The world has limited sympathy for Pakistan. There have been many documented incidents of this indifference across the globe, but perhaps none that was as pronounced as the dichotomy between the Army Public School attack, which claimed the lives of 132 innocent schoolchildren in Peshawar, and the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, France, just three weeks later. Both were horrendous, atrocious attacks of stark violence, worthy of the condemnation they received. But there was a marked difference in how the world reacted to Pakistan’s most shocking terrorism incident (and there have been literally thousands), and how the world reacted to the Charlie Hebdo incident.
Perhaps the fault is our own. Despite our tall talk of leaving no room for terrorism, or leaving no space for extremist philosophy, or not allowing our soil to be used by miscreants, we have faced international criticism and embarrassment for allowing the same. Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, just over an hour from the capital, by shadow operatives that were able to violate Pakistani airspace, and escape quietly, unscathed. Mullah Omar allegedly died after receiving treatment in hospitals in Karachi for two years. Mullah Mansoor was apparently killed in a drone strike in Balochistan in May. The list goes on. If we were ignorant of their presence in Pakistan, that makes us foolish. If we knew, and aided or abetted, we were criminals.
The impetus for any action to change this has to come from our own internal doctrine, which seems as unclear as ever.
The American policy in the region is beginning to get look more stern. The F16 sale issue, debates in political circles about making Pakistan’s aid contingent on forcing Islamabad’s hand against the Haqqani Network, making public statements about Mullah Mansoor’s death long before Pakistan had a chance to react – these are all indicative of a hardening, toughening US stance on Pakistan.
The US foreign policy for Pakistan has always been one of convenience, morphed by the ebb and flow of domestic needs and public sentiment, and molded by the volatility of international incidents and shifting priorities. Pakistan has traditionally treated the US as an ally, and while there is no need to discontinue this practice, there is dire need to match this with an internal desire for stability, economic prosperity and some semblance of peace.
There are three things Pakistan can do to achieve this.
First, our national security policy is disjointed and inconsistent. NAP, NISP, POPA, ATA, NACTA – the list of acronyms continues to expand. This reactionary tendency needs to be consolidated into one comprehensive plan with multiple facets, not several plans with disconcertingly intertwining objectives. After the APS attack, we thought the National Action Plan would fulfill that role. But the plan was formed in a state of national grief, and periodic recalibration is the only way to keep it relevant.
Second, Pakistan needs to take steps to move from a reactionary state of mind to a more proactive one. Historically, we always seem to be waiting for the next major catastrophe to react to and formulate a plan as a rejoinder. This keeps us squarely behind the curve. The Punjab search operations began after the Easter bombing. NAP was enacted after 132 children paid the price for our collective misdeeds. Operation Zarb-e-Azb should have started a long time ago, but it began after the attack on Karachi airport. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me literally every time, and the problem lies with me.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the national security policy has to have a better grounding philosophy than the social contract. The social contract is obviously a part of it, but it is insufficient as the sole reason for why Pakistan should proactively, comprehensively and unflinchingly target the ideology that stagnates our progress towards concord and economic stability. One such opportunity has been provided in the form of the CPEC, a tangible reason for infusing the national narrative and security dialogue with economic underpinnings. Setting aside the fact that Pakistan’s policy on CPEC is still reactionary, and metamorphosed to fit the “game changer” national narrative, all internal and external policies should first and foremost consider public interest, social cohesion, and economic stability, and proactively take the necessary steps to this end.
The author is a journalist and a senior research fellow at the Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad
Email: zeeshan[dot]salahuddin[at]gmail.com
Twitter: @zeesalahuddin
Perhaps the fault is our own. Despite our tall talk of leaving no room for terrorism, or leaving no space for extremist philosophy, or not allowing our soil to be used by miscreants, we have faced international criticism and embarrassment for allowing the same. Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, just over an hour from the capital, by shadow operatives that were able to violate Pakistani airspace, and escape quietly, unscathed. Mullah Omar allegedly died after receiving treatment in hospitals in Karachi for two years. Mullah Mansoor was apparently killed in a drone strike in Balochistan in May. The list goes on. If we were ignorant of their presence in Pakistan, that makes us foolish. If we knew, and aided or abetted, we were criminals.
The impetus for any action to change this has to come from our own internal doctrine, which seems as unclear as ever.
The American policy in the region is beginning to get look more stern. The F16 sale issue, debates in political circles about making Pakistan’s aid contingent on forcing Islamabad’s hand against the Haqqani Network, making public statements about Mullah Mansoor’s death long before Pakistan had a chance to react – these are all indicative of a hardening, toughening US stance on Pakistan.
If we knew, we are guilty; if we didn't, we are foolish
The US foreign policy for Pakistan has always been one of convenience, morphed by the ebb and flow of domestic needs and public sentiment, and molded by the volatility of international incidents and shifting priorities. Pakistan has traditionally treated the US as an ally, and while there is no need to discontinue this practice, there is dire need to match this with an internal desire for stability, economic prosperity and some semblance of peace.
There are three things Pakistan can do to achieve this.
First, our national security policy is disjointed and inconsistent. NAP, NISP, POPA, ATA, NACTA – the list of acronyms continues to expand. This reactionary tendency needs to be consolidated into one comprehensive plan with multiple facets, not several plans with disconcertingly intertwining objectives. After the APS attack, we thought the National Action Plan would fulfill that role. But the plan was formed in a state of national grief, and periodic recalibration is the only way to keep it relevant.
Second, Pakistan needs to take steps to move from a reactionary state of mind to a more proactive one. Historically, we always seem to be waiting for the next major catastrophe to react to and formulate a plan as a rejoinder. This keeps us squarely behind the curve. The Punjab search operations began after the Easter bombing. NAP was enacted after 132 children paid the price for our collective misdeeds. Operation Zarb-e-Azb should have started a long time ago, but it began after the attack on Karachi airport. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me literally every time, and the problem lies with me.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the national security policy has to have a better grounding philosophy than the social contract. The social contract is obviously a part of it, but it is insufficient as the sole reason for why Pakistan should proactively, comprehensively and unflinchingly target the ideology that stagnates our progress towards concord and economic stability. One such opportunity has been provided in the form of the CPEC, a tangible reason for infusing the national narrative and security dialogue with economic underpinnings. Setting aside the fact that Pakistan’s policy on CPEC is still reactionary, and metamorphosed to fit the “game changer” national narrative, all internal and external policies should first and foremost consider public interest, social cohesion, and economic stability, and proactively take the necessary steps to this end.
The author is a journalist and a senior research fellow at the Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad
Email: zeeshan[dot]salahuddin[at]gmail.com
Twitter: @zeesalahuddin