At the 25th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests last month, Lt-Gen Khalid Kidwai (retd), the longest-serving former Director-General of the Strategic Plans Division, spoke about Pakistan’s nuclear strategy at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. Somewhat surprisingly, there has not been any critical appraisal of what he said and what his remarks mean for Pakistan’s approach and signalling.
For some perspective, Lt-Gen Kidwai’s remarks do not carry a disclaimer that what he said are his personal views. As the first and longest-serving DG-SPD, he, along with some of his successors, continues to remain involved with the SPD as the organisation’s braintrust. Secondly, the ISSI, where he spoke, is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs-funded think tank. Like other such government-funded bodies in Islamabad, the ISSI is not in the business of critically examining official policies and approaches — at least for the most part — but to provide a platform for voicing them.
Corollary: we have to take what Lt-Gen Kidwai said as a non-official official statement of Pakistan’s nuclear “strategic” thinking.
Let’s begin with reproducing the relevant points from Lt-Gen Kidwai’s 14.37-minute speech.
Pakistan has entered the second nuclear era, which began with the tests in May 1998 and continues till date. On that day, 25 years ago, Pakistan proved its nuclear weapons capability. The country now possesses a well-balanced triad — land, air and sea-based capabilities to deter any aggression from India.
While remaining within the larger philosophy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD), Pakistan has developed full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) horizontally through a triad; vertically, the spectrum encapsulates adequate range coverage from “zero” metres to 2,750 kms and destructive yields at three tiers: strategic, operational and tactical. India’s vast eastern and southern dimensions are, therefore, adequately covered.
Further, Pakistan retains the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a target-rich India, notwithstanding India’s indigenous or imported ballistic missile defence capability to include countervalue (assets of value but not military threat, such as cities/civilian population), counterforce (specific targets to limit damage but degrade military infrastructure, forces and command and communication nodes) and battlefield (close encounters) targets.
Let’s unpack this to see whether official (read: SPD) thinking, as articulated by Lt-Gen Kidwai, is a new, great idea or grounded in strategies that are dated and should best be interred.
I think it was the American psychologist Maslow who said that “To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” In the same vein, to men who are dealing with nuclear weapons and strategy, every solution seems to be about yields, from the very low to the very high. Or, to put it another way, every aggression must have a nuclear response. That this is obvious folly — and I am being charitable — should be evident. But for our present purpose it is important to lay out how.
Firstly, contrary to what Lt-Gen Kidwai asserts, his explication of what FSD means runs counter to CMD. Without going into a longer debate about deterrence, deterrence by punishment and/or by denial, let me posit a central point of contention, if you will, between punishment and denial schools in that order: when two states possess nuclear weapons, the cost of aggression, given the adversary’s retaliation, far, far outweighs any possible gains.
Put another way, the punishment is so severe as to totally nullify any gains that could be accrued. This was Bernard Brodie’s argument in The Absolute Weapon, a book he wrote and edited some months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “War and obliteration,” he argued, “are now completely synonymous” because the atomic bomb has altered the basic character of war itself.
If two states have nuclear weapons, neither can afford war. In a way this sails close to the idea of existential deterrence put forward by McGeorge Bundy, President John Kennedy’s National Security Advisor. JFK and his cabinet colleagues who handled the Cuban Missile Crisis came to believe, as Bundy articulated, that nuclear deterrence is a function of survivable arsenals. This “lesson” came from the deal: Soviet Union would dismantle the missiles and the US, in exchange, wouldn’t invade Cuba. Reason: neither could afford a nuclear war.
The deterrence-by-denial school and victory theorists (there’s an overlap here) are, interestingly, deterrence-pessimists! They believed (or still do, as we seem to have here) that deterrence could fail and therefore the United States should be prepared to fight and win a nuclear war. As Colin Gray put it, there’s no guarantee that deterrence would always work. Hence the need to figure out ways to fight and win a nuclear war. Gray did finally come round to the view that “nuclear use cannot readily be accommodated within the general theory of strategy”.
When JFK came to office, he wanted a review of Eisenhower’s New Look strategy, also known as Massive Response. MR rested on massive retaliation to any Soviet provocation regardless of whether such provocation was conventional or nuclear. It also conflated the centre and the periphery; in reality it soon became obvious that it could not deter ideological struggles in the Third World, the instability at the periphery. And those “provocations” could not be countered through a massive nuclear response. Hence the need for a review.
JFK’s review formulated a strategy that came to be known as Flexible Response. FR had two levels: at the higher, politico-strategic level it sought to harness diplomatic, political, economic, and military options to deter the enemy; at the military level it called for a graduated response, moving from the conventional (in case of a conventional attack) to deliberate escalation (threat of nuclear use or targeted nuclear strikes in case of conventional setbacks) to a general nuclear response, the threat of mutually assured destruction.
Let me, again, iterate that this is by no means an exhaustive take on the nuclear strategy literature which developed many theoretical variations on certain basic themes. But the point is that CMD depends on a realisation on both sides (India and Pakistan) that with nuclear weapons in play, neither has a war-fighting option.
As I have noted in a longer piece on deterrence for Dawn Magazine, India’s thinking that it can punish Pakistan within a small band before matters spiral and its attempt to actualise it through Cold Start — a doctrine that rests on a forward-leaning posture and Independent Battle Groups for short, sharp strikes against Pakistan — have muddied the waters.
This is what prompted Pakistan to develop Nasr, a short-range missile and move towards tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). SPD officers insist (as they have done with me privately for years!) that Nasr should not be seen as an offensive option but as a deterrent — i.e., by throwing Nasr into play, Pakistan has complicated India’s Cold Start war-gaming. While one understands the intent, the logic is flawed. For instance, it is not clear how and when Nasr gets into the game? At what point? Straight away or if there are any initial conventional setbacks?
Also, if India does operationalise one or two IBGs as part of CSD, it’s obvious that deterrence has failed at the theatre-tactical level — in other words, Nasr’s “tac” deterrence has failed. Would it at that point transition from a “deterrent” to an operational option? If so, what exactly could it achieve which strategic non-nuclear weapons cannot, especially if it manages to, as it surely would, escalate to the nuclear level? Pakistan would become the initiator of a nuclear strike, regardless of the strike being tactical. Even if one were to discount international opprobrium, Pakistan will have to dominate the escalation ladder.
Could this be, with Pakistan being presumably the weaker power, the very logic of the use of Nasr? India could choose, as has been noted by Indian writers, to go for a strategic countervalue or counterforce strike. One could argue, as presumably SPD thinkers do, that India’s decision to escalate to the strategic level will be balanced by Pakistan’s retaliatory capacity — i.e., because Pakistan could retaliate, India would be hard pressed to go for a strategic strike.
That may be so, but there’s no guarantee. If deterrence can fail at the theatre-tactical level, bringing into play tactical nukes, there are too many unknowns for an assurance that it would remain intact at the strategic level. If, as Lawrence Freedman noted, “There was no premium in initiating nuclear war” because “each arsenal cancelled out the other”, then deterrence must hold along the full spectrum. In any case, this would be akin to arguing that we would resuscitate deterrence at the strategic level through its breakdown at the lower order of conflict.
The situation reminds me of an episode, “The Grand Design” from Yes, Prime Minister. Jim Hacker, now PM, visits the Ministry of Defence. General Howard tells him that British forces could hold out against a Soviet attack for barely 72 hours and the purchase of Trident would enhance Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Hacker’s personal secretary, Bernard, advises Hacker to also speak to his Chief Scientific Advisor, played by Oscar Quitak. That exchange still remains relevant. Would Hacker press the button? Against whom? When and at what point? What constitutes the line where Hacker would push the button — “remember you have 12 hours.” What if the Russians are using salami tactics, slice by slice.
Hacker realises that he would only push the nuclear button if he were given no choice. But if the Russians were to use salami tactics, he will probably never push the nuclear button. Therefore, Quitak advises Hacker to cancel the purchase of Trident and use the money to build an effective conventional army with hi-tech weaponry.
Something similar is happening here, except there’s no Quitak to challenge the assumptions on which the nuclear establishment is building the country’s response.
Take another bit from Lt-Gen Kidwai’s speech: the spectrum encapsulates adequate range coverage from “zero” metres to 2,750 kms and destructive yields at three tiers: strategic, operational and tactical. This is graduated war-fighting by any definition! Certainly not CMD. What is “zero” metres? Atomic Demolition Munitions or Mines? The concept the US used for years before it realised how infeasible it was? And what’s with the absolutely “precise” 2750 km range? The ranges were kept secret or ambiguous. Why such precision now? If the idea is to signal that Andaman and Nicobar naval stations can be targeted, that can be managed without giving the precise range. Or is the precise range to assuage the US whose talking points with Pakistan include ICBM ranges? We are not clear and Lt-Gen Kidwai has offered no clarity on these points. Deliberate ambiguity?
Then we have the problem of destructive yields at three tiers. This is again, as far as the operational and tactical levels are concerned about war-fighting because if deterrence does fail, as noted above, how would these options be employed?
The US moved away from MR to FR and added tac weapons and SADMs to its arsenal to avoid two extreme ends: defeat in a conventional encounter and a disproportionate nuclear exchange. But as the debates and ultimate developments showed, the approach was flawed.
Indian thinking that it can fight a limited war and punish Pakistan is dangerous. Pakistan’s introduction of nuclear weapons at sub-strategic levels is a response to that thinking and, to use Lt-Gen Kidwai’s phrase, seeks through the illogic of instability to create the logic of strategic stability.
Deterrence already is coming under pressure because of emerging technologies. Lt-Gen Kidwai’s remarks offer an opportunity to debate these issues threadbare. Decisions in a conflict which has the potential to escalate become a matter of life and death for 240 million people. They cannot be left to a few in a closed club.
For some perspective, Lt-Gen Kidwai’s remarks do not carry a disclaimer that what he said are his personal views. As the first and longest-serving DG-SPD, he, along with some of his successors, continues to remain involved with the SPD as the organisation’s braintrust. Secondly, the ISSI, where he spoke, is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs-funded think tank. Like other such government-funded bodies in Islamabad, the ISSI is not in the business of critically examining official policies and approaches — at least for the most part — but to provide a platform for voicing them.
On that day, 25 years ago, Pakistan proved its nuclear weapons capability. The country now possesses a well-balanced triad — land, air and sea-based capabilities to deter any aggression from India.
Corollary: we have to take what Lt-Gen Kidwai said as a non-official official statement of Pakistan’s nuclear “strategic” thinking.
Let’s begin with reproducing the relevant points from Lt-Gen Kidwai’s 14.37-minute speech.
Pakistan has entered the second nuclear era, which began with the tests in May 1998 and continues till date. On that day, 25 years ago, Pakistan proved its nuclear weapons capability. The country now possesses a well-balanced triad — land, air and sea-based capabilities to deter any aggression from India.
While remaining within the larger philosophy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD), Pakistan has developed full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) horizontally through a triad; vertically, the spectrum encapsulates adequate range coverage from “zero” metres to 2,750 kms and destructive yields at three tiers: strategic, operational and tactical. India’s vast eastern and southern dimensions are, therefore, adequately covered.
Further, Pakistan retains the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a target-rich India, notwithstanding India’s indigenous or imported ballistic missile defence capability to include countervalue (assets of value but not military threat, such as cities/civilian population), counterforce (specific targets to limit damage but degrade military infrastructure, forces and command and communication nodes) and battlefield (close encounters) targets.
Let’s unpack this to see whether official (read: SPD) thinking, as articulated by Lt-Gen Kidwai, is a new, great idea or grounded in strategies that are dated and should best be interred.
If two states have nuclear weapons, neither can afford war. In a way this sails close to the idea of existential deterrence put forward by McGeorge Bundy, President John Kennedy’s National Security Advisor. JFK and his cabinet colleagues who handled the Cuban Missile Crisis came to believe, as Bundy articulated, that nuclear deterrence is a function of survivable arsenals.
I think it was the American psychologist Maslow who said that “To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” In the same vein, to men who are dealing with nuclear weapons and strategy, every solution seems to be about yields, from the very low to the very high. Or, to put it another way, every aggression must have a nuclear response. That this is obvious folly — and I am being charitable — should be evident. But for our present purpose it is important to lay out how.
Firstly, contrary to what Lt-Gen Kidwai asserts, his explication of what FSD means runs counter to CMD. Without going into a longer debate about deterrence, deterrence by punishment and/or by denial, let me posit a central point of contention, if you will, between punishment and denial schools in that order: when two states possess nuclear weapons, the cost of aggression, given the adversary’s retaliation, far, far outweighs any possible gains.
Put another way, the punishment is so severe as to totally nullify any gains that could be accrued. This was Bernard Brodie’s argument in The Absolute Weapon, a book he wrote and edited some months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “War and obliteration,” he argued, “are now completely synonymous” because the atomic bomb has altered the basic character of war itself.
If two states have nuclear weapons, neither can afford war. In a way this sails close to the idea of existential deterrence put forward by McGeorge Bundy, President John Kennedy’s National Security Advisor. JFK and his cabinet colleagues who handled the Cuban Missile Crisis came to believe, as Bundy articulated, that nuclear deterrence is a function of survivable arsenals. This “lesson” came from the deal: Soviet Union would dismantle the missiles and the US, in exchange, wouldn’t invade Cuba. Reason: neither could afford a nuclear war.
The deterrence-by-denial school and victory theorists (there’s an overlap here) are, interestingly, deterrence-pessimists! They believed (or still do, as we seem to have here) that deterrence could fail and therefore the United States should be prepared to fight and win a nuclear war. As Colin Gray put it, there’s no guarantee that deterrence would always work. Hence the need to figure out ways to fight and win a nuclear war. Gray did finally come round to the view that “nuclear use cannot readily be accommodated within the general theory of strategy”.
When JFK came to office, he wanted a review of Eisenhower’s New Look strategy, also known as Massive Response. MR rested on massive retaliation to any Soviet provocation regardless of whether such provocation was conventional or nuclear. It also conflated the centre and the periphery; in reality it soon became obvious that it could not deter ideological struggles in the Third World, the instability at the periphery. And those “provocations” could not be countered through a massive nuclear response. Hence the need for a review.
JFK’s review formulated a strategy that came to be known as Flexible Response. FR had two levels: at the higher, politico-strategic level it sought to harness diplomatic, political, economic, and military options to deter the enemy; at the military level it called for a graduated response, moving from the conventional (in case of a conventional attack) to deliberate escalation (threat of nuclear use or targeted nuclear strikes in case of conventional setbacks) to a general nuclear response, the threat of mutually assured destruction.
Let me, again, iterate that this is by no means an exhaustive take on the nuclear strategy literature which developed many theoretical variations on certain basic themes. But the point is that CMD depends on a realisation on both sides (India and Pakistan) that with nuclear weapons in play, neither has a war-fighting option.
As I have noted in a longer piece on deterrence for Dawn Magazine, India’s thinking that it can punish Pakistan within a small band before matters spiral and its attempt to actualise it through Cold Start — a doctrine that rests on a forward-leaning posture and Independent Battle Groups for short, sharp strikes against Pakistan — have muddied the waters.
This is what prompted Pakistan to develop Nasr, a short-range missile and move towards tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). SPD officers insist (as they have done with me privately for years!) that Nasr should not be seen as an offensive option but as a deterrent — i.e., by throwing Nasr into play, Pakistan has complicated India’s Cold Start war-gaming. While one understands the intent, the logic is flawed. For instance, it is not clear how and when Nasr gets into the game? At what point? Straight away or if there are any initial conventional setbacks?
Also, if India does operationalise one or two IBGs as part of CSD, it’s obvious that deterrence has failed at the theatre-tactical level — in other words, Nasr’s “tac” deterrence has failed. Would it at that point transition from a “deterrent” to an operational option? If so, what exactly could it achieve which strategic non-nuclear weapons cannot, especially if it manages to, as it surely would, escalate to the nuclear level? Pakistan would become the initiator of a nuclear strike, regardless of the strike being tactical. Even if one were to discount international opprobrium, Pakistan will have to dominate the escalation ladder.
Could this be, with Pakistan being presumably the weaker power, the very logic of the use of Nasr? India could choose, as has been noted by Indian writers, to go for a strategic countervalue or counterforce strike. One could argue, as presumably SPD thinkers do, that India’s decision to escalate to the strategic level will be balanced by Pakistan’s retaliatory capacity — i.e., because Pakistan could retaliate, India would be hard pressed to go for a strategic strike.
That may be so, but there’s no guarantee. If deterrence can fail at the theatre-tactical level, bringing into play tactical nukes, there are too many unknowns for an assurance that it would remain intact at the strategic level. If, as Lawrence Freedman noted, “There was no premium in initiating nuclear war” because “each arsenal cancelled out the other”, then deterrence must hold along the full spectrum. In any case, this would be akin to arguing that we would resuscitate deterrence at the strategic level through its breakdown at the lower order of conflict.
The situation reminds me of an episode, “The Grand Design” from Yes, Prime Minister. Jim Hacker, now PM, visits the Ministry of Defence. General Howard tells him that British forces could hold out against a Soviet attack for barely 72 hours and the purchase of Trident would enhance Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Hacker’s personal secretary, Bernard, advises Hacker to also speak to his Chief Scientific Advisor, played by Oscar Quitak. That exchange still remains relevant. Would Hacker press the button? Against whom? When and at what point? What constitutes the line where Hacker would push the button — “remember you have 12 hours.” What if the Russians are using salami tactics, slice by slice.
Hacker realises that he would only push the nuclear button if he were given no choice. But if the Russians were to use salami tactics, he will probably never push the nuclear button. Therefore, Quitak advises Hacker to cancel the purchase of Trident and use the money to build an effective conventional army with hi-tech weaponry.
Something similar is happening here, except there’s no Quitak to challenge the assumptions on which the nuclear establishment is building the country’s response.
Decisions in a conflict which has the potential to escalate become a matter of life and death for 240 million people. They cannot be left to a few in a closed club.
Take another bit from Lt-Gen Kidwai’s speech: the spectrum encapsulates adequate range coverage from “zero” metres to 2,750 kms and destructive yields at three tiers: strategic, operational and tactical. This is graduated war-fighting by any definition! Certainly not CMD. What is “zero” metres? Atomic Demolition Munitions or Mines? The concept the US used for years before it realised how infeasible it was? And what’s with the absolutely “precise” 2750 km range? The ranges were kept secret or ambiguous. Why such precision now? If the idea is to signal that Andaman and Nicobar naval stations can be targeted, that can be managed without giving the precise range. Or is the precise range to assuage the US whose talking points with Pakistan include ICBM ranges? We are not clear and Lt-Gen Kidwai has offered no clarity on these points. Deliberate ambiguity?
Then we have the problem of destructive yields at three tiers. This is again, as far as the operational and tactical levels are concerned about war-fighting because if deterrence does fail, as noted above, how would these options be employed?
The US moved away from MR to FR and added tac weapons and SADMs to its arsenal to avoid two extreme ends: defeat in a conventional encounter and a disproportionate nuclear exchange. But as the debates and ultimate developments showed, the approach was flawed.
Indian thinking that it can fight a limited war and punish Pakistan is dangerous. Pakistan’s introduction of nuclear weapons at sub-strategic levels is a response to that thinking and, to use Lt-Gen Kidwai’s phrase, seeks through the illogic of instability to create the logic of strategic stability.
Deterrence already is coming under pressure because of emerging technologies. Lt-Gen Kidwai’s remarks offer an opportunity to debate these issues threadbare. Decisions in a conflict which has the potential to escalate become a matter of life and death for 240 million people. They cannot be left to a few in a closed club.