It began a year ago, on October 7, 2023, when Hamas guerrillas breached Israeli security, attacked a music concert, and killed and kidnapped Israeli citizens from various locations. The world was quick to condemn this action; no one of sound mind, regardless of their anti-Israeli sentiments, could celebrate the killing of innocents. Ironically, the casualties in Gaza resulting from a year-long Israeli campaign are also predominantly innocent civilians—almost 50,000. This is a classic cause-and-effect story that has roots nearly a century deep.
Without delving into the extensive history of this discord, which is readily available online, we will focus on the current scenario that has developed over the past year. Hamas and Hezbollah are two Iranian proxies in the region—one in Gaza and the other in Lebanon. Both organisations began with political aims, contesting elections and coming to power before establishing their respective militias, ostensibly with the support of Iran. Thus, it was only natural for Israel to target their leadership. They commenced with the assassination of an Iranian diplomat in Damascus, followed by the death of the Iranian president in a helicopter crash, the targeted killing of Ismail Haniyeh during the inauguration of Ibrahim's successor in Tehran, and finally the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon.
The pattern of conflict engagement exhibited from both sides has been to display caution—at least for now. Iran's two missile attacks on Israel were carefully executed to ensure no civilian casualties. Meanwhile, Israel's actions have been precise. This evident caution and reluctance to inflict indiscriminate damage may stem from domestic political needs, as well as international political design. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu finds himself on shaky political ground; for his political survival, a continuation of the war and a decisive Israeli victory are imperative. Not much has been achieved towards this goal, despite turning much of Gaza into rubble—Hamas still holds a significant number of Israeli hostages.
Conversely, in Iran, the Shiite Islamic regime led by Ayatollah Khamenei faces dissent and resentment from various sectors of society, particularly among the more liberal urban middle class and women. For the regime, failure to respond to Israel's actions is not an option. Both Iran and Israel are acutely aware of each other's political needs and compulsions—their respective survival hinges on an ongoing engagement, and treading the precarious path with caution. Thus, the war must persist, but cautiously, avoiding injuries severe enough to transform a so-far mild contest into a deadly conflict. As the situation escalates, Netanyahu has cleverly sent a message out to the Iranian people: we are not waging war against the people of Iran but against the Iranian regime. Once the Iranian regime is toppled, the Muslims of Faras (Iran) and the Jews of Israel shall co-exist peacefully as they did in the old times.
With the Americans focused on their elections, it appears to be an opportunity for Iran to develop its bomb within weeks
Israel's predicament is more complex than that of Iran. It is not merely a matter of Netanyahu's political survival; for Israel, maintaining its image as a regional hegemon is at stake. Withdrawing from Gaza or allowing Hezbollah to retain its power would result in a status quo that would intensify pressures on the already contentious idea of a two-state solution, which Israel vehemently opposes. Consequently, the war must be decisive, requiring the US to deploy troops alongside the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). However, the US has refused to support any direct action against Iran.
The spectre of China and Russia looms large in this context. While China has remained quiet thus far, Russia sent a high-level delegation to Tehran, led by their Prime Minister, a day before Iran launched its second missile attack on Israel. In my show Talking Politics on YouTube, Dr Hasnain Javed posited that the Russian economy expanded during the Ukraine war, with oil sales surging as India and China purchased Russian oil at discounted rates following the US and its Western allies' export bans. Infamously, the US economy has also benefited from the wars in the last four decades, as defence sales have surged. Dr Javed has termed these phenomena "the war economies" of Russia and the US.
However, the pressing question remains: will these powers' economies truly benefit from a potentially larger conflict in the Middle East?
So far, the calculations do not support this notion—politically or economically. As most of the oil-producing countries are situated in this region, an all-out war will mean a serious oil crisis in the entire world, halting industrial production, raising transport costs, and severely affecting the lives of ordinary people everywhere. In the midst of all this, the central issue is Iran's nuclear programme. With the Americans focused on their elections, it appears to be an opportunity for Iran to develop its bomb within weeks—as reports suggest it is only a few weeks away from assembling the bomb—and Israel finds it tempting to obliterate Iran's nuclear facilities to bury the matter once and for all. But for this, Israel needs the US nod, and their material support on the ground. If this is true, then the next eight to twelve weeks are critical for whatever action both Iran and Israel are aiming at—before a new administration takes office in the White House with a fresh mandate to make decisive decisions.
A crippled US economy is not in China's interest either because of their humongous bilateral trade volume. In this scenario, where a prolonged engagement in the Middle East would be detrimental for both Israel and the US, both militarily and politically, China, the main rival of the US, would be wary of seeing the US economy falter
Additionally, the US and its NATO allies are already embroiled in a significant conflict in Ukraine against Russia, where they face shortages of ammunition and direct nuclear threats. Furthermore, US forces have spent three long decades in Iraq and Afghanistan, making another Middle Eastern engagement likely to provoke a strong backlash domestically—the Democrats would certainly be reluctant to risk this so close to the elections.
It is also important to note that Iran and Israel are separated by several hundred miles, with Jordan in between. This geographical reality makes it unlikely for their armies to confront each other directly, placing Iran at a disadvantage. In the event of an all-out war between the two nations, air power would play a decisive role, an area in which Israel has a clear advantage. Still, the ongoing threat from Hezbollah remains, with its well-equipped force of over 50,000 trained militia, continuing to receive arms from Iran, and possibly from Russia and North Korea. It is conceivable that these countries would prefer to see the US embroiled in a larger conflict in the Middle East, thereby diverting its focus and resources away from Eastern Europe and the South China Sea, where US interests are paramount. However, Dr Javed raised a pivotal point that a crippled US economy is not in China's interest either because of their humongous bilateral trade volume. In this scenario, where a prolonged engagement in the Middle East would be detrimental for both Israel and the US, both militarily and politically, China, the main rival of the US, would be wary of seeing the US economy falter, let alone disrupting the oil supply for its industrial and domestic needs.
Therefore, whatever actions Israel needs to take, it must take these considerations into account. However, the dilemma is that any hesitation will provide Iran with the space it needs to develop its nuclear weapon. So, the question remains: can Israel entertain other nations' worries when its own security is under existential threat? Meaning that Israel has to decide swiftly. Will this entail the use of a nuclear bomb against Hezbollah? Or will it involve targeting Iran's nuclear facilities?
While all parties are occupied with their respective calculations, the real peril lies in the possibility of miscalculations that could dramatically alter the scale and scope of this conflict, fundamentally reshaping the geopolitical landscape. The stakes are extraordinarily high, with the potential for a regional war that could have far-reaching consequences not just for the Middle East, but for global stability as well.
The question of who truly wants this war remains. Is it Iran seeking to bolster its influence in the region and find an opportunity to develop its nuclear weapon? Is it Israel, striving to maintain its security and dominance in the region and taking this opportunity to destroy Iran's nuclear programme? Or is it the great powers, each with their own interests and agendas, playing a dangerous game that could spiral out of control? As tensions mount, the world watches, and the hope is that cooler heads will prevail before this conflict escalates beyond anyone's control.