A long effort backed by the West, various Arab states, and Turkey – which started after the Arab Spring and involved changing the political landscapes in Syria for greater geopolitical gains – has finally succeeded in the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad on 8 December 2024. The recent re-emergence of takfiri elements and the successful takeover of Syria is very important as it connects Iran with Palestine and Lebanon directly through land routes for the transportation of weapons and military personnel. The fall of Syria is seen as a breakthrough for the West and Israel to weaken the entire Axis of Resistance, as with Syria under the control of anti-Axis of Resistance groups will mean a constant threat to not just Lebanon but Iraq and Iran itself.
But how serious a challenge to Iran is this process, and could it lead to the fatal weakening of the Axis of Resistance and increase the influence of Israel and the United States of America in the region? Let's break down the strategy of the Axis of Resistance, the impact this could have and how will this reshape West Asia geopolitically.
Firstly, it is indeed true that Syria held an important strategic role for Iran and the entire Axis of Resistance, for both the smooth coordination and cooperation, and transportation of military equipment and military personnel from Iran to Lebanon and Lebanon to Iran. The region also played an important role in strengthening the resistance groups in Palestine such as Hamas. There is speculation that the recent diplomatic engagement between Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed upon some arrangements where the interests of all the parties are secured, and it was then understood that Assad would leave.
Iranian defence doctrine and posture had always aimed at fighting enemies away from its heartlands – and this concept seems to be in danger
The idea that Assad’s fall would completely disrupt Iran's connection with Lebanon is far from certain – and depends on how things unfold in coming weeks. More importantly, Iran also has other means of being in touch and continuing its support to Lebanon: after all the threat to its Syria-based lines of communication is not an overnight problem, and had been there since 2013. The difference is that today Hezbollah is a well-trained and established organisation with domestic capabilities for the production, training, and development of its organisation as well as its military capabilities. To take a recent example, when Israel destroyed Hezbollah's entire military and political leadership, the Lebanese group still continued to fight back, and its military strength and capabilities also survived the Israeli pager attack on Lebanon. Whereas the fall of Syria to anti-Axis forces will impact a swift and smooth coordination and transportation between Iran and Lebanon, it will not fatally impact the organisational capabilities of Hezbollah or diminish its role in the future.
Secondly, the fall of Syria will increase tensions in the region and would bring chaos and instability in the country, and impact the neighbouring states such as Iraq and even Turkey. Iraq is considered to be the second most important country for the Axis of Resistance, as it borders Iran and will prove as first battleground for any war with Iran by Western powers or Israel. Recent Israeli air strikes also were conducted using Iraq's air space, but Iran successfully prevented them from entering by early detection and successful engagement. Internationally, Turkey is the major player supplying weapons to the HTS and providing political support as well.
However, from what we have seen in countries like Pakistan, who once supported Mujahideen to overthrow the Soviets from Afghanistan later resulted in a spread pf extremist ideology in Pakistan itself: this process didn't stop there and continued to backfire when Pakistan aligned with the US in its ‘war on terror.’ In time, the Taliban considered Pakistan as their enemy. The recent Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, which in the past was supported by powerful elements in Pakistan, has caused worst damage to Pakistan itself as a state. Turkey might face similar repercussions, with extremist forces spreading into its own territory, which could disturb the equilibrium of the state of Turkey. A large chunk of the population in Turkey is secularised and the harbouring of religious extremists could threaten the domestic equilibrium of Turkey with increasing Islamist extremism and takfirism. Additionally, this process would be worsened by increased expansionism by Israel, seeking to secure its borders with Syria and easing tensions in Golan Heights.
The Israeli military has also launched a ground incursion to safeguard the buffer zone with Syria, and this expansion could go beyond its current scope, as the new Syria under rebels’ control would be unable to focus on the threat emerging from Israel. These groups, for the time being, would be busy in forming a government and organising themselves, which Israel could use to its advantage and expand beyond the supposed buffer zone.
Thirdly, the fall of key Iranian strategic position of Syria at the hands of anti-Resistance Axis groups would force Iran to work on alternate power sources to balance the equation. This includes increasing support for resistance movements in Yemen and Iraq. Also, Iran will try to work on new and unexplored areas such as Bahrain and Azerbaijan to strengthen and balance the power of the Axis of Resistance. Additionally, Iran also could go towards nuclearisation to make its defence more effective and acceptable without relying on other allies such as Hezbollah.
The Iranian policy of defending Iranian borders beyond these borders, and the nuclear policy, has been clear for a long time now. As such, Iranian defence doctrine and posture had always aimed at fighting enemies away from its heartlands – and this concept seems to be in danger as Syria's fall to hostile elements would mean enemies getting closer to the Iranian lands. The policy on nuclear weapons has been shaped by the religious degree of the supreme leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei which states that the acquiring of weapons of mass destruction is prohibited as it is against the rules and spirit of Islam, for it endangers the mass population. However, in events such as this which could increase the threat to the very survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran can change its policy of having nuclear weapons, based on Islamic principles that apply to situations of extreme necessity.
Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, there was a flurry of diplomatic engagement, and many reports indicate a back door deal and negotiation regarding the situation in Syria. If true, this must have involved security guarantees for Iranians both in terms of Israeli aggression as well as its coordination and cooperation with Lebanon. However, there is yet another case where the entire situation could rapidly change in Iran’s favour if Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Sistani intervenes and issues a degree to fight the takfiris to safeguard the holy shrines of Sayyeda Zainab bint Imam Ali (as) in Syria. This possible scenario would result in the reassembly and mobilisation of Shi’ite forces plus Syrian forces who withdrew to Iraqi territory following HTS attacks and could start the re-entry of Shiite forces in Syria with more power and enhanced capabilities of Iranians and Iraqi resistance factions. It is worth remembering that these two forces early in 2015 contributed towards the elimination of ISIS from Iraq after Sistani issued a religious degree for fighting the extremists.
Lastly, the recent developments in Syria could also worsen the tensions between Iran and other Arab states who have in the past supported the Syrian rebels – and this means a new strategic challenge for China. In recent months, China had worked hard to normalise relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Now, with Iran facing a severe challenge to its interests in Syria, and potentially looking to acquire nuclear weapons or activating further support for existing Axis groups, the repercussions could also be increased tensions between Iran and Arab states. Such tensions might endanger Chinese efforts towards peace and stability in the region.
The recent developments in Syria can significantly change the geopolitical and strategic dynamics of the West Asia. But the idea that this would result in the elimination or severe weakening of the Axis of Resistance is a far stretched argument. Iranian still has many cards and if the coming weeks show Syrian developments severely impacting Iranian security policy for West Asia, it could trigger harsh responses from Tehran, such as nuclearisation or expansion and activation of other pro-Resistance Axis forces in West Asia. The later scenario would change the dynamics and perhaps even adversely affect Chinese efforts in the region.
Nevertheless, how the situation unfolds in Syria in the coming weeks would decisively determine the future of West Asia.