Iran says the Matter has Ended. Would Israel Agree?

Escalation beyond this point would also do much damage to Israel. But Netanyahu’s calculation could be that damage to Israel would precisely be the reason for the US to get into the conflict. Biden simply would not allow Israel to be defeated.

Iran says the Matter has Ended. Would Israel Agree?

I wrote yesterday that “I find more meat in the argument for patience [by Iran] than immediate retaliation…. That said, the histories of wars tell us that leaders generally ‘sleepwalk into a war’. They also get caught in a commitment trap.”

Last night Iran attacked Israel through a combination of direct attack munitions (kamikaze drones), land-attack cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

My argument in yesterday’s article was that the issue does not hinge on whether Iran should or should not retaliate but when, where and how. That argument was pegged on the obvious question of why Iran would use the known and expected window of 48 hours given by the United States and Israeli intelligence assessments.

The reason was simple: If the US, its allies like the UK, and Israel were expecting an attack within a window, their air defences and electronic countermeasures would be on high alert. They were and it was known.

Why then did Iran opt for the very time band where most of its DAMs and missiles were likely to be taken out? This question is also important because Iran knew (or must have known) that the US and its allies would use a broad range of its technical means to help Israel cope with the incoming threat. Post-attack reports say that’s exactly what happened. Israel’s own air defences were patched with US capabilities and the US made a huge contribution to foiling the attack.

Some reports suggest that Biden told Netanyahu that the US would not help Israel if the latter chose to counter the Iranian counterattack.

Two other points were also evident. In the event that Iran did attack, it would not use the capabilities of its affiliate groups in the Axis of Resistance, but would go for a direct Iran to Israel attack. Israel attacked Iran; Iran would directly hit back. Second, coupled with the symbolic and strategic signalling imperative of a direct attack, the preparedness of US-Israeli defences, the distance involved and the relatively smaller number of the aerial package, the chances of failure were fairly high. This would have been obvious to anyone observing the Russo-Ukraine War.  Clearly, Iran knew this.

Why then did Iran choose the very window where it was unlikely to cause much damage on the ground?

I believe two factors played a role here. One was a clear statement (also tweeted) by Iran’s supreme leader, Seyyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei, that Israel had attacked Iran and that its act would not go unpunished. This sentiment was subsequently echoed by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who also said that his country would take revenge on Israel.

This put Iran in a commitment trap problem. Once you are committed, publicly, you must follow through or lose face. Studies in higher and military strategy as well as business strategy have accumulated a sizeable literature on decision-making traps. Commitments, whether informed by heuristics, biases, or by ignoring alternative strategies, trap the decision-maker. Traps can also emerge from a miscalculation of costs. Be that as it may, Iran had trapped itself.

What about the window when the adversary would be most expecting the attack? There can be two possibilities. One, Iran had begun the planning and the execution had a timeline. This is plausible because the US-Israeli intelligence was likely grounded in full or partial knowledge of those plans and the timeline. Iran could have changed course but that’s where the commitment trap came in.

Two, Iran was retaliating for reasons of prestige, not so much deterrence. In other words, from Iran’s perspective the attack itself was more important than any results on the ground and the known and expected window problem did not matter. This becomes plausible given the post-attack Iranian statement drawing a line under its retaliatory attack to the effect that the attack has been successful and the matter is now closed for Iran, unless Israel retaliates.

Netanyahu is also playing domestic political poker. Even as the Iranian attack was underway, he seemed to have nudged his rightwing cabinet members to make noises about a retaliatory strike.

This position has also been adopted by US President Joe Biden who, while condemning Iran’s attack, told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “You got a win. Take the win.” Some reports also suggest that Biden told Netanyahu that the US would not help Israel if the latter chose to counter the Iranian counterattack.

What are the possible scenarios now?

To begin with, the region continues to teeter on the brink of a wider conflagration. At the time of writing this, Israel’s war cabinet was still to meet and the G7 virtual meet was to take place in a couple of hours.

Individual western countries and the European Union have issued strong condemnatory statements on Iran’s “reckless action.” However, words of support for Israel notwithstanding, it is clear that the US and its NATO allies do not want further horizontal or vertical escalation. There’s just too much risk involved in such a scenario. As I wrote yesterday, a spiral is like a stone in free fall. No one can control it. Rationally speaking, given the massive damage to the region and globally ex post, it’s better to manage the ballooning crisis ex ante.

Netanyahu and his rightwing government’s calculation is likely different. Already, the strike in Damascus and Iran’s counterattack have diverted attention from Gaza and Israeli violence, including settler violence, in Occupied Palestinian Territories. (As I write this, settler violence in Ramallah has shown an alarming spike.)

Second, Netanyahu is also playing domestic political poker. Even as the Iranian attack was underway, he seemed to have nudged his rightwing cabinet members to make noises about a retaliatory strike. 

Third, while Biden has reportedly told Netanyahu that the US would not help Israel if the latter strikes Iran, he does not seem to have given Netanyahu an ultimatum to stop, or else. In fact, one report quoting an Israeli official suggests that “US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin spoke on Saturday with his Israeli counterpart Yoav Gallant and asked that Israel notify the US ahead of any response against Iran”.

This opens up many possibilities for Israel, especially since Netanyahu has been itching to pull the US into a conflict with Iran for the past two decades. Attacking and neutralising Iran has been his single focus even before he became the prime minister. 

He could argue to his colleagues: this is a great opportunity, Biden told me that we should not retaliate and that the US would not help us. But what does that mean in real terms? If we strike Iran, Iran could either be deterred or forced into mounting a counterattack. If they strike us, they will most likely also strike US interests. The US needs us. In both cases it will have no option but to get into the fray.

Netanyahu’s calculation, however, could be that damage to Israel would precisely be the reason for the US to get into the conflict. Biden simply cannot allow Israel to be defeated. It’s a terribly cynical calculus but one that syncs with how Netanyahu wants to play the game.

The only possibility that could perhaps deter Israel is Iran’s statement that an Israeli counter would beget a much larger and more lethal response. That response could be a combination of Iran and Hezbollah acting in concert from Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Given the shorter distances and overwhelming numbers of missiles used, Israel’s air defence could be exhausted. If that happens, Iran’s response could draw blood at a much larger scale.

Some military experts have already noted that without US help on Saturday night, the Iranian attack would have caused much damage to Israeli military and civilian infrastructure on the ground. There’s also the problem of cost. At least one report puts the cost of Israeli air defence use at $1 billion.

Netanyahu’s calculation, however, could be that damage to Israel would precisely be the reason for the US to get into the conflict. Biden simply cannot allow Israel to be defeated. It’s a terribly cynical calculus but one that syncs with how Netanyahu wants to play the game.

Equally, as I wrote yesterday, a spiral can lead to several unintended consequences, most of which would be catastrophic. 

Iran has drawn a line under this episode, as has the US. The big question now is: would Israel too.

The writer has an abiding interest in foreign and security policies and life’s ironies.