April 13 was the first direct Iranian attack on the sovereign Zionist state that put Israel in a conundrum as to how to respond to Tehran’s audacity. This leads many to question and discuss the response options available to Israel. Notwithstanding the significance of Israel’s response, this direct hit raised a larger question: how would this impact and guide Iran’s conduct in the region?
Israel’s airstrike on the Iranian embassy in Damascus on April 1 resulted in the killing of key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials, which called for Iranian reprisal. Iran urged the West to support an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and to support a UNSC statement condemning Israel’s strike in Damascus, and gave a warning for the weekend strike. Without any heed from the West, Iran fired a salvo of more than 300 drones and missiles—the largest drone attack—which was intercepted by a combination of Israel’s defences and assistance from allies. Iran’s retaliation demonstrated Tehran’s capability of signalling and reach. The telegraphing of these attacks in advance provided Israel with with a significant amount of time to prepare and intercept, which explains the success of Israel’s defences. Regardless of the efficiency of Israeli defences, the strike made a statement. As a consequence, it has emboldened Iran in the region.
"We blocked. We intercepted. Together, we will win," was how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu assessed things. But the weekend strike put Israel in a conundrum. Israel is facing serious a degradation of deterrence that started with Hamas’ attack. Moreover, its allies, such as the US and the UK, do not seek escalation, and rather believe in putting pressure on Iran with further sanctions. However, not responding would leave Israel look weak and would embolden Iran. In fact, even if Israel responded, sooner or later, Iran would react, which would be a testament to Iran’s emboldenment.
At the military-operational level, Israeli gains against Hamas regional brigades are appreciable, but have not succeeded in wiping out Hamas from the Strip yet. The situation on the ground is perilous.
The Hamas attacks of 7 October eroded Israel’s deterrence, which has not been established since then, and an Iranian strike further pierced it. At the political level, Israel could not establish itself as a credible force post-7/10 against Hamas in terms of addressing the heavy toll of civilian casualties, efficient management of relief operations, and garnering international support. The poor management of the relief and reconstruction operations is telling us that in the future Gazan political setup, Israel cannot be trusted as an effective stakeholder.
At the military-operational level, Israeli gains against Hamas regional brigades are appreciable, but have not succeeded in wiping out Hamas from the Strip yet. The situation on the ground is perilous. Israel is still struggling to retrieve all of its hostages and trying its best to destroy Hamas, whereas Hamas has established itself as a force to negotiate with, albeit through intermediaries, and is far from completely destroyed. This indicates a degradation of Israeli strategy.
To establish its credentials, Israel needs to focus on Gaza instead of responding to Iran. Iran’s strike is a distraction for Israel’s “total victory,” therefore, considering a quick response would distract Israel from Gaza and whatever it has achieved so far against Hamas. Nevertheless, the extent of Tehran's unprecedented strike would continue to haunt Israel until it embarked upon a fitting response.
To stay put is not an option that gels with Israel’s image in the region. Therefore, for Israel, there are a range of options to target, such as a direct hit on Iranian nuclear and military installations, cyber-attacks on facilities, the target assassination of Iranian commanders outside Iran, such as the US strike that assassinated Soleimani, or continuing with the old tactics of targeting Iran’s proxies in the region.
Targeting and neutralising deeply buried nuclear installations such as Natanz would surely be a miss for Israel. This is real life, not Top Gun: Maverick.
This could be an opportune time to target accelerating Iran’s nuclear program - the target is of great interest to many in the region and in neighbouring regions - but this would be a flagrant declaration of war for which neither Israel nor its allies are prepared. Targeting and neutralising deeply buried nuclear installations such as Natanz would surely be a miss for Israel. This is real life, not Top Gun: Maverick.
Therefore, even mounting such an impossible and impenetrable attack would prove to be a strategic mistake for Israel, as it would unleash conflict deeper and wider across the region, eroding any potential for regional support for Israel in the future. In the same line of argument, any target on Iran’s territory would be high-risk. The military sites and commanders situated deep inside Iran are lucrative high-value targets, and hitting them would be a proportionate part of Israel’s response—a direct-hit-for-direct-hit.
However, attacking sites and commanders inside Iranian territory would escalate the conflict and could convince Tehran to restrict its further response to direct attacks on Israel and not to involve its regional proxies. Even Biden does not want to directly hit Iran, but anything less than that would make Israel look weak.
Moreover, any further attack on Iranian commanders outside Iran could result in what we have witnessed this weekend. Furthermore, the IRGC would have changed their operations and hid their commanders in anticipation of such an attack. And if that happens, then the chances of Israel’s successful attack will further diminish.
Israel could wait and build a regional coalition against Iran or relay political support sufficient to carry out an attack inside Iran’s territory. But given the manner in which Israel has been conducting combat operations since 7/10 against Palestinians, the possibility of a regional coalition or political support seems low. Iran is clearly emboldened.
Tehran has just displayed its military capability and political will to carry out its largest ever drone and missile attack, which has rendered credibility and strength to its deterrence.
Besides Israel’s conundrum, the gradual deepening of Iran’s influence in the region is another factor that would embolden Tehran. Over the years, Iran has successfully established its network with non-state entities across the region, which provides Tehran with deeper and wider influence. According to an extensive study by the International Institute of Strategic Studies on Iran’s network of influence, through its proxies, such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, different militant groups in the Gulf states, and Shia militias in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran has achieved its objectives with minimum casualties and direct hits on its territory.
Likewise, Iran has successfully used its soft power, cyber domain, and financing of its partners to strengthen its influence and power projection. Furthermore, Tehran has just displayed its military capability and political will to carry out its largest ever drone and missile attack, which has rendered credibility and strength to its deterrence.
Overall, the weekend strike has changed the rules of confrontation between Iran and Israel, as from now on it will be more direct with less emphasis on proxies. The Iran hit at Israel is strategic. If it invites Israel’s retaliation by successfully hitting and dismantling the Iranian nuclear program or its key military installations, then it would prove to be a strategic miscalculation for Tehran.
However, if there is no response or low-risk response from Israel, then it would be a strategic move for Iran’s emboldenment. Either way, the resultant stakes are very high, but the latter option appears obvious. However, given the limitations that Israel’s deterrence has exhibited since 7/10, it is key for Netanyahu to focus on Gaza and incorporate the political dimension into Israel's approach and consider compromise, as well as display resilience by accommodating stakeholders such as the Palestinian Authority and Hamas in reconstructing, governing, and securing the Strip in the future, instead of being distracted by Iranian direct hits. This will bolster Israel’s credibility as well as serve as a hedge against the recuperation of the Hamas threat and provide ample time to prepare a calibrated response strategy to deal with Iran directly.