Former US President Donald Trump's re-election seems to have sparked a glimmer of hope for a change amongst some in Afghanistan. For instance, the former US ambassador to Afghanistan and the architect on the US side of the 2020 Doha Agreement with the Taliban, Zalmay Khalilzad, sees an opportunity in Trump's return to the White House for the Doha Agreement's "full implementation." Others have also expressed opinions about how things might play out in Afghanistan under Trump 2.0.
Khalilzad probably knows better, more than anyone else, why the Taliban negotiated with the Americans: to evict them from Afghanistan, the Taliban's first and last goal. To save face as well as to give the impression that the US did not lose the war or abandon its collaborators in Afghanistan, the Americans included clauses such as fighting terrorism and intra-Afghan negotiations in the Doha Agreement. If empty commitments on a piece of paper could lead to the complete US withdrawal, 'why not sign the whole thing' seemed like the Taliban's overall approach to the Doha Agreement.
Did the Taliban lie to the world and hide their true colours then? Honesty has long been a rare commodity in matters of statecraft. That said, there may have been some Taliban negotiators who (at least partly) meant what they were saying. However, the more senior leadership centred around the Taliban's leader seemed to have no interest in endorsing US meddling in internal Afghan affairs.
With the Americans out of Afghanistan and no diplomatic ties existing between the two countries, it matters little from the Taliban's perspective as to who resides in the White House. Therefore, calls for the US to put pressure on the Taliban to change their attitude and policy will not work. If pressure on the Taliban worked, they would not exist today. But even if the US wanted to put pressure on the Taliban, its options would be limited. For instance, no country recognises the Taliban government, and Afghanistan's banking system is cut off from the rest of the world.
One might point to the weekly grant of $40 million that the UN brings to Afghanistan as leverage which the US can use against the Taliban. The problem, however, is that the money does not go to the Taliban. The Taliban would still survive even if the money stopped. One, however, cannot rule out the possibility of the US trying to weaponise the money against ordinary Afghans. The US has a rich history of using the dollar and sanctions as tools to starve millions around the world. Cuba since the 1960s and Iraq in the 1990s are good examples.
The Taliban's ban on girls' education is a tragedy that the Taliban must rectify as soon as possible. But they will not do so under pressure from foreigners. I can also understand the enthusiasm of those Afghans who benefitted immensely from the US occupation of Afghanistan as to why they would like to see the US involved in Afghanistan once again
Lastly, the fundamental problem that many "experts" on the Taliban suffer from is a lack of understanding of the Taliban. Although there are diverse views and perspectives among the Taliban, when it comes to making major decisions, it is their amir who is the ultimate authority. Even during their war against the US, when the Taliban had a decentralised decision-making approach to military affairs and battlefield engagements, their amir still set the overall policy.
The current Taliban amir, Mawlawi Hibat Ullah Akhundzada, resides quietly in Qandahar and does not usually meet with people who are not high-level Taliban officials. He is not known to be a fan of the media either. Hence his indifference to Taliban bashing by the media, especially outside Afghanistan. He already made it clear in his June 2022 address to religious scholars in Kabul that if there was a problem, he preferred the problem to be dealt with quietly behind the scenes, rather than through the media.
The Taliban's media performance in Kabul and their uttering of nice words to Afghans and foreigners alike might raise hopes and expectations. However, the Kabul-based Taliban have little decision-making authority when it comes to setting the Taliban's overall policy. As such, they are usually as unaware as a rancher in Texas as to when, for instance, girls' school will reopen beyond grade six.
I can understand the harsh reality of life for girls and women under the Taliban in Afghanistan and their desire to learn and work in their own country. The Taliban's ban on girls' education is a tragedy that the Taliban must rectify as soon as possible. But they will not do so under pressure from foreigners. I can also understand the enthusiasm of those Afghans who benefitted immensely from the US occupation of Afghanistan as to why they would like to see the US involved in Afghanistan once again.
Any change in Afghanistan should come from within Afghanistan. That is the only viable long-term solution. No country invades another country to liberate its women or put it on the path to development and prosperity. If such a thing has ever happened anywhere in the world, then I would like to see an example. Plus, the US right now is like a sinking ship. It can neither afford another costly invasion of Afghanistan, nor do its orders carry the same weight that they did 20 years ago. Therefore, Trump 2.0 will not matter much to the Taliban, as things stand right now.