There is a great deal of literature on US-Pakistan relations. Different accounts have highlighted various aspects of this relationship. Zahid Hussain’s new book sheds light on this unique bilateral partnership in the shadow of Afghanistan’s war.
No-Win War: The Paradox of US-Pakistan Relations in Afghanistan’s Shadow by Zahid Hussain can be read as a compendium on US-Pakistan relations over the last decades. US-Pakistan relations have been a rollercoaster, alternating between intense mutual cooperation and estrangement.
Shaped largely by the Afghanistan war, bilateral relations between Washington and Islamabad have been characterized by strategic alliance and political divergences; partnership and mutual acrimony; military cooperation and deep mistrust. Through rare interviews, personal insights and journalistic experience, the author aptly captures these paradoxes.
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan lent strategic support to America’s invasion of Afghanistan and became an ally of the US in the global war on terror. Islamabad gave military bases to US forces, shared intelligence on global terrorists and Pakistani security forces conducted joint intelligence-based operations along with their American counterparts in tribal areas and different parts of Pakistan. As a result of this cooperation and working together, some key Al-Qaeda leaders, who had been involved in the 9/11 attacks, were apprehended in Pakistan.
But Pakistan was also accused of hunting with the Americans and running with the Taliban. Successive US administrations blamed Pakistan for giving sanctuary to terrorists crossing over into Pakistan from Afghanistan, undermining Kabul regime and sponsoring violent attacks against International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Intense American pressure and presence of international terrorists in the erstwhile FATA region pushed Pakistan to conduct a series of military operations, which later expanded to parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, culminating in operation Zar-e-Azb in 2014.
The author identifies the divergent strategic and political goals of the US and Pakistan as the cause of friction and tensions between them. The former wanted to defeat the Taliban, establish a modicum of political stability in Afghanistan and make Afghan security forces self-sufficient with the aim of avoiding the prospect of Afghanistan becoming a hub of global terrorists. While for Pakistan, unchecked support to Northern Alliance and giving India political leeway meant decreasing leverage for Pakistan and fomenting of instability in parts of Balochistan and KP. As the US goals proved more elusive, Pakistan came under intense pressure to do more.
Besides discussing the US-Pakistan relations in the post-9/11 period, No-Win War: The Paradox of US-Pakistan Relations in Afghanistan’s Shadow lends credence to the assertion by some political analysts that the unending war in Afghanistan and its likely perpetuation is in no small measure an outcome of a ‘strategic blunder’ by the US, the latter politically snubbing Taliban immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan. Imperial hubris, a desire for revenge and a lack of understanding of social, political and historical dynamics of Afghanistan doomed the American efforts, notwithstanding the initial military successes. With time, Taliban recovered, mobilized and revitalized its organizational structure in 2005-6. It was helped by atrocities of Northern Alliance, political corruption, politics of revenge, poor governance, and entrenched tribal links. Later increased American troop deployment and intense kinetic action failed to make a real dent to Taliban forces.
The book covers the recent negotiations between the US and the Taliban, and between the latter and Afghan government. But it offers no new insight as to what solution is required to end the decades-old conflict in Afghanistan and how that solution is going to be implemented. Maybe, it is a question nobody has an answer to.
No-Win War: The Paradox of US-Pakistan Relations in Afghanistan’s Shadow by Zahid Hussain can be read as a compendium on US-Pakistan relations over the last decades. US-Pakistan relations have been a rollercoaster, alternating between intense mutual cooperation and estrangement.
Shaped largely by the Afghanistan war, bilateral relations between Washington and Islamabad have been characterized by strategic alliance and political divergences; partnership and mutual acrimony; military cooperation and deep mistrust. Through rare interviews, personal insights and journalistic experience, the author aptly captures these paradoxes.
Shaped largely by the Afghanistan war, bilateral relations between Washington and Islamabad have been characterized by strategic alliance and political divergences; partnership and mutual acrimony; military cooperation and deep mistrust
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan lent strategic support to America’s invasion of Afghanistan and became an ally of the US in the global war on terror. Islamabad gave military bases to US forces, shared intelligence on global terrorists and Pakistani security forces conducted joint intelligence-based operations along with their American counterparts in tribal areas and different parts of Pakistan. As a result of this cooperation and working together, some key Al-Qaeda leaders, who had been involved in the 9/11 attacks, were apprehended in Pakistan.
But Pakistan was also accused of hunting with the Americans and running with the Taliban. Successive US administrations blamed Pakistan for giving sanctuary to terrorists crossing over into Pakistan from Afghanistan, undermining Kabul regime and sponsoring violent attacks against International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Intense American pressure and presence of international terrorists in the erstwhile FATA region pushed Pakistan to conduct a series of military operations, which later expanded to parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, culminating in operation Zar-e-Azb in 2014.
The author identifies the divergent strategic and political goals of the US and Pakistan as the cause of friction and tensions between them. The former wanted to defeat the Taliban, establish a modicum of political stability in Afghanistan and make Afghan security forces self-sufficient with the aim of avoiding the prospect of Afghanistan becoming a hub of global terrorists. While for Pakistan, unchecked support to Northern Alliance and giving India political leeway meant decreasing leverage for Pakistan and fomenting of instability in parts of Balochistan and KP. As the US goals proved more elusive, Pakistan came under intense pressure to do more.
The author identifies the divergent strategic and political goals of the US and Pakistan as the cause of friction and tensions between them
Besides discussing the US-Pakistan relations in the post-9/11 period, No-Win War: The Paradox of US-Pakistan Relations in Afghanistan’s Shadow lends credence to the assertion by some political analysts that the unending war in Afghanistan and its likely perpetuation is in no small measure an outcome of a ‘strategic blunder’ by the US, the latter politically snubbing Taliban immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan. Imperial hubris, a desire for revenge and a lack of understanding of social, political and historical dynamics of Afghanistan doomed the American efforts, notwithstanding the initial military successes. With time, Taliban recovered, mobilized and revitalized its organizational structure in 2005-6. It was helped by atrocities of Northern Alliance, political corruption, politics of revenge, poor governance, and entrenched tribal links. Later increased American troop deployment and intense kinetic action failed to make a real dent to Taliban forces.
The book covers the recent negotiations between the US and the Taliban, and between the latter and Afghan government. But it offers no new insight as to what solution is required to end the decades-old conflict in Afghanistan and how that solution is going to be implemented. Maybe, it is a question nobody has an answer to.