
The story doesn’t stop here. There are responsible Indians who have been claiming that any use of tactical nukes against Indian armed forces, even outside Indian territory would receive a massive nuclear retaliation, which in other words means all out nuclear war.
But all of this is not part of regular political discourse in either India or Pakistan. Tactical nukes and their delivery systems made headlines in Pakistan around 2013. But their military implications were hardly discussed in the media. The Indian government repeatedly denied the existence of any plan by the name of Cold Start. But their land and air forces have been conducting military exercises every year since 2002 to validate the lessons learned during the frustrating experience of the 2002 military confrontation which manifested in the Cold Start Doctrine. One thing that could trigger latent military hostilities into direct military conflict is a cross-border terror attack by any of the terror groups in ample supply in the region. There are local and international nuclear experts who believe that the Pakistani and Indian governments should spend some time and energy on preventing future terror attacks in the region that could possibly trigger a military conflict, instead of spending millions on the development of tactical nukes and their delivery systems. A joint counterterrorism policy will serve the purpose of bringing strategic stability to the region far more effectively than the outdated concept of nuclear deterrence. This is why visionary political leadership is needed in Pakistan and India.
Last week, the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers sternly, although indirectly, attacked the conduct of each other’s state over the issue of terrorism while addressing a virtual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and security organization, which unites China, Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and now Iran. It’s currently the world’s largest regional bloc in terms of geographic scope and population. The Indian Prime Minister asked regional heads of state to condemn those countries which are supporting cross border terrorism. He said not condemning such countries amounts to double standards. He didn’t name Pakistan, but the reference was obvious.
Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif in response said that the issue of terrorism should not be used for diplomatic point scoring. "The hydra-headed monster of terrorism and extremism, whether committed by individuals, societies, or states, must be fought with full vigor and conviction," he said. "Any temptation to use [terrorism] for diplomatic point-scoring must be avoided under all circumstances. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, including state terrorism, must be condemned in clear and unambiguous terms," the premier added.
PM Shehbaz, in an oblique reference to the Kashmir dispute, said that the SCO stands for observance of the UN principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and people’s right to self-determination. “UN Security Council resolutions offer us a workable framework for the resolution of some longstanding disputes in the region. These must be addressed immediately and settled amicably before it is too late,” he said. In his speech, Prime Minister Modi said that not condemning cross border terrorism so was tantamount to double standards. His unnamed target in this context was the Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Indian Prime Minister also said that “some countries use cross-border terrorism as an instrument of their policies, and provide shelter to terrorists. SCO should not hesitate to criticize such nations. There should be no place for double standards on such serious matters,” he said. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted the video conference as this year’s SCO president. He reiterated India’s allegations of cross border terrorism without naming Pakistan.
The tragedy in this entire situation is that no outsider really cares about strategic stability in South Asia anymore. The Americans are too busy propping up the Indian military as a countervailing force to China’s rising military might. Have they turned their back on South Asia? Not really, but their perception of the region has changed. Instead of bringing Pakistan and India closer, they seem more interested in making efforts to serve their own strategic interests by coopting India into the club of Western allies to counter China.
The Pakistani Prime Minister wants intense publicity for his jibes at the Indian Prime Minister in the SCO virtual Summit the closer Pakistan moves to general parliamentary elections. The Indian Prime Minister is also playing the game of electoral politics. All the while, the region’s strategic stability remains fragile.
The media does not discuss these military and strategic trends, and they are not part of our regular political discourse. Yet, these trends are visible to all attentive observers, and they form an intrinsic part of our strategic environment.
Ironically, the political leaderships in the two countries are not on talking terms amidst this tense strategic environment, in spite of the fact that we have never required more regular political contacts between the two countries than we do right now. Immediately after the May 1998 nuclear explosions, the Americans came running to both Islamabad and New Delhi, coaxing and cajoling the leadership there to maintain regular political contacts. They came with handbooks from the Cold War experience on how to maintain hotlines at the technical, bureaucratic and political levels to make a nuclear deterrence relationship functional. The Americans were clear that it is absolutely essential to maintain somewhat lukewarm personal relations between the political leaders of Pakistan and India for a stable strategic environment in the South Asian region. American diplomats in Islamabad and New Delhi used to pontificate in the years immediately following nuclear explosions about the need to harbor warm and close personal relations; the cordiality between then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was partially the handiwork of serving top diplomats at the US State Department.
Fast forward to July 2023, and the strategic environment is much more dangerous than it was in the years immediately following the nuclear explosions. Since then, we have witnessed a direct military conflict in the alpine heights of Kargil and a ten months long eyeball to eyeball confrontation between the militaries of the two countries in 2002 immediately following the terror attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001. The military confrontation was militarily very frustrating for Indians. It took them 3 weeks to mobilize their strike formations and reach the areas close to the international border. This was a time which was utilized by the Americans, French and British to pressurize the Indian government to back off from punishing Pakistan for its alleged role in the attack on the Indian parliament.
Faced with the threat of cross border terrorism, the Indian military flirted with the idea that they would punish Pakistan by destroying part of its military assets, below the level where it would be backed into a corner to use nuclear weapons.
Two developments in the strategic realm made South Asia an extremely dangerous place. Firstly, the Indian military flirted with the idea of a limited war in order to punish Pakistan militarily, below its threshold for where it would be forced to employ its strategic nuclear weapons in the war. Pakistan has not made its nuclear doctrine public, but it is generally perceived that Pakistan would be forced to use its nuclear option only if its existence as a sovereign and independent country would be at stake. Faced with the threat of cross border terrorism, the Indian military flirted with the idea that they would punish Pakistan by destroying part of its military assets, below the level where it would be backed into a corner to use nuclear weapons. To facilitate this limited war concept, the Indian military developed the Cold Start Doctrine in the light of its frustrating experience of the 2001 military confrontation, when its military took a cumbersome three weeks to mobilize.
The Cold Start Doctrine facilitates the placement of Indian strike formations—both land forces and Air Force assets—close to the international border. As if this was not dangerous enough. Pakistan came up with its own response to the Cold Start Doctrine: tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Some Pakistani analysts claim that these tactical nukes and their delivery systems, which have been repeatedly flight tested by Pakistan, have been made part of Pakistan military war plans. This means any Indian armored formation entering Pakistani territory would be pulverized with the help of tactical nukes.
The story doesn’t stop here. There are responsible Indians who have been claiming that any use of tactical nukes against Indian armed forces, even outside Indian territory would receive a massive nuclear retaliation, which in other words means all out nuclear war.
There are local and international nuclear experts who believe that the Pakistani and Indian governments should spend some time and energy on preventing future terror attacks in the region that could possibly trigger a military conflict, instead of spending millions on the development of tactical nukes and their delivery systems.
But all of this is not part of regular political discourse in either India or Pakistan. Tactical nukes and their delivery systems made headlines in Pakistan around 2013. But their military implications were hardly discussed in the media. The Indian government repeatedly denied the existence of any plan by the name of Cold Start. But their land and air forces have been conducting military exercises every year since 2002 to validate the lessons learned during the frustrating experience of the 2002 military confrontation which manifested in the Cold Start Doctrine. One thing that could trigger latent military hostilities into direct military conflict is a cross-border terror attack by any of the terror groups in ample supply in the region. There are local and international nuclear experts who believe that the Pakistani and Indian governments should spend some time and energy on preventing future terror attacks in the region that could possibly trigger a military conflict, instead of spending millions on the development of tactical nukes and their delivery systems. A joint counterterrorism policy will serve the purpose of bringing strategic stability to the region far more effectively than the outdated concept of nuclear deterrence. This is why visionary political leadership is needed in Pakistan and India.
Last week, the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers sternly, although indirectly, attacked the conduct of each other’s state over the issue of terrorism while addressing a virtual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and security organization, which unites China, Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and now Iran. It’s currently the world’s largest regional bloc in terms of geographic scope and population. The Indian Prime Minister asked regional heads of state to condemn those countries which are supporting cross border terrorism. He said not condemning such countries amounts to double standards. He didn’t name Pakistan, but the reference was obvious.
Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif in response said that the issue of terrorism should not be used for diplomatic point scoring. "The hydra-headed monster of terrorism and extremism, whether committed by individuals, societies, or states, must be fought with full vigor and conviction," he said. "Any temptation to use [terrorism] for diplomatic point-scoring must be avoided under all circumstances. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, including state terrorism, must be condemned in clear and unambiguous terms," the premier added.
American diplomats in Islamabad and New Delhi used to pontificate in the years immediately following nuclear explosions about the need to harbor warm and close personal relations; the cordiality between then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was partially the handiwork of serving top diplomats at the US State Department.
PM Shehbaz, in an oblique reference to the Kashmir dispute, said that the SCO stands for observance of the UN principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and people’s right to self-determination. “UN Security Council resolutions offer us a workable framework for the resolution of some longstanding disputes in the region. These must be addressed immediately and settled amicably before it is too late,” he said. In his speech, Prime Minister Modi said that not condemning cross border terrorism so was tantamount to double standards. His unnamed target in this context was the Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Indian Prime Minister also said that “some countries use cross-border terrorism as an instrument of their policies, and provide shelter to terrorists. SCO should not hesitate to criticize such nations. There should be no place for double standards on such serious matters,” he said. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted the video conference as this year’s SCO president. He reiterated India’s allegations of cross border terrorism without naming Pakistan.
The tragedy in this entire situation is that no outsider really cares about strategic stability in South Asia anymore. The Americans are too busy propping up the Indian military as a countervailing force to China’s rising military might. Have they turned their back on South Asia? Not really, but their perception of the region has changed. Instead of bringing Pakistan and India closer, they seem more interested in making efforts to serve their own strategic interests by coopting India into the club of Western allies to counter China.
The Pakistani Prime Minister wants intense publicity for his jibes at the Indian Prime Minister in the SCO virtual Summit the closer Pakistan moves to general parliamentary elections. The Indian Prime Minister is also playing the game of electoral politics. All the while, the region’s strategic stability remains fragile.