In a realistic sense, politicians, and particularly the elected members of the parliament, cannot afford being in the opposition. They have to get things done in their constituencies that need governmental patronage. Arguably, inseparability of executive and legislature ruins transparency, meritocracy, and effective citizen-centered governance.
With the dissolution of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provincial assemblies, and a looming threat of depriving the federal government of a legitimate right to govern through a presidential move to require the vote of confidence, Imran Khan and his PTI have put an incredible political pressure on Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif and his allies. The country or at least a huge part of it is about to enter into electioneering mood. The absence of the top leadership of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz is playing havoc with the party’s electoral standing.
The real beneficiaries of the parliamentary system of government – the makers of the king – are smaller parties or independent parliamentarians. In 2008 elections, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) did win 98 seats but fell considerably short to attain the absolute majority. It fell prey to the smaller parties, like MQM, JUI-F, 19 independently elected parliamentarians, and others. The predatory practices by these smaller parties in the form of political blackmailing resulted in a palpable frustration in the top ranks of the PPP that was already at odds with the Supreme Court and security establishment, and finding it hard to deal with deteriorating economic conditions and internally-displaced people (IDPs), eventually allied with the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) of 53 seats with Parvez Elahi becoming the deputy prime minister. The blame for poor governance fell on the PPP, making it the real loser in the 2013 elections, wherein it could secure only 39 seats in total. Another loser was the PML-Q. It could win only two seats.
Similarly, in the 2013 elections, the PML-N won 126 seats and could make a simple majority with the help of independent members of the parliament. It then invited smaller and regional parties, obliging them through ministerial positions and access to government funds on preferred bases.
The smaller regional parties and independent parliamentarians maintain preferred access to government portfolios and funds, and remain immune to political fallout in the next elections. They ally with any party in the parliament with no repentance of their past antagonistic relationships.
The PTI did not win a majority in the parliament in the 2018 general elections. It had to compromise on several electoral and political pledges to accommodate the MQM, BAP, PML-Q, GDA, 13 independently elected members, and other parties represented by sole members.
Instability was written on the wall. Every single party asked for more than the due share in the government. When the MQM and BAP switched the isle, the Imran Khan government lost the confidence of majority members.
Currently, there are infamous 13 parties forming a coalition government. However, since the PML-N holds the premiership, all blame of bad governance is falling on it.
The smaller regional parties and independent parliamentarians maintain preferred access to government portfolios and funds, and remain immune to political fallout in the next elections. They ally with any party in the parliament with no repentance of their past antagonistic relationships. They may fully participate in promoting government instability and intensifying political conflict in the country, and still may carry no baggage of legacy. While in the government, these regional smaller parties and independent parliamentarians offer no meaningful reforms in governance structure, lead no policy debate, and offer no effective input in the legislative process, except voting according to prime minister’s directives.
They complain about the scarcity of funds and easy access to government leaders. Their primary focus is their own constituency where, unfortunately, a complex amalgamation of multilayered factors, such as clan-based political affiliations and ethno-cultural prejudices, generate a myopic understanding of the national policy challenges.
Since they are the makers of the king, they are at mercy of powers that be. The non-constitutional forces of the country rally them around the person or party they like.
Unfortunately, the 1997 experiment of heavy mandate has resulted in an abrupt end of democracy in the country. Since then, no one party has won any election singlehandedly. The consequence of this dispersion of opinion on small and non-party lines is that Pakistan is lacking national political parties.
Arguably, except the PTI, no one party can claim its effective electoral representation across Pakistan. Even the PTI lacks effective parliamentary power in Balochistan. The PML-N is limited primarily to Punjab whereas the PPP holds Sindh. In KP, the PTI has been the most powerful political party and its recent rapid rise in Punjab is threatening the PML-N’s long-term objectives.
The PTI also has governments in Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. It is being reported that the PTI’s parliamentarians from South Punjab are being encouraged to make another political party to win elections and then merge it with the PPP or support it in the national assembly for next premiership.
Given the fact that no one party is currently capable of sweeping national elections and making a stable government of its own, and that smaller political parties are capable of shaking the system, Pakistan is ripe to experience years of this built-in political instability. It is imperative to understand the dynamics of the system and how it favours elitism in the country. It can be challenged by only populist narratives that focus on redefining the system and rewriting the rules of the game -- to promote constitutional democracy.
The writer is a Lecturer at Bush School of Government & Public Service, Texas A&M University, USA. He can be approached at slashari@tamu.edu